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ABSTRACT 
 
Current liberal discourse relies upon a fundamentally categorical distinction 
between the public and the private in both the practice and critique of 
democratic government. A separation of the public/private modes of social 
organization is quintessential: the state and the corporation are supposed to 
inhabit separate arenas and act exclusively in the public or private interest. On 
this premise, broadly based on laissez-faire doctrine, the public/private 
distinction further attempts to keep governmental regulation of corporations’ 
activities to a minimum level in order to maximize national wealth and 
individual liberty. It is evident, however, that these ideas lost much of their 
practical significance over the course of the twentieth century, with the rise of 
the welfare entrepreneurial state, and later, the adoption of the neoliberal 
modes of governance that enacted particularly through privatization. A re-
appraisal of the public/private distinction thus becomes necessary in order to 
bring it into correspondence with the increasing assimilation and cooperation 
between the state and the corporation in promoting and protecting the public 
interest.  
 
 
Having juxtaposed the intellectual history of the public/private distinction with 
those of the state and the corporation in a chronological narrative, this thesis 
seeks to demonstrate that the state and the corporation was not separated by 
reference to the public/private distinction until the late eighteenth century. A 
key marker, it is argued, is to be found in the metropolitan public discourse 
surrounding the transformation of the East India Company into a local 
sovereign power in India. A significant segment of public opinion of that time, 
mostly exemplified in Edmund Burke’s public speeches, held that the 
governance should be institutionally separated from the commerce to avoid 
the possible erosion of the public interest by the private interest. The 
public/private distinction thus turned into an artificial rubric for defining the 
separate roles and characteristics of the state and the corporation, which in 
turn served to obscure the complex social interlinkage and the inherent 
similarity between them. An alternative to this pseudo-distinction, as proposed 
in the end of this thesis, is to avail a nuanced version of individualism to 
reconceptualize the relationship between the state and the corporation.     
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Is there a genus of which the state and the corporation are species? This 
thesis argues that, perhaps, there is, and redefining the public/private 
distinction might have a crucial role to play in recognizing this 
homogeneity between the state and the corporation. The term 
'corporation' is used here to refer to a particular form of human 
association that stands beyond its individual members and has its own 
distinctive personality, which means it is recognized by law as capable of 
having its own rights and performing its own duties.2 In current legal and 
political discourses, state activities are viewed as different from the 
activities of the corporation in the sense that they occur in separate 
realms with opposite aims and principles. While the state should perform 
the duty of governance strictly based on the public law in the clear-
defined public realm exclusively for public welfare; the corporations are 
supposed to exercise in the rest sphere of private market, subject to the 
terms of the private law, and pursue their individual profits at their free 
wills. One of the key analytical markers that distinguish the state from 
the corporation, thus, is that the state is, by definition, ‗public‘ and the 
corporation is ‗private‘.   
 
This clear-cut distinction between the state and the corporation, or 
between the public and private modes of social organization, is 
fundamental to Western legal and political thought. In modern political 
theory, it directly relates to the answer to the most essential question of 
what constitutes the legitimate boundaries of state authority. In the field 
of law, the logical corollary of the public/private distinction is the 
                                        
2  See generally John Patterson Davis, Corporations: A Study of the Origin and 
Development of Great Business Combinations and of Their Relation to the Authority of 
the State (GP Putman's Sons 1905); Frederick Hallis, Corporate Personality: A Study in 
Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press 1930); Frederic William Maitland, State, Trust 
and Corporation (David Runciman and Magnus Ryan eds, Cambridge University Press 
2003). 
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distinction between the public law and the private law, both in the 
common law system and the civil law system. Its content includes, on 
one side, as the product of modern political theory of sovereignty and 
constitutionalism, the recognition of the state as the sole reservoir of all 
political power and the imposition of the strict requirements on the state‘s 
actions, subjecting them to operate within the prescribed boundary of 
governance and to adhere to the tenets of public law. On the other side, 
the public/private distinction, based upon the liberal doctrine of laissez 
faire, provides the fundamental rationale for government regulations on 
market. Laissez-faire doctrine holds that the ‗optimal environment‘ for 
corporation‘s activities to produce maximum national wealth is identical to 
keeping the state regulation of the market to the lowest/essential level to 
sustain a well-functioned free market. In this sense, the public/private 
distinction  reflects the strong opposition to a paternalist governmental 
style, since it indicates that the proper role of government in relation to 
market should be a reluctant regulator and a cautious policy maker, 
serving to promote healthy competition and redistribute justice. It should 
never participate in the market itself as a private actor akin to the 
corporation. The public/private distinction thus works as a rubric for 
defining and separating the different characters of the state and the 
corporation, state administration and market economy, or generally, 
politics and economy. 
 
However, it is apparent that since the twentieth century the public/private 
distinction no longer resonates with the political and practical realities. 
For one thing, the state has been deeply involved in the business of the 
market under the comfortable name of providing ‗public goods‘. Many 
new terms also emerged accordingly to describe this new state role-play, 
such as ‗government engaged in a proprietary activity‘ and the 
‗entrepreneurial state‘ (state capitalism).3 Although the phenomenon of 
                                        
3 Entrepreneurial state (state capitalism) is a term employed to describe the managerial 
and entrepreneurial role of the state in the private market: in order to achieve national 
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public enterprise has its deep roots historically in initiatives to control and 
exploit natural resources, it was only after World War II with the rise of 
welfare state that this phenomenon became a prevalent feature 
throughout the world, and the main hallmark is the processes of 
‗nationalization‘. 4  The central justification behind nationalization was a 
general political belief that collectivist economic policy would provoke a 
fundamental change in the distribution of power, engendering a new 
socioeconomic equilibrium and ‗genuine‘ industrial democracy. 5  Some 
economic theories also justified nationalization as a way to promote 
national economic growth. 6  In terms of the legitimacy issues, the 
governments resorted to the notion of the ‗public interest‘ in justifying 
their actions by reference to legislative authority.  
 
Nationalization apparently liquidated the strict separation of private law 
and public law. From the private law viewpoint, it is the question of 
whether contract law and company law, which originally developed to 
regulate private corporations, should be applied equally to the public 
enterprise in market. From the public law viewpoint, since public 
enterprises generally have monopolies over certain activities or the 
provision of certain goods and services, it is reasonable to require that in 
exercising these monopolies, they should be subject to some extra ‗public 
accountability‘ in addition to the general requirements of the private law. 
                                                                                                           
economic growth, the state either operates nationalized industries or intervenes heavily 
in the operation of private firms.  
4  See generally Pier Angelo Toninelli, ‗The Rise and Fall of Public Enterprise: The 
Framework‘ in Pier Angelo Toninelli (ed), The Rise and Fall of State-Owned Enterprise in 
the Western World (Cambridge University Press 2000) 3-24. 
5 Some social responsibilities of the state might be achieved as a result, including the 
guarantee of full employment, better working conditions, or an improvement in 
industrial relations. See ibid.  
6 There are several types of economic theories that promote nationalization: (1) natural 
monopoly theory argues that a public enterprise of monopoly would produce cheaper 
without predatory measures to hold off potential market entrants; (2) the development 
theory argues that the public enterprise could make its decision on the basis of long-
term considerations and foster modernization in the underdeveloped countries or 
regions; and (3) the theory of industry bailout suggests that through nationalization, the 
state could rescue private businesses affected by deep and irreversible economic crises 
and solve social issues such as employment. See ibid.  
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Yet nationalization should also be viewed as part of the general trend of 
government‘s extending of functions. Indeed, even predated 
nationalization, the government has already used its bargaining and 
contractual powers to achieve extraneous policy objectives. 7  And a 
general shift has long been identified from governmental use of 
regulation, to governmental use of wealth to secure its policy objectives.8 
These extended functions of government are also arguably responsible 
for obstructing the consistence of public law. As a consequence, there 
have emerged many individual areas of law that blend the elements of 
both public law and private law, such as those relating to public health, 
the highways, the social insurance, the education, and the provision of 
gas, water, and electricity. More significantly, the public/private distinction 
could no longer state its original credo that governmental interventions 
should be strictly limited, since almost all modern governments have 
adopted interventionist policies of one form or another. Here is the rub of 
the fundamental principle of public law in preventing the government 
from intervening in the market: inasmuch as the government could justify 
‗scientifically‘ that its policies and activities in the market are efficient and 
beneficial to the public, there seems no limit. To ensure these new 
governmental functions will not jeopardize democracy, legal controls 
might not be enough, parliamentary supervision and citizen participation 
through advisory committees are all essential.  
 
The blurring of the public/private distinction has been intensified by the 
current prevalence of the neoliberal privatization movement, as the 
private corporation is now providing public services. The neoliberal 
privatization movement, which generally refers to the delegation to 
private businesses of fundamental tasks that traditionally associated with 
government, has gained a great momentum in the past decades. 
                                        
7 JWF Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law: A Historical and 
Comparative Perspective on English Public Law (Clarendon Press 1996) 85-86.  
8 ibid. Also see PP Graig, Public Law and Democracy in the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America (Oxford University Press 1990).   
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Privatization, like other new modes of governance, such as the 
marketization of bureaucracy, the adoption of business models for public 
management, and the public-private partnerships (PPPs), represents an 
effort to reform the inefficient welfare state by introducing market 
mechanisms and incentives into governance in the hope for lower costs 
and better services.9  The basic ambition behind it is to transform the 
bureaucratic system of government into an entrepreneurial system, 
replacing the monopolistic control with the market control.10 It has been 
theoretically justified by neoliberalism, whose major theme is to ‗discover 
how far and to what extend the formal principles of a market economy 
can index a general art of government‘.11 Neoliberalism also casts doubt 
upon the authority of centralized power: Hayekian theorization of the 
centralized power as redundant has provoked a renewed enthusiasm for 
private enterprises and market mechanism. Nonetheless, privatization 
does not necessarily mean the dying of the welfare state. As one 
American scholar has observed, ‗Reagan didn‘t, and couldn‘t, kill the 
Nanny State. But he did replace our old familiar nanny with a commercial 
upstart, a nanny corporation as it were.‘12 
 
On the face of it, privatization seems to test the traditional boundary 
between the public sector and the private sector by creating a so-called 
'Fourth Branch of Government'.13 But making public actions ‗private‘ is not 
                                        
9 These reforms have been bracketed under the name New Public Management (NPM), 
for a current literature review on the NPM, see JC Thomas, Citizen, Customer, Partner: 
Engaging the Public in Public Management (M. E. Sharpe 2012).  
10 For the origination of this idea, see Alfred D Chandler and Herman Daems (eds), 
Managerial Hierarchies: Comparative Perspectives on the Rise of the Modern Industrial 
Enterprise (Harvard University Press 1980); David Obsorne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing 
Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector (Perseus 
Books 1992).  
11 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979 
(Springer 2008) 129. 
12 Jon D Michaels, Constitutional Coup: Privatization‘s Threat to the American Republic 
(Harvard University Press 2017) 2-3. 
13 The 'Fourth Branch' is now used to describe the private contractor in the privatization, 
though it is quite ironic that the term has originally used to refer to independent 
agencies that the President was trying to rein in. Paul R Verkuil, Valuing Bureaucracy: 
The Case for Professional Government (Cambridge University Press 2017) 12.   
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an auto-dichotomous choice, as the transfer of power to private hands 
often comes with specified strings attached, including procedural controls, 
oversight and accountability.14 The question of how to keep the public 
checks on the private agents that perform public functions now is a 
general concern. Failure to do so might cause the sacrifice of the 
democratic value for efficiency: this means that the privatization might 
encourage more ‗rent-seeking‘ behaviors of the corporation, and that the 
corporation gains lucrative profit at the public expense.15 The full range of 
responsibilities that government faces in privatization and the degree and 
level of those delegations have not yet been fully understood and 
carefully clarified. Many of the benefits of privatization, especially in 
infrastructure sectors, could only be achieved as long as an appropriate 
regulatory framework has been established by the government and well 
enforced by the effective judiciary.16 But the existing legal patterns are 
obviously not enough in fulfilling this task, and there is the calling for 
creativity in designing more flexible means to hold the private actors 
accountable.  
 
Nonetheless, privatization underscored once again the strong social 
influence of modern corporations, which has long been contributing to 
the controversy on the public/private distinction from another perspective. 
In the name of a wide array of concerns about ‗public interest‘, the 
government has long been intervened heavily into the regulation of the 
market and the operation of the corporation: those include promoting the 
long-term sustainable investment in the corporation development,  
requiring the corporation to take responsibility for environmental issues, 
                                        
14 Paul R Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty: Why Privatization of Government Functions 
Threatens Democracy and What We Can Do about It (Cambridge University Press 2007) 
80–81. 
15 See Alfred C Aman, The Democracy Deficit: Taming Globalization through Law Reform 
(New York University Press 2004); Jody Freeman, ‗Extending Public Law Norms Through 
Privatization‘ (2003) 116 Harvard Law Review 1285. 
16  Mariana Mota Proda, ‗Regulatory Choices in the Privatization of Infrastructure‘, in 
Simon Chesterman and Angelina Fisher (eds), Private Security, Public Order: The 
Outsourcing of Public Services and Its Limits (Oxford University Press 2009). 
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and holding the corporation accountable to public welfare. These 
concerns often prompt radical bills that require the corporation to both 
hold extensive social responsibilities externally and democratize its 
governance structure internally. They implicitly abandon the laissez-faire 
belief, the fundamental underpinning the public/private distinction.  
 
The problematic of the corporation in association with the public/private 
distinction is even more complicated at international level, mostly 
reflected by those heated debates on the proper regulation of 
multinational corporations (MNCs). It has been argued that it is precisely 
the adoption of the liberal framework of the public/private distinction by 
international law that has resulted the current difficulty in subjecting 
multinational corporations (MNCs) directly to it. 18  Specifically, the 
adoption of the public/private structure results international law treating a 
corporation as identical to a national of a state, and the sole subject of 
international law is the sovereign-state. MNCs are thus are ‗invisible‘ in 
international law.19 However, as modern era of economic globalization is 
marked by the enormous political and economic power that have 
acquired by MNCs, they now have been regarded as a potential threat to 
the global political order: while having the ability to breach the 
fundamental norms of international law, they are only indirectly 
                                        
18  Fleur E Johns, ‗The Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: an Analysis of 
International Law and Legal Theory‘ (1994) 19 Melbourne University Law Review 893; A 
Claire Cutler, ‗Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law 
and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy‘ (2001) 27 Review of International Studies 133; 
A Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler and Tony Poter (eds), Private Authority and 
International Affairs (State University of New York Press 1999).  About the liberal 
foundation of international law in general, see Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to 
Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge University Press 
2005); Fernando Teson, ‗The Kantian Theory of International Law‘ (1992) 92 Columbia 
Law Review 53. For critics of this viewpoint, see Gerry J. Simpson, ‗Imagined Consent: 
Democratic Liberalism in International Legal Theory‘, 15 (1994), 103; Anne-Marie 
Slaughter and Jose E. Alvarez, ‗A Liberal Theory of International Law‘, Proceedings of 
the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), 94 (2000), 240–53.  
19 This view has been confirmed by Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd, Belgium 
v Spain [1970] ICJ 3, para 70.  
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accountable to international law through the agent of the state.20 More 
seriously, ethnographical studies have even revealed that some MNCs are 
exercising de factor sovereign power in the third countries: this is 
particularly with regard to many ‗development projects‘ in the source-rich 
developing countries, where MNCs (who are originally based in developed 
countries or on behalf of them) are providing vital infrastructural services 
and security operations. 21  MNCs also involve deeply into international 
human rights issues both as a good role and as a bad role. For example, 
they have been viewed as a major source of global environmental harm 
as well as a leading source of technology to combat environmental 
problems.22 In regarding these issues, many ‗soft‘ responsibilities, and on 
rare occasion, ‗hard‘ obligations have been imposed on MNCs, but the 
public/private distinction blocks any potentiality in renewing the subject 
doctrine to systematically accommodate MNCs within international law. 
International law thus is argued experiencing a legitimacy crisis.23  
 
 
It is therefore to be expected that, where the developments of 
nationalization, privatization and corporation have prompted new legal 
concerns and challenged the sufficiency and cogency of the traditional 
regime of public law and private law, legal thought should find itself in 
need of new construction of the public/private distinction. However, in 
                                        
20 Though the orthodox view is that the corporation is created by the state, gaining 
agency from the grant of the state, and the state thus should take full responsibility for 
its creation‘s behaviors at international level. However, if we reverse the perspective, 
viewing the state as the agent who constantly mediates between its corporation and the 
other country, it makes much sense.    
21 Many such situations could be found in Africa, see Jean Francois Bayart, Stephen Ellis 
and Béatrice Hibou, The Criminalization of the State in Africa (James Currey Publishers 
1999). But one of the most typical examples could be found in Iraq. During the post-war 
construction, almost all the state assets in Iraq were substantially sold out to 
multinational corporations under the Bush Administration. Even the task of privatization 
itself has also been privatized to a MNC, namely the KPMG Offshoot Baring Pint. These 
privatization processes received forceful local resistance.   
22 Peter T Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford University Press 
2007) 574. 
23 A Claire Cutler, ‗Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International 
Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy‘ (2001) 27 Review of International Studies 
133. 
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Anglo-American jurisprudence very little has changed even after the 
emergence of the welfare state. This 'stability', perhaps, could be 
contributed to the general adoption of Austinian doctrine in common law 
systems. Austinian jurisprudence has differentiated between de jure 
sovereign authority from de facto sovereign power to protect its 
juristically constructed conception of sovereignty from any disharmony 
with actual fact, in order to bring a unity and (hierarchical) order into the 
world of social difference. Dicey, too, regards the province of 
jurisprudence as exclusive and self-contained, separating from the 
political province. For him, if the problem is juristic, its solution must also 
be so, and thus the ultimate foundations of law must be sought within 
the province of purely legal judgment.  
 
This divorce of law from political ideas, philosophy and social facts, has 
long been questioned by legal scholars in the most critical fashion with 
regard to the disharmony between the growing social force of 
corporations and their fictitious legal personality.24 If the development of 
the new social facts cause new social concerns and prompt new political 
ideas, then the law should be responsible for a timely responding and a 
reconstruction if necessary, instead of just intentionally ignoring them for 
the sake of maintaining a superficial stability. As it has often been said, 
any system exhibiting a contradiction between its legitimating logic and 
its reality is set up for a moment of crisis. In current situation, 
continuingly applying the traditional conception of the public/private 
distinction to the new realities might considerably lessen the democratic 
values preserved by the public law, especially the democratic principles of 
accountability, transparency and due process that are associated with the 
issues of public interest. As a result, Austin‘s ruse – to divorce ‗law‘ from 
the structures of social life in order to preserve the authority of the 
former in light of the vagaries of the latter - threatens to reverse itself. 
                                        
24 For example, see FW Maitland, ‗Moral Personality and Legal Personality‘ (1905) 14 The 
Journal of the Society for Comparative Legislation 192; and Hallis (n 2).  
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Once it is argued that public law has lost its ability to preserve democratic 
values, or to ensure the delivery of a genuine public interest, its very 
authority is brought into question.  
 
More problematically, in the center of the current debates on the 
public/private distinction, there is a perplexing philosophical question that 
needs to be confronted with: what is the difference between the state 
and the corporation? Or, to put this in another way, what implications 
does the emerging idea of businesslike government have for future 
political theory of the state? After all, if the government can outsource 
public functions based on the principle of efficiency and cost-effectiveness, 
just like the private corporations makes a classic make-or-buy decision on 
contracting out the previously in-house functions, then there seems no 
difference between them. 25  The state is traditionally thought to be 
distinguishable from the corporation by its size, its bureaucratic 
complexity, its monopoly over coercive power, and its responsibility in 
delivering public services and promoting public goods. The enormous 
expansion of government resulted in the creation of decentralized units of 
bureaucratization, each of which defines their own sub-goals, operating 
procedures and expertise. Thus, the government becomes functionally 
separated inside. This double-movement of government toward both 
decentralization and bureaucratization suggest an essential similarity and 
continuity with nongovernmental collective entities. It also poses 
questions not just over its unity but its uniqueness as well.26 Obviously, 
the first two characteristics of the state, namely its sheer size and 
bureaucratic complexity, have not only been undermined by the trend of 
the disaggregation of the state, but have also come to resemble modern 
giant corporations. As such, it appears that the only remaining substantial 
                                        
25 Paul R Verkuil, ‗Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions‘ (2005) 
Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper  No. 104.  
26 See generally Chandler and Daems (n 10). 
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differences between the state and the corporation are the state‘s 
monopoly over force and its functional goal for providing public goods.  
 
Yet even these final markers of the state, as a visibly ‗public‘ institution 
for ‗public interest‘, appears to be in the process of being surrendered. 
This is why the privatization of state functions, especially in the domains 
of the military, prisons, policing and domestic security, have naturally 
drawn intensive attention from academics and policy-makers. 27  The 
concern is that privatization might be going too far when it involves 
governmental functions that are ‗inherent in sovereignty‘, namely the 
acquisition of coercive power that had formerly been reserved to the 
sovereign. This has often been discussed under the heading of 
‗outsourcing sovereignty‘.  Perhaps the most dramatic recent example is 
the operation of private military corporations in Iraq. It has been argued 
that such practices will inevitably lead to a defensive military force paid 
for by energy corporations to protect their interests in third countries 
(such as Blackwater USA, a leading private service provider for battalions 
of troops to protect oil fields in Nigeria). 28  
 
On second thought, conceiving the corporation and the state as of same 
genre is not as alien to modern consciousness as to the common sense of 
people in history. We might easily forget the fact that the form of the 
‗corporation‘, as suggested by its old name the ‗body politic‘, was 
widespread in England from medieval times onwards as an economic-
political compound for ecclesiastical, municipal, and educational purposes. 
The English legal historian, Maitland, once wrote a vivid enumeration of 
the application of the corporation in English history:  
                                        
27  See generally, Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (eds), From Mercenaries to 
Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies (Oxford University Press 
2007); Simon Chesterman and Angelina Fisher (eds), Private Security, Public Order: The 
Outsourcing of Public Services and its Limits (Oxford University Press 2009). 
28 See Paul R Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty: Why Privatization of Government 
Functions Threatens Democracy and What We Can Do about It (Cambridge University 
Press 2007). 
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Within these bounds [of corporation] lie churches, and even the 
medieval church, one and catholic, religious houses, mendicant orders, 
non-conforming bodies, a Presbyterian system, universities old and new, 
the village community which Germanists revealed to us, the manor in 
its growth and decay, the township, the New England town, the counties 
and hundreds, the chartered boroughs, the gild in all its manifold 
varieties, the inns of court, the merchant adventurers, the militant 
‘companies’ of English condottieri who returning home help to make 
the word ‘company’ popular among us, the trading companies, the 
companies that become colonies, the companies that made war, the 
friendly societies, the trade unions, the clubs, the group that meets at 
Lloyd’s Coffee-house, the group that becomes the Stock Exchange, and 
so on even to the one-man-company, the Standard Oil Trust and the 
South Australian statutes for communistic villages.29  
 
There were two critical phases in emergent corporate thought and 
practice, one in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, and the 
other, later phase, between 1780 and 1840. The first critical phase saw 
the corporation being transformed from an institution of local government 
to a trading corporation governing international commerce. The second 
critical phase witnessed a transformation in the functions and behavior of 
the corporation as they became much more detached from the 
management of state. The private corporation pure and simple, and as 
we regard it today, was in fact was a product of social, political and 
economic conditions largely peculiar to the nineteenth century in which 
emergent ideas of laissez faire and individualism were its foundations. 
Before that, the social function performed by corporations was always 
recognized as its primary role, and promoting the welfare of the public 
and of society was considered as its primary goal.   
 
The social dimension of the corporate form has always been emphasized 
as promoting public welfare through private interest by affording to 
private interest a social mechanism through which to adequately and 
effectually to express itself in social activity. If it is indeed the case that 
the form of corporation prevailed because it was found to be the best 
                                        
29 FW Maitland, ‗Translator‘s Introduction‘ in to Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the 
Middle Age (Cambridge University Press 1900) xxvii. 
 
19 
form of business ownership for the large permanent investments under 
concentrated management, and the best form to reconcile the private 
motive and public purpose of the activity exercised within it, then the 
corporate character of the modern state, substantiated as the public 
enterprises, should not be an exception. In short, when the state are 
deeply involved in market, when contracting out to the corporation is an 
increasingly common way for states to carry out their public 
responsibilities, when the multinational corporation clearly exhibits an 
independent agency in international economic and political affairs, it is 
imperative to rethink the public/private distinction, especially by 
examining the history of its development,  to bring it into correspondence 
with the current social and political changes. Before engaged in exploring 
the ways in which this task might be addressed, the thesis sets off by 
clarifying the definition of the public/private distinction and its association 
with the legal and political relationship between the state and the 
corporation.  
 
1. Theoretical Foundation I: The Multiple 
Meanings of the Public/Private Distinction   
This distinction between the public and the private has often been 
regarded as represented mostly of how liberalism approaches and 
categorizes the social world.30 It connotes, foremost, the most common 
separation between the private firm and the public government agency, 
who are regarded as possessing different capacities, operating on 
                                        
30 For example, in Theory of Justice, Rawls writes that the public/private distinction 
‗presupposed that the social structure can be divided into two more or less distinct parts, 
the first principle applying to the one, the second to the other. They distinguish between 
those aspects of the social system that define and secure the equal liberties of 
citizenship and those that specify and establish social and economic inequalities.‘ See 
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press 1971) 61. See also, Alan 
Watson, ‗The Structure of Blackstone‘s Commentaries‘ (1988) 97 The Yale Law Journal 
795.  
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different principles and responding to different incentives. In the strictest 
sense, the distinction might only refer to a laissez-faire attitude of the 
government with regard to the economic activities occurred in the civil 
society, which is associated with how to secure individual liberty and 
maximize national wealth. In the broadest sense, it is one of the 
overarching themes for socialism and liberalism in debating a wide range 
of social policies in liberal democratic states.31 Thus, the public/private 
distinction is characterized as multifunctional. Its contends are also 
context-dependent: the conceptual binaries that it denotes include the 
state and the non-state, politics and economy, publicity and privacy, 
social life and family, and so on. These binaries are often bounded up 
with different underpinning ideological assumptions and commitments, 
driven by different political and judicial purposes. In other words, their 
operations are often analytically distinct within the specific field of 
discourse, though they are ‗neither mutually reducible nor wholly 
unrelated‘.32 Habermas once used the phrase ‗the syndrome of meanings‘ 
to describe the ironic fact that those concurrent binaries that possessed 
by the public/private distinction might have fused into a ‗clouded 
amalgam‘.33 As a result, as Habermas has argued, the plural meanings of 
the public/private distinction make it impossible to replace the traditional 
category of the public/private with more precise terms when applying the 
term to certain situation. 
 
In an attempt to explain the reason behind the ‗overlapping and 
intertwined‘ meanings of the public/private distinction, Weintraub looks 
                                        
31 See generally, Jeff Weintraub and Krishan Kumar (eds), Public and Private in Thought 
and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy (University of Chicago Press 1997); 
Michael Walzer, ‗Liberalism and the Art of Separation‘ (1984) 12 Political Theory 315; 
Norberto Bobbio, Democracy and Dictatorship: the Nature and Limits of State Power 
(Peter Kennealy tr, Polity 1989). 
32  Jeff Weintraub, ‗The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction‘ in Jeff 
Weintraub and Krishan Kumar (eds), Public and Private in Thought and Practice: 
Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy (University of Chicago Press 1997). 
33 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into 
a Category of Bourgeois Society (first published in Germany 1962, Thomas Burger and 
Frederick Lawrence tr, Polity 1989) 1-2. 
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back to the time when the Roman Empire was replacing the ancient 
Greco-Roman republic. 34  He argues that the Roman Empire inherited 
much of the political vocabularies of the republican Greeks but also 
projected new meanings into them. The term ‗public‘ is one of these 
shaded vocabularies: on the one hand, it maintains the original meaning 
of the collective self-determination of citizenship as the legacy of ancient 
Greek republicanism (which was later rediscovered by the self-governing 
cities of the Middle Ages); on the other hand, it could also be interpreted 
as equivalent to the notion of a centralized, unified and omnipotent 
sovereignty as the legacy of Roman Empire (which was conveyed by 
Roman law and reasserted later by royal power in the early modern time). 
According to Weintraub, this dual register of the term ‗public‘ was later 
weakened and almost disappeared by the liberal tendency to resolve 
everything into the market and its autonomy.  
 
Th historical explanation offered by Weintraub is, however, too remote to 
be confirmed, though the influence of the history in the current multiple 
meanings of the public/private distinction should not be ignored, as the 
distinction is one of few conceptual dichotomies that have a long and 
distinguished genesis. Before engaged deeply into it history, in the 
following, I would first try to briefly clarifying the various meanings of the 
public/private distinction to avoid unnecessary complexity and ambiguity. 
Generally speaking, there are mainly three basic senses of the 
public/private distinction that have been employed by the current legal 
and political discourses.  
 
Free trade  
The most widely applied meaning of the public/private distinction in 
current legal and political discourses is the so-called liberal-economic 
version of the public/private distinction, which refers to the distinction 
                                        
34 Weintraub (n 32). 
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between government and market economy (or state and civil society). 
The establishment of this version of the public/private distinction was 
associated heavily with the rise of political economy, especially the work 
of Adam Smith, who first elaborated and celebrated how the price 
mechanism of the free market efficiently allocated resources in a society. 
Contemporary simplified formulation of his central argument can be 
briefly represented by Mitchell‘s syllogism： 
First, every individual desires to increase his own wealth; second, every 
individual in his local situation can judge better than a distant statesman 
what use of his labor and capital is most profitable; third, the wealth of 
the nation is the aggregate of the wealth of its citizens; therefore, the 
wealth of the nation will increase most rapidly if every individual is left 
free to conduct his own affairs as he sees fit.35 
 
Adam Smith believed in the invisible hand of the free market to 
automatically guarantee the public good by relying on healthy 
competition. According to him, a free market would ‗maximize efficiency 
as well as freedom, secure for each participant the largest yield from his 
resources to be had without injury to others, and achieve a just 
distribution, meaning a sharing of the social product in proportion to 
individual contributions‘.36 Leading by it, the individual exercise of self-
interest is the best way to promote the the general welfare.  Since the 
individual‘s search for ‗the most advantageous employment for whatever 
capital he can command … naturally, or rather necessarily leads him to 
prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society.‘ 37 
Adam Smith also believed that people are more prodigal with the wealth 
of others than with their own. Thus, public administration was, in his 
opinion, prone to be negligent and wasteful because public employees 
did not have a direct interest in the outcome of their actions. The best 
strategy for the state is to adopt a laissez-faire attitude, which meant the 
                                        
35 Wesley C Mitchell, ‗The Backward Art of Spending Money‘ (1912) 2 The American 
Economic Review 269.  
36 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (first 
published 1776, Oxford University Press 1998). 
37 ibid. 
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minimum and essential level of government regulation in the market, in 
order to let the market run itself freely by its own will. The authority of 
the state should only be used, when it can provide the public value that 
cannot be offered by the market itself.  
 
The private sector ( or the market) thus is ‗a sphere of private autonomy 
which government is bound to respect‘, 38  and in this sector, ‗it is not 
legitimate for the state to be paternalistic or highly regulatory‘.39 Since 
liberalism is basically the philosophy of civil society, the private sector 
could also be understood as identical to the domain of civil society 
(though the private sector now has often been extended to include the 
sphere of activities associated with domesticity, intimacy and privacy). 
Civil society is commonly defined as ‗a social world of self-interested 
individualism, competition, impersonality, and contractual relationships‘, 
and it comes into existence in the specific historical circumstances of a 
developing market economy as the corollary of a depersonalized state 
authority. 40  Civil Society is governed by the rational, voluntary and 
contractual relations between individuals and private organizations. It is 
supposed to be self-sufficient, autonomous, and subject to a set of 
distinctive principles of jurisprudence, namely the private law, that is 
presumptively established on a scientific foundation and stripped of 
political ideology.  
 
As for the public sector, it refers to state administration and government 
agency that are regulated by the public law, such as constitutional law, 
administrative law and international law. One of the central maxims in the 
public sector is ‗limited government‘ that sets the strict boundary of 
government regulation in order to protect the private sector from the 
                                        
38 Prune Yard Shopping Centre v Robbins (1980) 447 US 74, 93 (Marshall J, concurring). 
39  Robert H Mnookin, ‗The Public/Private Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and 
Academic Repudiation‘ (1982) 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1429.  
40 Weintraub (n 32).   
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possible coercion of public force. It thus allows the market to flourish 
with maximum autonomy and safety.  
 
Democracy  
The second meaning of the public/private distinction relates closely to 
Jürgen Habermas‘ concept of the ‗public sphere‘. The contemporary 
worldwide fascination with the ‗public sphere‘ began in the 1990s when 
the English translation of his book The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere was published.41 The public sphere has been envisioned by 
Harbermas and his proteges as the communicative engine of modern 
democratic politics. As a politically-charged term, it mainly refers to the 
active citizenship as participating in the process of collective decision-
making within a democratic framework of fundamental equality. Before 
this republic-virtue version of the ‗public‘ was conceptualized and 
popularized by Habermas as the ‗public sphere‘,42 it had already been 
expressed by Arendt as the ‗public space‘43 and far earlier, by Tocqueville 
                                        
41 Though it was first published in Germany in 1962, it has only been translated into 
English in 1989 by Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence. 
42 Habermas uses the term ‗public sphere‘ as a shorthand reference to the concept of 
the ‗bourgeois public sphere‘, where ‗private people come together as a public‘, and 
through their public use of reason engage in a debate with the state authority over ‗the 
general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere 
of commodity exchange and social labour‘. He later also defines it as ‗a network for 
communicating information and points of view‘. In his influential work, The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas provides a historical-sociological account 
of the formulation of the public sphere in England, France and Germany from the 
eighteenth century to the twentieth century. To a large extent, his account represents a 
liberal tale of modernity: he sees the public sphere as a conception unique to the 
historical development of ‗civil society‘ in the European High Middle Ages, and it is the 
public sphere that gave rise to the ‗revolutionary establishment of parliamentary and 
democratic regimes‘. See Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere : An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Polity 1989). See also his 
other works on the public sphere, ‗The Public Sphere‘ in Michael Schudson (ed), 
Rethinking Popular Culture: Contemporary Perspectives in Cultural Studies (Recording 
for the Blind & Dyslexic 2008); ‗The Public Sphere: an Encyclopedia Article (1964)‘ in 
Jostein Gripsrud and others (eds), The Idea of the Public Sphere: A Reader (Lexington 
Books 2010) 114.  
43 See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (University of Chicago Press 1958).  
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as the ‗political society‘.44 The public sphere is located within the civil 
society, it is an isolated and middle space exclusive for the discursive 
interaction between the absolutist state (the public sector) and civil 
society (the private realm). In this discursive and rational sphere, the 
chief operative force is reasoned argument: instead of sheer economic or 
political power, critical reasoning constitutes the sole authoritative 
steering force and the only valid base for any decision in changing law 
and state policy. In this way, state authority is publicly monitored and 
held accountable for its activities, especially with regard to those  
economic and controversial social issues. Consequently, state legislations 
are often achieved as a compromise between the will of sovereign power 
and the public opinion. A well-functioning public sphere perfectly 
embodies the normative ideals of civil society proposed by liberal 
democratic theory.  
 
The current popularization of the concept of the public sphere was 
coincident with the revival of the idea of civil society, within which a well-
functioning public sphere was commonly understood to be the essential 
discursive infrastructure. Citizens of democratic states see government 
not only as a complementary mechanism to the market, but also as a 
platform to achieve higher moral aspirations. While the public/private 
distinction in legal discourse mostly concerns the legal controls of 
governmental activities, in the political discourse, it has been often 
invoked as an effort to foster effective civic engagements in making 
political decisions. 45  Through the public sphere, political ideas and 
opinions on controversial issues of society and government can be openly 
expressed and discussed. Nevertheless, it is important to be aware that 
                                        
44 See Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution (first published 
1856, Anchor 1955). In this book, he drew a tripartite distinction between the state, civil 
society and political society. 
45  See generally, Judith Rodin and Stephen P Steinberg (eds), Public Discourse in 
America: Conversation and Community in the Twenty-First Century (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 2011); and Jean L Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and 
Political Theory  (MIT Press 1994). 
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this orthodox account of the public sphere by Habermas has also received 
several critics. 46 In its severest critic, it has been even argued that the 
public sphere is ‗a conjuring trick‘ and public opinion is a ‗sham‘, both of 
which are ideological façades that conceal the vast differences between 
reasoned debate and manipulation by spin doctors, and between 
universal participation and limited access. 
 
Private life  
The third meaning of the public/private distinction refers to the distinction 
between public life and private life. Led initially by French scholars 
working on the history of intimate family life,50 over the course of the 
past century, there has been an intensified interest from many disciplines 
in studying the transformation of the modes of public life (or social life) 
and private life.51 The notion of ‗public‘ here refers to everything that is 
open and accessible, which can be seen and heard by everybody. The 
term ‗private‘, on the other hand, refers to the place of intimacy, 
domesticity and privacy, which include household and family, sexual 
identities and behaviors, intimate relationships and friendships, and so 
on. 52  Some scholars also describe this sense of the public/private 
distinction in the following terms: ‗the public is the world of duty, work, 
hard decision-making, frustration, social maneuvers and transactions, 
battle and Foucault‘s age of surveillance; the private is ―heaven in a 
heartless world,‖ place of rest, peace, contemplation, renewal—
                                        
46 See Pierre Bourdieu, ‗The Public Opinion Does Not Exist,‘ in Armand Mattelart and 
Seth Siegelaub (eds), Communication and Class Struggle (International General 1979); 
Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (Routledge 1927). 
50 The most famous work is by Philippe Aries and Georges Duby, A History of Private Life, 
5 volumes (Arthur Goldhammer tr, Harvard University Press 1992). 
51 See generally, Dena Goodman, ‗Public Sphere and Private Life: Toward a Synthesis of 
Current Historiographical Approaches to the Old Regime‘ (1992) 31 History and Theory 1; 
52 Some scholar also uses the public/private distinction for demarcating the boundaries 
between the inner privacy of the individual self and the ‗interaction order‘ of the outer 
world.  
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sanctuary‘.53 In short, whereas the ethos of public life is impersonal and 
standardized, that of private life is personal and emotional.  
 
Modernization is characterized by the sharpening polarization of these 
two divided lives.54 On the one hand, there is the aggregation of the 
swamped public realm of the market, the bureaucratic government and 
other hierarchical social organizations, full of strife and striving. On the 
other hand, there is the concurrent intensification of the private realm of 
intimacy and emotion, where the growing significance of the nuclear 
family and romantic love has been cherished as the last peaceful refuge. 
It has been described that the family has an ‗awareness of itself as a 
precious emotional unit that must be protected with privacy and isolation 
from outside intrusion‘.55  Private life has surprisingly become a pivotal 
subject in social science as ‗the mass phenomenon of loneliness in 
modern society‘ might reach its ‗most extreme and most antihuman form‘, 
and intimacy has been regarded as the fight against it.56 Yet, what we 
generally take granted as private life or public life today might not 
necessarily been separated in the past, as this split of life ‗becomes so 
compulsive a habit, that it is hardly perceived in consciousness.‘57    
 
 
                                        
53 Paula R Backscheider and Timothy Distal (eds), The Intersections of the Public and 
Private Spheres in Early Modern England (Frank Cass 1996) 1.   
54 See generally, Dario Castiglione and Lesley Sharpe (eds), Shifting the Boundaries: 
Transformation of the Languages of Public and Private in the Eighteenth Century 
(University of Exeter Press 1995).    
55 Edward Shorter, The Making of the Modern Family (Basic Books 1975) 227.  
56 Arendt (n 43).  
57 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations 
(Wiley 1939) 190.  
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2. Theoretical Foundation II: The Debates on 
the Public/Private Distinction  
The fact that public/private distinction fails to be an organizing principle, 
clear of agreed definitions or consensus, has constantly been the subject 
of heated debates from as early as the late nineteenth century up to date. 
The effort to draw a clear line between the public and the private, 
became unproductive and lost much of its practical significance, once the 
nineteenth-century world of ‗decentralized competitive capitalism‘58 and 
‗liberal legalism‘59 had gone, replaced by the unprecedented twentieth-
century administrative government with its deep involvement in economic 
and social affairs. 60  Many intermediate institutions have also been 
developed and shared the characteristics of both the public sectors and 
the private realm.  
 
Yet, for the past decades, in the wake of international trends towards 
extensive deregulation and privatization,62 a resurgence of interest in the 
                                        
58 Morton J Horwitz, ‗The History of the Public /Private Distinction‘ (1982) 130 University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 1423. 
59 Duncan Kennedy, ‗Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction' (1981) 130 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1349. Kennedy also argued that although the 
judiciary could still have the authority to decide whether an entity is public or private, 
this could not change the fact that the public/private distinction has already lost its ‗all-
or-nothing‘ and ‗set-like‘ quality.  
60  In modern states, there are three main types of government intervention in the 
economy: income redistribution (transferring resources from one group to another, and 
compelling the citizens to consume ‗merit goods‘, such as primary education, social 
insurance and health care), macroeconomic stabilization (sustaining satisfactory levels of 
economic growth and employment through fiscal and monetary policy, sometime also 
through labor market and industrial policy), and market regulation (aiming at correcting 
‗market failures‘, such as monopoly power, negative externalities, incomplete information 
and insufficient provision of public goods).  
62 Though both privatization and deregulation both share a belief that the market will 
greatly improve the services that used to be provided by a monopolistic bureaucracy, 
their focuses are different. Whereas privatization only shifts the operations of 
government responsibility to private hands, deregulation shifts the fundamental 
government power of the decision-making. Deregulation often takes place in the form of 
relaxed controls on entry barriers and rates in certain sectors, such as airlines, natural 
gas, railroads, telephone companies, and financial institutions. In America, the Bush 
administration‘s version of an ‗ownership society‘ best epitomizes the ideal of 
deregulation. The debates over whether social security and health care should be public 
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public/private distinction could be observed. The public/private distinction 
now has ventured beyond its traditional preoccupation with limiting the 
government‘s activities in market, and engaged itself with some new 
tasks: as private enterprise is widely regarded as a superior organizing 
principle to governmental monopoly (as championed by Hayek and his 
followers), the public sector now is forced to reassert itself, and it tries to 
do so by re-invoking the public/private distinction to defend the territory 
of public sector. 63 It is undeniable that the relationship of government to 
the private sector is very much in flux these days as there is no longer a 
criterion of moral and political homogeneity available to determine what 
should be subject to government intervention and what should be left to 
the society to decide by itself. This indeterminacy of the public/private 
distinction has often worked as an invitation to rhetorical abuse. As 
Smelzer has argued, ‗the private-public distinction constitutes a political 
strategy in and of itself‘. 64  Similarly, Verkuil concludes that ‗the legal 
                                                                                                           
functions are fueled precisely by the ideology of deregulation. For a discussion on the 
relationship between devolution and privatization, see Joel F Handler, Down from 
Bureaucracy: The Ambiguity of Privatization and Empowerment (Princeton University 
Press 1996).  
63 For symposiums, see Symposium, ‗The Public/Private Distinction‘ (1982) 130 U Pa L 
Rev 1289; Meir Dan-Cohen, ‗Mediating Institutions: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction‘ 
(1994) 61 U Chi L Rev 1213; Michel Rosenfeld, ‗Rethinking the Boundaries of Public Law 
Between Private Law and Public Law‘ (2013) 11 Int‘l J Const L 125; Symposium, 
‗Public/Private Beyond Distinction?‘ (2013) 15 Theoretical Inquiries L 1. For books, see 
Paul Fairfield, Public/Private (Rowman & Littlefield 2005); Martha Minow, Partners, Not 
Rivals: Privatization and the Public Good (Beacon Press 2002); Jeff Weintraub & Krishan 
Kumar (eds), Public and Private in Thought and Practices: Perspectives on a Grand 
Dichotomy (University of Chicago Press 1997); SI Benn and GF Gaus (eds), Public and 
Private in Social Life (Croom Helm 1983). For articles, see Robert H Mnookin, ‗The 
Public/Private Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and Academic Repudiation‘ (1982) 130 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1429; Thomas K McCraw, ‗The Public and Private 
Spheres in Historical Perspectives‘ in Harvey Brooks, Lance Liebman and Corinne 
Schelling (eds), Public-Private Partnership: New Opportunities for Meeting Social Needs 
(Ballinger Publishing Company 1984); Alan Freeman and Elizabeth Mensch, ‗The Public-
Private Distinction in American Law and Life‘ (1987) 36 Buff L Rev 237; Christine Chinkin, 
‗A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension‘ (1999) 10 Eur J Int‘l L 387; Paul R Verkuil, 
‗Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions‘ (2005) 84 North 
Carolina Law Review 397; Paul M Schoenhard, ‗A Three-Dimensional Approach to the 
Public-Private Distinction‘ (2008) Utah Law Review 635; Harvard Law Review, 
‗Developments in the Law: State Action and the Public/Private Distinction‘ (2010) 123 
Harvard Law Review 1248.    
64 Neil Smelzer, ‗A Paradox of Public Discourse and Political Democracy‘ in Judith Rodin 
and Stephen P Steinberg (eds), Public Discourse in America (University of Pennsylvania 
Press 2003). 
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definition of private and public will ebb and flow based on the 
preferences of interest groups, the agendas of political parties, and the 
view of the judiciary‘.65  
 
Nonetheless, the debate on the public/private distinction with regard to 
state intervention in economic affairs could still approximately boil down 
to differences within utilitarian liberalism between Adam Smith and 
Bentham. While Adam Smith believes in the ‗natural‘ harmonization of 
selfish interests, or the ‗invisible hand‘ of the market, Bentham calls for 
an active planning for the maximum social happiness. This is because, 
while Bentham‘s utilitarianism is compatible with many of the premises of 
the laissez-faire doctrine, it also includes the consideration of ‗justice‘ and 
‗equity‘. This explains why it has been cited later as a rationale for some 
of the earliest social policies in Britain with regard to the elimination of 
child labor, usury and prison abuse.66  
 
Beyond the utilitarian framework, the theory of market failure also 
proposes a strong government intervention when a structural flaw could 
be identified in the market. It argues that there are some tasks that 
cannot be organized through the market, when the prices of goods and 
services give false signals about their real value, confounding the 
communication between producers and consumers. In other words, the 
market fails when prices lie.67 In addition to the false price, the efficiency 
of markets could also be undermined by other factors, such as monopoly 
or the inability of providers to avoid ‗free riders‘ (which refer to those who 
                                        
65 Verkuil (n 28). 
66  Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest: Counterbalancing Economic 
Individualism (Georgetown University Press 2007).  
67 There is a voluminous amount of economic literature on market failure, including Paul 
Samuelson, ‗The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure‘ (1954) 36 Review of Economics and 
Statistics 387; Francis Bator, ‗The Anatomy of Market Failure‘ (1958) 72(3) Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 351; and Kenneth Arrow, ‗The Organization of Economic Activity: 
Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Nonmarket Allocation‘ in Robert 
Haveman and Julius Margolis (eds), Public Expenditure and Policy Analysis (Boston, 
Houghton and Mifflin 1979) 59.  
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benefit from a good or service without paying for it). 68  Stokey and 
Zeckhauser have identified six causes of market failure that need state 
intervention.69 Once the flaw in the market has been identified, several 
possible public actions will be proposed accordingly. In theory, the 
government should calculate the estimated costs and benefits of each 
proposals, and adopt the one that promise the maximum net benefits.  
 
Last but not least, the private sector now not only includes the market 
but also includes family, intimacy and privacy, which have opened up 
many of the traditionally invisible moral and cultural issues to public 
scrutiny. But when it comes to state intervention in those issues, the level 
of confusion has increased as a consequence of the fact that the left and 
the right have switched their traditional sides on the public/private 
distinction. 70  The traditional patterns, namely the ‗natural‘ affinity 
between the left and the public sphere and between the right and the 
private sphere, 71  have been swapped. While most conservatives now 
generally expect government intervention on moral and cultural issues 
such as abortion, religion and sexuality to encourage the ‗right‘ kinds of 
behavior, leftists in fact privilege privacy in those matters. Nevertheless, 
this left‘ preference for privacy itself has become inconsistent because it 
also argues that some private acts are not truly private if those acts 
embody the consolidation of oppression and discrimination. As Wolfe has 
commented, if this criterion is pursued far enough, it could eliminate the 
category of the private altogether. 
                                        
68 Mancur Olson has argued that rational actors will never engage in collective action 
due to the ‗free-rider‘ problem unless subjected to coercion and selective incentives. See 
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press 2009). 
69 Edith Stokey and Richard Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy Analysis (WW Norton 1978) 
298.  
70 Alan Wolfe, ‗Public and Private in Theory and Practice‘ in Jeff Weintraub and Krishan 
Kumar (eds) Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand 
Dichotomy (University of Chicago Press 1997).   
71 The primary concern of the left is excessive privatism (the concentrations of private 
power) with the preference for public policy. The left commonly believes that what is 
carried out in private is illegitimate. As to the right, it emphasizes a defense of private 
decisions, both familial and economic, in favor of the private.  
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The real entity theory  
The earliest debate on the public/private distinction began in the late 
nineteenth century in the form of challenging the fiction theory of 
corporate personality. The socialism of the nineteenth century defined 
itself as state-socialism, since it was believed that the best way of 
ensuring the individual liberty from the powerful capitalists was to 
increase the power of the state.72  On the other hand, the nineteenth 
century also witnessed the appearance of a great variety of corporations 
that embodied both the public and the private characters. These 
corporations, including trade-unions (and trade guilds), professional 
associations and the giant trading corporations, took on some of the 
responsibilities of the state, controlled the means of public services, and 
thus rivalled the state both in social influence and in organizational 
sophistication. These intermediate institutions mainly provided three 
kinds of mediation between the private individual and the public state. 
The first kind was a form of negative mediation, which tried to protect 
individuals from the power of state by providing them with a shelter or 
fulcrum for resistance. The second kind is positive mediation that offered 
people a chance of a collective life, from which people might derive 
indispensable spiritual and moral sustenance to flourish.74 The third kind  
facilitates the well-function of democracy and the promotion of social 
welfare, and it includes private standard setting bodies, professional 
associations and charities. These have come to engage in public decision-
making, providing public services and delivering benefits in myriad 
ways. 75  Many new loyalties have thus cut across the relation of the 
individual to the state, lying on these intermediate corporations.  
                                        
72 Frederick Hallis, Corporate Personality: A Study in Jurisprudence (Oxford University 
Press 1930). 
74  Meir Dan-Cohen, ‗Between Selves and Collectivities: Toward a Jurisprudence of 
Identity‘ (1994) 61 The University of Chicago Law Review 1213. 
75 Jody Freeman, ‗The Private Role in the Public Governance‘ (2000) 75 NYU L Rev 543.  
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The public character of these intermediate corporations, or the 
decentralization of political authority, produced a demand for a new type 
of political theory to re-construct the relationship between the state and 
these social organizations. It has been claimed that the orthodox theories 
of state-sovereignty were out of date, and the state should no longer be 
the reservoir of all political power. The pressure of new social forces (the 
so-called syndicalist forces of trade-unions and other associations) 
stimulated a new kind of legal discourse, namely an emergent criticism of 
the traditional fiction theory of corporate personality. These modern 
social associations, especially trade-unions and professional associations, 
claim to have their distinguish spheres of social influence over which the 
state has no right of control. Far from admitting that their powers are 
conceded by and derived from the state, as the traditional ‗fictional‘ 
theory always asserted, they argued that their power inhered in their 
nature as living social organizations. Their legal personalities are not 
fictitious, but real, which no state should deny.  
 
The real legal personality of the corporation was first systematically 
theorized by German jurist Otto von Gierke in his ‗real entity‘ theory (or 
the ‗natural entity‘ theory) in the late nineteenth century. This theory 
holds that each corporate entity (including the state, since this theory 
also holds that the state and the corporate group are of the same genus) 
is a pre-legal entity, something already there, and the law is bound to 
‗see‘ its personality rather than inventing it. The real entity theory is 
chronologically the last-emerging theory of corporate personality. Before 
it were the ‗fiction‘ theory and the ‗contract‘ theory. The fiction theory 
suggests that the personality of the group is a mere legal artefact and the 
formation of its existence is exclusively left in the hands of the state. The 
contract theory holds that groups became legal entities by voluntary and 
consensual partnerships of individual members, which has a constitutive 
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status-creating consequence in law. 77  Both the fiction theory and the 
contract theory have a hard time explaining the social force that was 
acquired by corporations and other social organizations beyond the 
state‘s control and the existence of ‗de factor corporations‘.78  Gierke‘s 
proposal of the real entity theory constituted the most essential part of 
his ardent criticism of Savigny‘s adoption of the individualism of Roman 
law. In drafting of the German Civil Code, Gierke and his followers were 
trying to preserve the tradition of indigenous German law in order to 
prevent a purely Romanist codification which was being promoted by 
Savigny‘s theories of the systematic and historical character of law. 79 
According to Gierke, the collectivist character of indigenous German law 
was best represented by its unique understanding of group association: 
as contrasting to the fiction theory of corporate personality that 
originated from Roman Law, the ontological speculation about the ‗real 
group personality‘ is that the existence of German collective groups is 
something beyond the mere realm of law.  
 
The real entity theory was first spread outside the German world by 
Frederic William Maitland‘s 1900 translation of Gierke‘s Political Theories 
of the Middle Age, which was identified as ‗the beginning of the Anglo-
American controversy over paradigms of the corporation‘. 80  As the 
founding father of English legal history, Maitland is undoubtedly one of 
the dominant figures in nineteenth-century British intellectual thought. 
After a failure to gain a Fellowship in Moral and Mental Science at Trinity 
College, Cambridge, Maitland gave up his initial ambition to be a scholar 
                                        
77 Michael J Phillips, ‗Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation‘ (1994) 21 
Fla St U L Rev 1061. 
78 For the idea of ‗de facto corporations‘, see Henry Osborn Taylor, A Treatise on the Law 
of Private Corporations (Kay & Brother 1884) 145; Victor Morawetz, A Treatise on the 
Law of Private Corporations (Boston, Little, Brown and Co 1886) 735.  
79  On the Romanist-Germanist interplay in legal scholarship in nineteenth-century 
Germany, see Mathias Reimann, ‗Nineteenth Century German Legal Science‘ (1990) 31 
BCL Rev 837.    
80 Mark H Hager, ‗Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational ―Real Entity‖ 
Theory‘ (1989) 50 U Pitt L Rev 575. 
 
35 
and moved to London, becoming a barrister specializing in conveyancing. 
In 1884, he returned to Cambridge and became a Reader in English Law. 
By utilizing the untouched resources of the Public Record Office, he 
started his renowned legal historical research.81 Having earned his fame 
through his works, such as The History of English Law up to the Time of 
Edward I,82 in the later years of his life Maitland‘s interest seemed to turn 
from a purely technical account of legal history to the intersection 
between law and politics. It is widely acknowledged that his late works 
were heavily influenced by Otto von Gierke. Maitland appears to have 
been first drawn to Gierke‘s work in his research on the legal history of 
persona ficta, but he soon became fascinated by Gierke‘s political theory 
of real entity. Maitland himself was also the key proponent of the real 
entity theory in Britain: in his late life, he published five papers in an 
attempt to substantiate the real entity theory with the local legal practice 
of England.84 The real entity theory was seen as a liberation from the 
laissez-faire and individualist jurisprudence that represented by 
contemporary common law, and Maitland‘s argument was later taken up 
enthusiastically by the English political pluralists who were against the 
theory of state sovereignty.  
 
The prevalence of the real entity theory in England resonated profoundly 
with one of the most important political features of that time, namely ‗the 
attack on the state‘. During this period the state had in many respects 
become a discredited institution and the parliamentary government in 
England was falling into cynical disfavor. Maitland‘s promotion of real 
entity theory was also launched by his attack on the traditional legal 
concept of the state in common law, namely the Crown as ‗corporation 
                                        
81 See generally HAL Fisher, Frederick William Maitland, Downing Professor of the Laws 
of England: A Biographical Sketch (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
82 Although this book was co-written with Sir Frederick Pollock, Maitland is said to have 
undertaken most of the work.  
84  Those five articles are all collected in David Runciman and Magnus Ryan (eds), 
Frederic William Maitland: State, Trust, and Corporation (Cambridge University Press 
2003). 
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sole‘. Relying on Gierke‘s real entity theory, Maitland argued that the 
Crown as a corporation sole caused the long divorce of legal thought and 
political thought. This long-existing inconsistency between legal thought 
and political thought perhaps resulted from the fact that the English 
jurists, unlike the German or French jurists, neither needed to tackle 
certain philosophical difficulties nor required political thought for their 
solution. English jurisprudence was a ‗well-marked-out science‘, a 
dialectical machinery with its own autonomy. The later dominance of the 
Austinian view of sovereignty as a unitary juridical organization only 
aggravated the division as it reiterated that the province of jurisprudence 
was exclusive and self-determined, and no extra-legal interpretation 
would be needed for the purposes of giving it authority.  
 
As to America, in the nineteenth century, the fiction theory continued to 
be dominant, and the clear affirmation could be found in the famous 
Dartmouth College case.85 Ironically, it was also in the case of Dartmouth 
College that for the first time a clear-defined differentiation between the 
public corporation and the private corporation has been launched, which 
freed the business corporation from state regulation and thus gave rise to 
its tremendous proliferation in the late nineteenth century. This 
development of the private corporation in turn triggered widespread 
intellectual debates as to whether the corporation could enjoy the 
protection of various rights as a natural person under the Constitution 
and the Bill of Rights. When the application of constitutional protection of 
individuals has been extended to the private corporations by the court, it 
was generally believed this was because Freund published The Legal 
Nature of Corporations86 and introduced real entity theory into the United 
States, which has been implicitly applied in the case (some scholars, 
                                        
85 Chief Justice Marshall stated in Dartmouth College: ‗A corporation is an artificial being, 
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature 
of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon 
it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.‘ Trustees of Dartmouth College 
v Woodward (1819) 17 US 518, 636.   
86 Ernst Freund, The Legal Nature of Corporations (University of Chicago Press 1897). 
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though, hold that the Supreme Court‘s decision to advance the 
application of constitutional rights to corporations was based on the 
contract theory).87 The real entity theory thus became one of the most 
centered legal discussions in the early-twentieth-century America. Writing 
in the heat of the debate in 1911, Machen has observed that any 
American lawyer writing upon the subject of corporations was not 
permitted to treat this global controversy with indifference and he had to 
choose on which side to stand. 88  Yet Machen also argued that the 
followers of real entity theory ‗strive to exaggerate the importance of 
those questions, in order to pose as great reformers engaged in the 
gigantic task of emancipating the legal world from the thralldom of 
mediaeval superstition‘.94  
 
After more than two decades of intense debate on corporation personality 
in America, Dewey‘s article in 1926 muzzled any further argument by 
arguing convincingly that there was no fixed linkage between the 
particular political doctrine and the particular theory of corporate 
personality.95 He suggested that any given theory of corporate personality 
could be manipulated to yield different and even contradictory political 
conclusions. This sharp critique took the wind out of the debate, and the 
nature of his critique exemplified the trending outlook of legal realism of 
that time. As Hager has observed later, ‗to Dewey‘s pragmatic mind, such 
controversies represented an enormous philosophical error, a 
preoccupation with abstract concepts, rather than concrete things, of 
which all the disputing parties were equally culpable‘. 96  The debates 
                                        
87 See Hale v Henkel 201 US 43 (1906).  
88 See Arthur Machen Jr, ‗Corporate Personality‘ (1911) 24 Harv L Rev 253; Morton J 
Horwitz, ‗Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory‘ (1985-1986) 88 
W Va L Rev 173, and the case Santa Clara County v Southern Pacific Railroad Co 118 US 
394 (1886); Morton J Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960: The 
Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (Oxford University Press 1992) 72;  
94 Machen, ibid. 
95 John Dewey, ‗The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality‘ (1926) 35 Yale 
LJ 655. 
96 Hager (n 80). 
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surrounding the real entity theory thus abruptly subsided, ‗leaving only 
traces for historians to follow‘.97 Contemporary scholars generally accept 
Dewey‘s idea that corporate personhood can be easily manipulated to 
arrive at varying conclusions based on different political agendas.98 For 
example, Hager has observed that, in the dissents of the contemporary 
American constitutional case of Bellotti,99 a contemporary version of the 
fiction theory is used in a pro-regulatory fashion, presenting a striking 
contrast to early twentieth-century legal discourse which viewed the 
fiction theory as anti-regulatory and the real entity theory as pro-
regulatory. 100  Similarly, in his research on the ‗migration‘ of the legal 
discourse of corporate personality from Germany to the Anglo-American 
world, Harris also found that sometimes one corporate personality theory 
can be utilized for conflicting purposes and sometimes different theories 
can be utilized for the same purpose. He concludes that each personality 
theory ‗became embedded in certain meanings when it functioned in 
concrete historical and spatial discourse settings‘.101  
 
 
                                        
97 Ron Harris, ‗The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse‘ (2006) 63 Wash & Lee L Rev 
1421. 
98 Hager (n 80). 
99  First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti (1978) 435 US 765, 809-10 (J White 
dissenting). 
100 This refers to First National Bank (ibid) which concerned the Massachusetts statute. 
The Massachusetts statute arose due to the concern that the huge concentrations of 
private capital might influence politics, posing a serious threat to the democratic 
mechanism of voting and decision-making. The statute forbade corporations from 
spending money to influence public referenda which did not directly affect their business 
interests. However, it was struck down by the- Supreme Court in First National Bank. 
The Court held that such a statute violates first amendment speech rights, which 
corporations enjoy along with natural persons. The dissenting justice insisted that 
corporate personhood must be understood as merely fictional, created solely by the 
state through its grant of incorporation and for the purpose of certain economic goals, 
since corporate personhood is in no sense on a par with a ‗natural person‘. It is therefore 
reasonable that a corporation should be afforded lower first amendment protection than 
a natural person. 
101 Harris (n 97). 
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The welfare state 
Over the course of the twentieth century, the complex social and 
economic situations associated with modernity called out for a more 
interventionist government, which became known as the modern 
bureaucratic administrative state. 102  This fundamentally changed the 
relationship between the state and the market, and accordingly the 
relationship between the public and the private. Strong interventionist 
government especially took place in countries that are often regarded as 
second-comers to industrialization, such as Belgium, France, Germany 
and the United States, who shared the belief that the state should 
perform a primary role in economy in order to catch up with the then-
industrialized Great Britain. 103  This belief gave rise to two different 
patterns of state behavior in economy: one was the continental pattern, 
known as the ‗entrepreneurial‘ state, which involved massive government 
intervention in the market, and it was epitomized by the Weimar period 
of Germany; and the other was the American pattern, known as the 
‗regulative‘ state, which was characterized by a limited involvement in 
production but a greater reliance on state regulation of the market, and it 
was epitomized by Roosevelt‘s New Deal. The period after World War II 
also witnessed the apogee of public enterprise and nationalization in 
Great Britain and France. Governments worldwide had never been so 
extensively involved in social, economic and domestic affairs as they were 
at that stage. The states shaped virtually every sector of the economy 
either through macroeconomic planning, welfare programs, or public 
infrastructure and services  
 
                                        
102 This period is called the period of pax administrativa that is characterized by ‗a large, 
wide-reaching, and meaningfully public State bureaucratic infrastructure, thick legal 
webs constraining and guiding administrative exercises of State power, and broad 
popular support‘. Jon D Michaels, Constitutional Coup: Privatization‘s Threat to the 
American Republic (Harvard University Press 2017) 40. 
103 See generally, Pier Angelo Toninelli and Pierangelo Maria Toninelli, The Rise and Fall 
of State-Owned Enterprise in the Western World (Cambridge University Press 2000).  
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Unsurprisingly, both the growing state-owned enterprises, and the 
explosion of government agencies that perform a combination of 
executive, legislative and adjudicative functions, have foreclosed the 
discussion of the public/private distinction.104 It is no longer meaningful 
to apply the public/private distinction to limit state activities, since in 
these situations it makes no difference whether categorized them as 
public or private. There were concurrent declines of other conceptual 
dichotomies, such as the dichotomies of state/society, 
property/sovereignty, individual/group, and so on. In together, they 
indicate the decay of the liberal way of demarcating the social world.105 
The prevalence of the critical legal studies and the public choice theory 
further has strengthened the view that there was no longer a purely 
private realm or a purely public one. Governance should be understood 
as a set of negotiated relationships between different political powers and 
public opinions.  
 
In addition, how to keep a state competitive also becomes one of the 
primary responsibilities of the modern state in the era of globalization. 
This responsibility again emphasizes state‘s interventionist role in 
economic affairs. It manifests mostly in the popularity of the concept of 
‗competition state‘, which has come to the fore in the 1980s when 
Thurow developed a zero-sum view of the role of government from a 
global perspective.106 He argued that the state must stimulate investment 
by using public funds in order to keep competitive on a global basis. 
                                        
104  In this context, administrative law scholarship has attempted to defend the 
administrative state against accusations of illegitimacy by promoting mechanisms, such 
as legislative and executive oversight and judicial review, to render government 
agencies indirectly accountable to the public (Direct political accountability often refers 
to the notion that citizens could punish or reward decision-makers by voting them in or 
out of office), see generally Kathleen Bawn, ‗Choosing Strategies to Control the 
Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System‘ (1997) 13 
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 101.    
105 See generally, David Kairys, The Politics Of Law: A Progressive Critique (Basic Books 
1998).  
106  Lester Carl Thurow, The Zero-Sum Society: Distribution and the Possibilities for 
Economic Change (Basic Books 1980). 
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Cerny later identified the different modes of state economic intervention 
in adaptation to economic and political globalization. He also predicted 
that they all would finally homogenize into one orthodox mode.107 Ronen 
Palan further delineated three elements that comprised the competition 
state: the belief in national competitiveness as the means for generating 
economic growth, the shift from demand-side measures to supply-side 
measures, and the disappearance of the distinction between national and 
international policies as they both integrated into an overall national 
competitive strategy.108 
 
Privatization 
In a way, our society has come full circle: from an early time when civil 
society struggled to emerge, to a period when the liberal state 
established separate realms of public and private, to the time when 
government became virtually indispensable, to the present when many 
things government does have devolved to the private sector.109 
 
While the corporation is growing into a new social power, the welfare 
government increasingly fell into public disfavor and turn into something 
cynically discredited, which finally resulted in the public demands for the 
devolution of governmental power. There were mounting questionings 
over the public ‗accountability‘ of the government. While a wide-reaching 
bureaucratic government might demonstrate a greater ability to deliver 
‗public goods‘ and promote the ‗public interest‘, it simultaneously became 
vulnerable to the countervailing principle of democracy and accountability.  
                                        
107 See Philip G Cerny, ‗Paradoxes of the Competition State: the Dynamics of Political 
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108 See Ronen Palan ‗Luring Buffaloes and the Game of Industrial Subsidies: A Critique of 
National Competitive Policies in the Era of the Competition State‘ (1998) 12 Global 
Society 326.  
109  Paul R Verkuil, ‗Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions‘ 
(2005) 84 North Carolina Law Review 397.  
 
42 
This has often been viewed as the constitutional crisis of the twentieth 
century. Specifically, according to the conventional theory of the 
democratic society, the political and bureaucratic model of accountability 
would allow the public, as a collective, to define through established 
processes what it would like the government to provide (this collectively 
desired output is the so-called ‗public value‘); to keep pressure on 
government agencies to ensure good performance;110 and to develop the 
technical means for determining to what extent these purposes have 
been achieved. 111  However, in the past several decades, there are 
increasing doubts about both the capabilities of the collective institutions 
and the government agencies in forming a genuine public will and in 
practically achieving the original public goals, instead of turning into a 
tool for advancing the economic interests and policy ideas of the special 
groups. This loss of confidence in government again convinced the public 
to keep as little as possible to these collective institutions and 
governmental agencies, and to leave as much as possible to market 
mechanisms. 112  In this sense, this view of government has little 
difference from a view of commercialism or the radical idea of 
‗individualism‘.  
 
 
 
                                        
110 The public could demand and review information about government performance, 
complain to elected representatives, make suggestions in administrative hearings, and 
file suits in courts. It might be helped by outsiders such as the media and professionals. 
111 According to Mark Moore, the success this assessment of satisfaction depends on 
three things: (1) the ability to form a coherent collective aspiration that reflects many 
voices and ambitions, and to help make those who are disappointed understand why 
they have been disappointed; (2) the ability to measure activity and results in ways that 
assure us that goals we collectively agreed upon were reached; and (3) the capacity to 
provide incentives for those who are doing the inventing, the managing, and the 
working—incentives both to work hard and to remain creative and adaptable. In other 
words, it is the flexibility to allow government agencies to recognize differences in the 
client population and to experiment with alternative ways of achieving the public goals. 
See Mark H Moore, ‗Introduction‘ (2003) 116(5) Harvard Law Review 1212. 
112 In addition to the doubts about government‘s capacity to deliver public goods and 
services, there are other possible explanations for why citizens in the US have lost 
confidence in their government. See generally, Joseph S Nye, Jr, Philip D Zelikow and 
David C King, Why People Don‘t Trust Government (Harvard University Press 1997).  
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The cynical view of government has further been deeply entrenched by 
the neoliberal theory. Neoliberalism was born in America to support a 
state-reduction project that directed against the New Deal regulatory 
architecture of the welfare state. It holds that society is so complex that 
no comprehensive or omnipotent public authority can guide all actors to 
their appropriate destinations. On this premise, it is better to allow 
individuals to make personal decisions, in the faith of that the market will 
guide those decisions toward an unplanned but harmonious equilibrium. 
The promotion of decentralized decision-making, as opposed to central 
planning (that proposed by socialism and totalitarianism), is in the center 
of neoliberal argumentation. The best society is believed to be the one 
that allows the maximum number of private choices. Driven by market 
competition, private contractors can provide higher-quality and lower-cost 
services than government in some governmental tasks.  
 
This view once again repeats the liberal fetish for ‗the market‘ as the best 
mechanism to advance efficiency, effectiveness and material prosperity. 
However, what is new this time is a belief that such advances can be 
made without the re-occurrence of the deleterious economic, social and 
political consequences of the past, and seems to underscore both the 
success of the Corporate Social Responsibility movement and the current 
enthusiasm for social enterprise and social entrepreneurship.113 Doubts 
continue to be cast upon the behavior of government officials and the 
trustworthiness of their intentions. Attention has focused on the need for 
increased accountability and transparency of their actions. To this end, 
numerous toolkits have been added, such as regulatory guidance, ‗best 
practice‘, the preferred prescription by regular monitoring, and regulation 
to ensure conformity and answerability. The reduced autonomy of 
government officials has arguably allowed them to manage processes but 
                                        
113  See Mark H Moore, ‗Creating Public Value through Private/Public Partnerships‘ 
(conference paper 2005). 
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not to shape the implementation of public policy, or neutered their 
capacity to think and respond imaginatively and with reflexivity to the 
challenges. The proliferation of market-based governance mechanisms 
has naturally promoted ideas such as the businesslike state (or the 
market state) and the privatized military, which generate complex and 
heated debates. 114  It seems now that the task of the public/private 
distinction has shifted from protecting the private sphere to defending the 
public sphere: it is worth asking whether the public/private distinction can 
be helpful in setting some objective boundary for government activities, 
both as a general idea and as a concrete proposal, especially when 
countless debates about market-and-morality issues surround us in the 
age of globalization.115   
 
In reality, a major wave of disenchantment with state intervention in the 
economy did sweep through the industrial nations since the 1980s when 
state-owned enterprises began to decline due to the poor performance of 
economies. A form of political consensus has been reached in both the 
United States and Britain that the welfare state should to be reformed. 
The economic role of the state has been reappraised and the anti-state 
climate has gained greater prominence, both of which have cleared the 
way for a massive dismantling of public undertakings. The privatization 
movement, which generally refers to the delegation to private businesses 
of fundamental tasks traditionally associated with governance, has gained 
great momentum. This has been done in the hope of shaking up the 
                                        
114   The current Donald Trump presidency epitomizes perfectly the trend of the 
businesslike state. One of Trump‘s ‗shadow advisers‘ is the Blackwater founder Erik 
Prince who champions a private military alternative to a recommitment of uniformed 
personnel in Afghanistan. It has also been revealed recently that Prince is pitching the 
idea of privatizing functions of the CIA to the White House as a means of countering 
‗deep state‘ enemies in the intelligence community seeking to undermine Trump‘s 
presidency.  
115 The two most powerful converging forces currently affecting the world economy and 
global politics are the forces of privatization and globalization. Although it is ironic that 
the very moment that the nation-state is called upon to fight against the unprecedented 
concentration of global capital, its size is shrinking and its capacity is squeezed by the 
privatization movement and the political demands for devolution of power. 
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current governmental bureaucracies and increasing efficiency, innovation 
and responsiveness.116 It began in Britain when Margaret Thatcher took 
office in 1979 and engaged in a sweeping privatization agenda. 117 
Throughout the 1980s, the Thatcher government shed major assets and 
responsibilities.118 In America, as early as 1955 the former Bureau of the 
Budget issued a directive that discouraged federal agencies from 
producing for themselves any ‗product or service [which] can be procured 
from private enterprise through ordinary business channels‘.119 However, 
it during the Reagan administration that the privatization movement 
officially began. 120  It is noteworthy that there is a major difference 
between privatization in these two countries because historically fewer 
assets have been state-owned in the United States. America has never 
had as many public enterprises and assets as Britain has had, especially 
considering its entirely private telecommunications, steel and oil 
industries, and the overwhelmingly private rail, gas and electricity 
industries. In this sense, while privatization has been mostly a matter of 
selling off public enterprises in Britain (such as British Gas and British 
Telecom), in America it just means enlisting private energies to improve 
the performance of governmental tasks.121  
                                        
116 There is another kind of government transformation associated with privatization, 
namely the so-called ‗marketization of the bureaucracy‘. Government agencies radically 
overhaul their in-house employment practices in accordance with the private sector: 
hundreds of thousands of tenured civil servants have been reclassified as at-will 
employees to make sure they internalized the pressures, demands, and incentives of the 
competitive private labor market. See Jon D Michaels, Constitutional Coup: 
Privatization‘s Threat to the American Republic (Harvard University Press 2017).  
117 See generally Madsen Pirie, Dismantling the State (National Center for Policy Analysis 
1985); Peter Young and Stuart Butler, Privatization: Lessons from British Success Stories 
(International Briefing No 15, The Heritage Foundation, 1987). 
118 It sold British Gas, British Telecom, Jaguar, British Airways, the Sealink ferry service, 
all or part of its stakes in British Sugar, British Aerospace, British Petroleum and British 
Steel, as well as nearly one million public housing units and various public utilities. 
119  Bureau of the Budget, Bulletin 55-4, 1955. This policy was reformulated by the 
successor agency, the Office of Management and Budget, as Circular A-76 in the late 
1960s, which later became the label for federal-level privatization. 
120 See generally, Peter Young, Privatization around the Globe: Lessons for the Reagan 
Administration (National Center for Policy Analysis 1986); Stuart Butler, ‗How Reagan 
Can Put Privatization Back on Track‘ (December 1986).  
121 With respect to privatization in America, see generally Emanuel S Savas, Privatizing 
the Public Sector: How to Shrink Government (Chatham House 1985). 
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This difference can be understood more easily by differentiating between, 
on the one hand, the privatization of the ‗producing‘ agents (i.e. shifting 
the production of public goods and services to private providers) and the 
privatization of the means of ‗financing‘ (i.e. shifting the financing of 
public goods and services from using public fiscal resources to charging 
individual consumers directly, often in infrastructure sectors though 
occasionally with government subsidies) on the other hand.122 Obviously, 
the latter is more radical in the sense that it represents a shift from a 
‗collective‘ decision-making process (the political procedure) to an 
‗individual‘ decision-making process (the market mechanism), and 
significantly shrinks the government – as long as government‘s size is 
measured not by the number of its employees but by the proportion of 
the nation‘s resources gathered under the government to achieve 
collective goals. In addition, though the privatization movement has often 
gone hand in hand with the deregulation movement, they are not 
identical. Deregulation challenges the economic role of government over 
the economy based on the idea that government regulation is 
overzealous and needs to be reined in. The deregulation movement seeks 
to end government regulatory programmes that are unnecessary, 
inefficient or counterproductive.  
 
Privatization poses the question of what can private agencies do for 
government and what the government should be doing for itself. It is 
true that efficiency and accountability need not to be in opposition to one 
another, but when efficiency dominates, as in the case of privatization, it 
might clash with accountability and so undermine democratic values.123 
By reviving the concept of the public/private distinction, public law 
scholars suggest using this concept to reserve the ‗inherent public 
                                        
122 John D Donahue, The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means (Basic Books 
1989) 131. 
123 See generally, Alfred C Aman, The Democracy Deficit: Taming Globalization Through 
Law Reform (NYU Press 2004). 
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functions‘ in the hands of government. Verkuil has argued that, although 
long-standing practices assume that contracting-out ‗inherent 
government functions‘ is not permitted, the pro-privatization environment 
has eroded whatever limits that phrase implies. He suggests the national 
legal system can put a limit on privatization and retain a core of activities 
as inherently public (such as in the Israeli Supreme Court case regarding 
prisons).124  
 
Perhaps, the challenge for the market economy and governance of the 
twenty-first century is to continuously invent some new public-private 
hybrid to accommodate the new reality. The increased reliance on public-
private partnerships (PPPs) to help struggling governments in their efforts 
to achieve social goals perhaps indicates a compromise approach to 
privatization, offering a ‗third way‘ to view government and regulation. 
However, the idea of PPPs is hardly a new one. PPPs have been used in 
urban economic development for at least a century and have been used 
in the Western exploration and development of trade with both the New 
World and the Far East for at least four centuries. The very concept of the 
joint-stock corporation grew out of the combination of state authority 
(the power of various monopolies) with private economic pursuits as 
early as the sixteenth century, though concerns have been constantly 
expressed that the public side of PPPs are routinely overmatched by the 
private side.  
 
 
 
                                        
124 Verkuil (n 109). 
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3. Theoretical Foundation III: The 
Distinction between Public Law and Private 
Law 
In both civil law and common law systems, the laws that are applied to 
the government and those that are applied to the corporation and the 
individual, are subject to different legal regimes with different principles 
and inner values. A division of labor is involved here: while the 
responsibility of public law is to control the government by both limiting 
and regulating it to duly perform its basic duties, the responsibility of 
private law is to provide the corporation and the individual with a fair 
starting point and a safe environment in the pursuit of their individual 
ends using their own resources.125 This is also based on the belief that 
since public officials and agencies have special privileges, either the 
legitimate exercise of coercive power over citizens or the monopoly in 
certain fields, they should bear special responsibilities and duties for their 
activities, such as the duty of procedural fairness and so on, and thus 
subject to a set of special regime of law, namely the public law.  
 
Public law concerns the Constitution and the maintenance and regulation 
of a centralized, distinct and identifiable governmental authority. Its main 
constituent elements are constitutional law, administrative law, criminal 
law and sometimes international law.126 The inner values of public law 
                                        
125 See generally Ronald Dworkin, Law‘s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986); John 
Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press 2005); Arthur Ripstein, Force and 
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University Press 2012).  
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executive and judicial, administrative law focuses primarily on the executive function, 
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generally include accountability, transparency, due process and 
participation. It deals primarily with relations between citizens and the 
government. Given the state is believed to have a propensity to be 
irresponsible, abusive and discriminatory, the most pressing goal for 
public law is to subject governmental administration strictly to a distinct 
body of law. 127  Private law, on the other hand, is concerned with 
regulating interpersonal relationships between free and equal individuals 
and corporations. It encompasses foremostly, amongst other things, tort 
law, contract law and property law. The ultimate goal of private law is to 
fulfill human needs; in other words, to ‗maximize the total satisfactions of 
valid human wants‘.128 
 
If the liberal public/private distinction is mainly about both limiting the 
regulation of the state in the market and guaranteeing the protection of 
the rights and interests of private parties, then it is the presence of 
‗public law‘ that instantiates the fundamental ideology of a ‗democratic, 
rule of law-bound state‘.129 Public law, grounded on the profound distrust 
of government, not only sets the boundary of government activities in 
order to create a free space for civil society to flourish, but also specifies 
the responsibilities of the government in order to guarantee the well-
function of the market and civil society. The private sphere of social 
relations and the economy is governed by private law in a self-sufficient 
and autonomous manner as private law is presumptively established on a 
scientific foundation stripped of political ideology. Currently, in many 
areas of American legal scholarship, such as bankruptcy, contracts and 
commercial law, the so-called scientific foundation of private law is almost 
                                                                                                           
institutions that perform them. See Peter Cane, Administrative Law (Oxford University 
Press 2011) 3-4.    
127 Having said this, it has been argued that public law‘s preoccupation with discretion is 
not practically fruitful. See Christopher Edley, Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial 
Control of Bureaucracy (Yale University Press 1990). 
128 Henry Melvin Hart and others, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and 
Application of Law (Foundation Press 1994) 114.  
129 See generally Adam Tomkins, Public Law (Oxford University Press 2003). It describes 
the development of English public law.  
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identical to the employment of economic approach to design the most 
efficient legal institution, most of which are founded on rational choice 
theory.       
 
Civil law tradition  
The distinction between public law and private law has its roots in ancient 
Roman Law, and the earliest clear definition could be found in Justinian‘s 
Digest. According to Ulpian‘s description, 
There are two branches of legal study: public and private law. Public law 
is that which respects the establishment of the Roman commonwealth, 
private that which respects individuals’ interests, some matters being of 
public and others of private interest.130  
 
The distinction between public law and private law reappeared during the 
renaissance of Roman law in the late Middle Ages, but it lacked 
institutional significance for a long time as it was not compatible with the 
feudal setting. But the distinction was still preserved superficially. The 
compilers of Justinian‘s Institutes simply adopted the Roman classification 
of private law into persons, actions, and things, which placing obligations 
illogically under things (though they included titles on criminal law and 
the office of the judge). 131  The revival of Roman law in the twelfth 
century did not develop public law very much. As the compilers declared 
that all law concerns either persons, actions or things, leaving public law 
as ‗an indeterminate residue rather than as a residual category‘. 132 
Nevertheless, one important source, under the heading De statu 
hominum in Justinian‘s Digest stated that ‗since all law is established for 
the sake of human beings, we first need to consider the status of such 
                                        
130 The Digest of Justinian, Vol I, extract from Ulpian‘s Institutes, D. 1.1.1.2.  
131 PG Stein, ‗The Development of the Institutional System‘ in PG Stein, Joseph Anthony 
Charles Thomas and ADE Lewis (eds), Studies in Justinian‘s Institutes: In Memory of 
J.A.C. Thomas (Sweet & Maxwell 1983) 151.  
132 JWF Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law: A Historical and 
Comparative Perspective on English Public Law (Oxford University Press 1996) 111.  
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persons, before we consider anything else‘.133 The word status came to 
designate the legal standing of all sorts and conditions of men, in which 
the ruler‘s status was described as enjoying a distinctive ‗estate royal‘. As 
a result, whenever a legal question about the ruler was raised, it has 
been emphasized as an issue about a state of majesty and a high estate. 
This formula could be observed in chronicles and official documents 
throughout the latter half of the fourteenth century in the well-
established monarchies of France and England.  
 
In the late sixteenth century, absolutist monarchy achieved administration 
centralization, and the modern concept of government began to 
crystallize. 134  In the eighteenth century, the separation between the 
executive power and the judicial power emerged.135 It was only until the 
nineteenth century that the distinction between public law and private 
law acquired some significance in continental jurisprudence, especially in 
French law. Napoleon held the firm conviction that judges must never be 
allowed to impede the actions of the government. He did this by 
reconstituting two sets of courts: one was ordinary judicial courts dealing 
with private and criminal cases, and the other was administrative courts 
that connected with the government administration. It was these 
administrative courts that developed the distinctive droit administrative in 
France law. The nature of French droit administrative was composed of 
two main ideas: (1) relations between the government (and its officials) 
and private citizens must be regulated by a distinctive body of laws, 
which may differ considerably from the laws that governed relations 
between private persons; (2) ordinary judicial tribunals that determined 
                                        
133 The Digest of Justinian I, 5.2: 35. 
134 The concept of modern government was first described in Bodin‘s work The Six 
Books of a Commonweale (1583). Also see Quentin Skinner, ‗The State‘ in Terence Ball, 
James Farr and Russell L Hanson (eds), Political Innovation and Conceptual Change 
(Cambridge University Press 1989) 349.  
135 Montesquieu‘s analysis in The Spirit of the Laws (Esprit des Lois, 1748) Book XI, ch 6 
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ordinary questions, either civil or criminal, must have no concern with 
matters between a private person and the state.136  
 
French Revolution seemed to be a destructive example of what could be 
done in the name of the general will (as promoted by Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau‘s notion of an infallible general will). Benjamin Constant 
criticized Rousseau for establishing the unlimited sovereignty of the 
people without clarifying a workable relationship between it and 
government. Unlike Rousseau, he was reconciled to the idea of the 
representative government and justified the legal control over such 
government, either through individual rights of surveillance or through 
legal control over governmental administration.137 Later, the Doctrinaire 
Liberals and Tocqueville focused upon how administrative centralization 
became the outcome of the Revolutionary history of France. The 
perception of a centralized, distinct and identifiable administration 
rendered it possible to subject the government administration to a 
distinct body of public law. The prominence of the distinction between 
public law and private law culminated in the establishment of a separate 
system of courts for resolving public-law disputes in nineteenth-century 
France: the establishment of the Tribunal des Conflits, as the extended 
jurisdiction of the Conseil d‘Etat, marked the first declaration of the 
formal autonomy of public law. 138  The public law thus has been 
continually developed by the Conseil d‘Etat. 
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Adoption by common law 
The distinction between public law and private law was little known in 
England before the twentieth century. The relative success of the 
institutional changes of the seventeenth century meant that the 
institutions of British public life in the early twentieth century had never 
been under sufficient ‗strain‘ to raise these phenomenological questions 
about laws on government in a pressing form.139  While the economic 
troubles of the seventeenth-century resulted in an extensive 
administrative centralization in France, the similar economic problems 
gave rise to legislative and judicial centralization in England. This meant 
that unlike the alliance between the Crown and the bourgeoisie against 
the feudal nobility in France, in England there was an alliance between 
the nobility and the bourgeoisie in the destruction of royal bureaucracy.140 
This precluded England the development of a theory of popular 
sovereignty conducive to administrative centralization, but promoted, 
instead, the parliamentary sovereignty and the supremacy of the 
common-law courts.141  
 
In the nineteenth century, despite the fact that the English administrative 
system began the process of centralization, the legal concepts of the 
state and the constitution were still left theoretically unelaborated due to 
the general insularity from political theory and political reality of legal 
scholars and practicing lawyers. The rationale of the administrative role of 
the government was express obscurely by a prescriptive laissez-faire 
theory of the time. Or, perhaps, there is something especially ‗un-English‘ 
about public law, as there was not no separation between the ‗office-
holder‘ and the ‗office‘. English law traditionally used the concept of the 
                                        
139 FW Maitland, ‗Translator‘s Introduction‘ in to Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the 
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140 See generally Allison (n 132). 
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Crown as corporation sole and the concept of the person as the individual 
official to deal with the affairs of the state and the government. As Barker 
has identified, the state barely existed in English law, and Hale, 
Blackstone, and Austin all dealt with public issues under the law of 
person. In this sense, Barker concluded that ‗our State is on its executive 
side a bundle of officials, individually responsible for their acts, and only 
united by a mysterious Crown which is responsible for nothing and serves 
chiefly as a bracket to unite an indefinite series of 1+1+1‘.142 Indeed, the 
modern British legal history could be said to be based precisely upon a 
rejection of the idea of public law.143 Thanks to the Victorian jurist AV 
Dicey, this rejection is perfectly justified. Popularizing Tocqueville‘s 
theoretical criticism of the Conseil d‘Etat, Dicey argued that French public 
law essentially privileged and protected public officials, especially when 
compared to the English legal system that subjected public officials 
equally to the general law in a uniform way with citizens. He 
differentiated the meaning of ‗independence of the judges‘ in England 
from that in France. As he argued, in France: 
… while the ordinary judges ought to be irremovable and thus 
independent of the executive, the government and its officials ought 
(whilst acting officially) to be independent of and to a great extent free 
from the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts.144   
 
In contrast, in England:  
… the idea of legal equality, or of the universal subjection of all classes 
to one law administered by the ordinary courts, has been pushed to its 
utmost limit. With us every official, from the Prime Minister down to a 
constable or a collector of taxes, is under the same responsibility for 
every act done without legal justification as any other citizen.145  
 
This normative commitment to the equality between government official 
and citizen eliminates any possible exemption of officials ‗from the duty of 
                                        
142 Ernest Barker, ‗The Discredited State: Thoughts on Politics before the War‘ (1915) 2 
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obedience to the law which governs other citizens‘, nor ‗from the 
jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals‘. 146  By arguing that ‗rule of law‘ 
admits no separation between public law and private law, Dicey thus 
concludes that there can nothing in England really corresponding both to 
the ‗administrative law‘ (droit administrative) or the ‗administrative 
tribunals‘ (tribunaux administratifs) of France.147  
 
Needless to say, the distinction between public law and private law has 
apparently been adopted (at least on the surface) by English law since 
the twentieth century, especially in relation to the reformed application 
for judicial review. 148  But it has still been the subject of ongoing 
debate.149 It appears that Dicey‘s ‗rule of law‘ argument continues to be 
relevant, and in fact has been further developed. For example, in case 
Regina v Somerset County Council ex parte Fewings, Justice Laws states:  
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Public bodies and private persons are both subject to the rule of law … 
But the principles which govern their relationship with the law are 
wholly different. For private persons, the rule is that you may do 
anything you choose which the law does not prohibit. It means that the 
freedoms of the private citizen are not conditional upon some distinct 
and affirmative justification for which he must burrow in the law 
books … But for public bodies the rule is opposite, and so of another 
character altogether. It is that any action to be taken must be justified by 
positive law. A public body has no heritage of legal rights which it enjoys 
for its own sake; at every turn, all of its dealings constitute the 
fulfilment of duties which it owes to others; indeed, it exists for no 
other purpose.150 
 
The focal point is still on whether creating an autonomous body of public 
law would in fact protect the officials or limit them. As Freedland has 
observed, for English lawyers ‗the drawing of the distinction between 
public law and private law has become a wonderfully intricate mixture of 
taxonomy and ideology, as the drawing of the distinction between 
Common Law and Equity used to be, and perhaps for not wholly 
dissimilar reasons‘.151  
 
Modern Skepticism  
In the contemporary context, while traditional private law still retains a 
prominent position on the European continent, American law has clearly 
shifted its focus from substantive private law to a legal regime centered 
on public and procedural law. This was stimulated by the emergence of 
the American Legal Realist movement of the 1920s and 1930s.152 The 
conventional distinction between public law and private law thus has 
been tremendously challenged. It was argued that when private law was 
examined from a functional perspective, its assumed neutrality was 
                                        
150 Regina v Somerset County Council ex parte Fewings and Others [1995] 1 ALL ER 513, 
524.  
151 Mark Freedland, ‗The Evolving Approach to the Public/Private Distinction in English 
Law‘ in Mark R Freedland and Jean-Bernard Auby, The Public Law/Private Law Divide 
(Hart 2006) 
152 For an authoritative collection of readings on legal realism, see Dennis Hutchinson, 
History of American Legal Thought II: The American ‗Legal Realists‘ (University of 
Chicago Press 1984).  
 
57 
totally debunked by its hidden public nature and the political distributive 
effects.153 For example, Cohen argues that because both property rights 
and contract rights were enforced by the state, the ‗rights‘ should be 
conceived as delegated public powers subject to the rules of public 
accountability.154 In a similar sense, Hale points out that the use of force 
to guarantee private property (property itself determining the distribution 
of income) implied that the free market was an artifact of public 
violence.155 The implication of this kind of viewpoint is that private law, 
which seems satisfied with ostensible independence and formal equality 
of human relationships, should not be immunized from a genuine liberal 
commitment to self-determination and substantive equality. As Horwitz 
concludes, ‗by 1940, it was a sign of legal sophistication to understand 
the arbitrariness of the division of law into public and private realm‘.156  
 
Nevertheless, by the 1950s, as most of the changes that advocated by 
legal realists had been adopted, it was widely believed that private law 
had been restored to a position of political neutrality.157 The ‗scientific‘ 
nature of private law is understood as generated from its economic 
approach to produce complex and sophisticated analyses of the incentive 
effects of different liability rules and social policies.158 Still, both critical 
legal studies and public choice theory have contributed to the 
pervasiveness of the view that there is no purely private realm and no 
purely public one. Kelsen‘s argument is widely quoted when discussing 
the unwieldiness of the distinction: ‗the distinction between public and 
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private law thus varies in meaning upon whether it is criminal law or 
administrative law that one wishes to separate from private law. The 
distinction is useless as a common foundation for a general 
systematization of law.‘ 159  Verkuil has expressed a similar idea in 
metaphor in stating that: ‗if the law is a jealous mistress, then the public-
private distinction is like a dysfunctional spouse—you can‘t live with it and 
you can‘t live without it. It has been around forever, but it continues to 
fail as an organizing principle.‘160   
 
The confusion somehow intensifies once the distinction between public 
law and private law goes international. It has been argued that the 
traditional public/private distinction only acts as an effective ‗stabilizer‘ by 
projecting given values to the international level, recreating a ‗familiar‘ 
legal regime beyond the state.161 But this projection can be problematic: 
since the state is not only a subject but also the source of international 
law, there is no guarantee that the values and mechanisms behind the 
public/private distinction will remain the same. In fact, once the 
public/private distinction transcends their contexts of origin into the 
‗multipolar‘ global legal space, public law and private law begin to imitate 
each other, adopting and replicating the mechanisms and instruments 
from the other side, to move toward ‗a genuine global law‘. Casini 
borrows Lewis Carroll‘s ‗rabbit-hole‘ to describe this hybrid public-private 
global law and treats it as an opportunity for public law and private law to 
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move from their long-standing mutual indifference and collaborate with 
each other. This interbreeding process, argued by Casini, would better 
suit the contemporary social practices, which characterized by multitude 
fragmentation and thus could no longer be analyzed by a single binary 
distinction between the public and the private. 
 
Furthermore, since the early twentieth century, feminist legal scholarship 
has provided the most trenchant and systematic criticism of the 
public/private distinction in the legal field, which continues to date. 
Through the lens of power, feminism has exposed the dark side of the 
public/private distinction as a legal technique to obscure the regressive 
features of private law and to improperly shield it from critical scrutiny 
and possible government intervention. It is argued that the public/private 
distinction is not so much an innocent analytic category that was 
naturally formulated according to the social fact, but rather a discursive 
artefact that serves a very strong ideological function of hiding the hand 
of the state in maintaining the hierarchical structure of the private sphere. 
Various dominations (patriarchal, class, racial and so on) are obscured by 
the propagation of a public/private dichotomy, pretending that social and 
economic life are outside government and law, and whose arrangements 
have simply arisen from individual decisions and choices.162 Such criticism 
is so powerful that Weintraub even claims that the public/private 
distinction has now literally moved from the ‗liberal-economistic‘ 
formulation to the ‗Marxist-feminist‘ one.163  
 
For feminists themselves, the public/private distinction provides them 
with a certain language of analysis that ‗promises to confer a unity upon 
the investigations of the diverse social, legal and economic practices 
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within which women are subordinated‘. 164  Without such a central 
organizing theme, feminists previously could only tie up concrete 
instances of oppression and domination with either general networks of 
social power or specific and immediate strategies for reform. Now, each 
of the contingent and local cases can be understood in terms of the 
division and opposition of public and private spheres. No wonder 
Pateman declared that ‗it [the public/private distinction] is, ultimately, 
what the feminist movement is about‘.165  
 
The normative dimensions of the feminist critique are perfectly 
encapsulated in the maxim that ‗the personal is the political‘.166 Feminists 
argue for a ‗double separation of the public/private distinction‘, namely a 
sub-separation between the private and the public within civil society 
itself. The private sphere within the civil society is the domain of the 
family, the household, or the domestic (sometimes also intimacy), the 
‗forgotten‘ area for liberal theorists. Reviving this forgotten area is 
important because on the one hand it is impossible to detach individual 
economic activity of civil society from domestic life since the worker 
(invariably taken to be a man) can only concentrate on his work when his 
wife performs (unpaid) all the ‗natural‘ activities, such as providing food, 
washing and cleaning, and taking care of the children.167 On the other 
hand, it helps us realize that the social life of women in this area should 
not be conceived as a matter of individual ability but as public factors 
structured by laws and by policies. As Benhabib has argued, any issues 
should become matters of public-political dispute if they are reflexively 
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challenged ‗from the standpoint of the asymmetrical power relations 
governing them‘.168  
 
Public Interest 
The legal concept of the ‗public interest‘ deserves some special 
examination here, as it has played a fundamental/contentious role in 
legitimating the invasion of public power into the private sphere in 
common law systems, especially during the New Deal period in America. 
After all, based on liberal ideology, in a democratic society, all 
government actions are presumptively based on, and justified by 
reference to, the concept of the ‗public interest‘.169 And ―one commonly 
held distinction between government and market organizations is that 
government should work in the ‗public interests‘.‖170 In the name of public 
interest, the governmental interventions mainly occur in the areas of 
health care, housing, education and in providing other ‗essential‘ services 
such as electricity gas, water, transport and oil. The common law has 
used the notion of ‗public interest‘ in both a negative sense and a positive 
sense. In terms of negative, the courts have used this term to deny some 
private rights and duties arising in the agreements and activities of 
individuals and corporations. For example, the courts will not enforce a 
duty of secrecy if the disclosure of the secret is the public interest. For 
the positive sense, the common law goes beyond the prohibitory usage 
and employs public interest as a justification for governmental imposition 
of obligations upon individuals and corporations. It is this positive sense 
of public interest that this section is mainly concerned with.   
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(1993) 6 History of the Human Sciences 97. 
169  Paul R Verkuil, ‗Understanding the ―Public Interest‖ Justification for Government 
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Historically, English judges, in the absence of a division between private 
law and public law, have particularly focused their attention on the 
conception of public interest to protect ‗the specific interest of the state 
or the community to which private interests may sometimes have to give 
away‘.173 As early as medieval time, the common law has already used 
‗public interest‘ to subjected ‗common carriers‘, whose labors or services 
were made available to the public, to absolute liability when they 
exercised their economic powers to raise prices and restrict output. These 
regulations included: ‗a common laborer was obliged to serve 
whomsoever sought and retained him; common hostelers and common 
victuallers had to sell their food at market price; the common gaoler had 
definite duties in relation to the reception and care of prisoners.‘174 These 
common callings also had a uniform ‗public duty‘ to serve all comers to 
the extent of their particular calling and could only charge reasonable 
rates for their services. At least since the middle of the seventeenth 
century, the public interest regulation has been furnished with a new 
theory by the common law to limit private enterprise: the public interest 
regulation could also be invoked ‗if an individual or corporation is given a 
charter or franchise by the Crown or by Parliament to provide service to 
the public generally, and if the effect of that charter or franchise is to give 
that individual etc. a legal or de facto monopoly in that service.‘175 Yet, 
these two paralleled applications of the public interest regulation slowly 
gave way to the idea of liberalism. It not only led to a contraction of the 
types of the common callings and finally limited them to only three types, 
namely the innkeeper, the common carrier and the ferryman. But the 
courts also became increasingly reluctant to apply the public interest 
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regulation on private service: in the courts‘ view, if the activities of 
service corporations were to be regulated, it was for Parliament and 
Parliament alone to effect such regulation.176   
 
While the public interest encountered a total abdication in England, it 
somehow revived in America. In the case Munn v. Illinois, the U. S. 
Supreme Court has applied the public interest regulation to the situation 
of monopoly power and declared that it has been subjected to state 
control since the earliest times.177 By referring to Lord Chief Justice Hale‘s 
treatise, the court argued that when private property is ‗affected with a 
public interest‘, it ceases to be juris privati only. This revival of the public 
interest regulation endowed the states substantive regulatory power over 
private entities, and after the Munn decision, the regulation of monopoly 
had later been developed into statutory status in the form of the 
Sherman Act.178 The case Munn v. Illinois was thus a watershed in the 
struggle for public regulation of the private enterprise, though, as some 
scholar has commented, trying to apply the fact of ‗common carriers‘ to 
the ‗shifting sands‘ of monopoly power made no economic sense.179  
 
More significantly, during the New Deal period, the term ‗public interest‘ 
was consistently employed in the Congresses‘ delegations of legislative 
authority to the expanded administrative agencies of the federal 
government. Motivated by the redistributive goals of remedying market 
failure and of solving problems of non-transactional costs, New Dealers 
interpreted the public interest as the utilitarian concept of the greatest 
good for the greatest number. Admonished to act in ‗the public interest, 
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convenience and necessity‘, a phalanx of agencies was created by 
Congress, equipped with legislative, executive, and judicial powers. 180 
New Deal leaders approached the regulatory state with a great optimism. 
Believed in the ‗science of administration‘ and the value of expertise, they 
argued that the delegation of complicated decisions to talented regulators 
overseen by the courts would produce the genuine public interest, and 
legislature should have a free hand in making the social choices inherent 
in the regulatory state. The courts also supported this commitment of 
New Deal leaders. During the New Deal period, the concept of public 
interest was first explored by Justice Brandeis in Muller v. Oregon.181 
Influenced heavily by Gerald Henderson, who was then a public law 
scholar and the architect for the science of administration, Justice 
Brandeis constructed the idea of the public interest through the tools of 
economic analysis, financial acumen, and an inherit sense of fair play.182 
Later in the case National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, Justice 
Frankfurter established the utilitarian concept of the ‗public interest‘ by 
equating it with securing ‗the maximum benefits of ratio to all the people 
of the United States‘. 183   
 
4. Methodology: The Cambridge School and 
Contextualization  
In examining the genealogy of the distinction between the public state 
and the private corporation, one method that this study has heavily relied 
upon is that of contextualization. As early as the 1960s, Quentin Skinner 
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has already emphasized the importance of contextualization in studying 
intellectual history by problematizing the traditional paradigm of direct 
interpretation. 184  According to him, in the center of the traditional 
paradigm there is a set of perennial ‗fundamental concepts‘, on which the 
scholars relied to analysis the ‗classic texts‘. Those concepts are the 
category we used to classify the unfamiliar, unintelligible and 
heterogeneous ‗text‘ into our familiar, intelligible and homogeneous 
modern discourse. However, the moment we try to define those concepts 
in order to conduct our research, we have already established the frame 
of reference and preconceptions about what we expect to find. In other 
words, these preconceptions will ‗act as determinants of what we think or 
perceive‘.  As Skinner has argued, this is simply the old and familiar 
epistemological dilemma that ‗by our past experience we are sent to 
perceive details in a certain way‘, ‗the process is one of being prepared to 
perceive or react in a certain way‘.185  
 
Skinner‘s discussion of contextualization is an essential part of the so-
called ‗linguistic turn‘ in intellectual history, of which John Pocock and 
John Dunn are also important. The product is the establishment of the 
Cambridge School of Political Thought. This concern, in fact, was 
coincidence with the ‗representation crisis‘ in the discipline of 
anthropology, which literally changed the whole discourse of anthropology. 
The reflexive interaction and distance ‗between the things‘ we study and 
‗the frame we used to study them‘, between ‗ourselves‘ and ‗our objects 
of our study‘ are a constant methodological starting point. 186 The typical 
method for overcoming the traditional paradigm is to contextualize the 
writer‘s work both with the material reality and the common sense 
system of his time, aiming to locate the specific question that the writer 
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was responding to. The material reality refers to the social, political and 
economic environment, and the common sense system refers to 
something like the ideological principles. According to Clifford Geertz, the 
contextualizing process should be conducted in a manner of a ‗continuous 
dialectical tracking‘ back and forth between the abstract and the concrete, 
between the whole and the parts. The abstract ideology principle 
motivates, makes sense of each concrete symbol part; the each symbol 
part actualizes, substantiates and in turn proves the existence the 
abstract whole.187  
 
In recent years, the influence of the Cambridge School has extended to 
other academic disciplines, such as the history of international law and 
international relationships. Consequently, there is a so-called ‗colonial 
turn‘ of the Cambridge School, which aims at exposing the ‗dark side of 
rights theories‘. Specifically, there is a growing suspicion that the natural 
right theories of Locke and Grotius might have been served to justify 
Western imperialism and colonialism in the early modern period.188 Within 
this field of intellectual history, the most distinctive achievement perhaps 
is Richard Tuck‘s re-interpretation of the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius‘ 
work.189 Tuck points out that the theory of property rights outlined by 
Grotius was expedient to the Dutch opposition to the claimed Portuguese 
monopoly over the East Indies trade. The same is true with one of 
Grotius‘ ‗extreme original‘ believes that sovereignty over the sea required 
countries to concede the right of innocent passage. In addition, according 
to Tuck, Grotius‘s support of the robust view of natural punishment, 
which allowed private persons to punish transgressors based on natural 
law in the absence of an independent and effective judge, also proved to 
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be beneficial to the Dutch and English East India Companies against the 
oppositions of Iberia and India. He even argues that Grotius altered his 
position later in order to legitimize the post-1619 Dutch practice of 
forcibly annexing native territory.  
 
Following this line of suspicion set by Tuck, Van Ittersum has signified the 
practical purposes for Grotius to develop his right and contract theories 
through reading the text in the context of his personal political aspiration 
and his collaboration with the directors of the Dutch East India Company 
(VOC). He argues that Grotius‘ theory was a line-by-line response to a set 
of practical problems faced by the VOC. 190  Similarly, exploring the 
ideological origins of the British Empire, David Armitage shows that Locke 
wrote chapter five of Second Treatise of Government in the summer of 
1682, when he was revising the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, a 
colonial project that he engaged to support his patron, the Earl of 
Shaftesbury. The sufficient similarity between these two suggests that it 
was not a coincidence. In chapter five, Locke adopted an essentially 
Grotian theory of private property, which led to the conclusion that the 
natives of North America did not deserve the ownership of their land 
because they only occupied it as hunter-gatherers.191 
 
Rich in historical and contextual detail, this claimed colonial turn of the 
Cambridge School was undoubtedly novel, and does present a prolific 
approach in reinvigorating the study of Grotius and his era of positivism. 
But to what extent it actually sticks to the intertextual approach that 
represented by the Cambridge School is questionable. The 
contextualization method that promoted by the Cambridge School not 
only requires an interpretation of the text from the perspective of its 
material reality, that is the social, political and economic environment in 
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which the text was produced, but also emphasis on locating the text 
within the symbol system it inhabited. It is this second layer of 
contextualization that features the ‗contextualist methodology‘ of the 
Cambridge School. There is the effort to read the work of earlier scholars 
within the intellectual milieu within which they found themselves, or the 
restoration of the intellectual debates that those canonical figures of 
Western philosophy engaged themselves in. In order words, in order to 
avoid the danger of ascribing the thoughts of an earlier period to some 
later concepts that unknown to them. The Cambridge School engages in 
exploring the original usage of the terminology at issue, especially by 
cross-examining the usages in the dominant thoughts by reference to 
their contemporary texts from the unrepresentative writers. The 
inevitable consequence of this kind of contextualization is to bring into 
prominence the opponents of these canonical figures, who unfortunately 
ended up on the wrong side of history. They either have been totally 
forgot, or recognized as ‗second-rate‘ pamphleteers and polemicists in the 
intellectual history. For example, in Machiavellian Moment, John Pocock 
has demonstrated that James Harrington‘s Oceana (1656), as one of the 
most important republican theorists in England in the seventeenth 
century, which overshadowed by Hobbes‘ Leviathan.192 Another famous 
example is Locke‘s defense of the right of resistance in fact first worked 
as a denunciation of Robert Filmer‘s Patriarcha (1630), an overlooked 
religious justification of monarchical government and of the divine right of 
the king.193  
 
Overall, the Cambridge School set a very much high expectation for a 
proper research of the intellectually history: it requires not only the in-
depth reading of the original works, but also the thorough research into a 
large record of the past texts. Though this study uses an amalgam of 
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sources, it has very little claim to this dignity. It nevertheless tries to 
contextualize the text with the social, economic and political environment. 
It also aware of the ‗opponent‘ of the writer, for example, how Maitland 
despised Austin and his doctrine of sovereignty.194 Considering the long 
span of time and the broad range of history it attempts to cover, it 
reluctantly chooses to base mostly on the reading of the (preeminent) 
secondary accounts of the historiography, and only limitedly on primary 
source. Such an approach is inevitably conditional and leaves this study 
open to criticism of many kinds. It also needs to address that when 
considered the success of any canonical figures to become the 
‗mainstream‘ narrative, they should not be explained as the mere effect 
of social forces by a crude form of determinism. This means that the 
certain ideology became predominant only because it speculatively 
favored the interest of the dominant social group (class).  
 
In terms of the epistemological standpoint of this study, when enduring 
and vexed question that whether it is possible to truly penetrate into 
other people‘s modes of thoughts (whether they are from other culture or 
they were in history) and represent them haunts almost all the social 
science and humanities, this study takes an stance from Clifford Geertz: 
Cultural analysis is (or should be) guessing at meanings, assessing the 
guesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions from the better guesses, 
not discovering the Continent of Meaning and mapping out its bodiless 
landscape.195  
The historical interpretation offered by this thesis is also in nature a 
guessing. Or, in a more advanced anthropological language, the 
interpretation is the product of a collaborative interaction between the 
interpreter (that is me) and the ‗text‘. Yet, the analysis of legal history 
was different from cultural analysis in the sense that law and legal 
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discourse has a rather strong constitutive effect in reality and a rather 
tight definition in history. It is still a guessing but more approximate to 
the truth.   
 
5. About this Thesis  
In tracing the history of the public/private distinction, this thesis chooses 
to particularly focus on English experience. England enjoys an 
incomparable situation in modern history as the first country to initiate 
the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century, which often serves as 
the starting-point of modern capitalism. This is the reason for Marx to use 
England as the chief illustration in the development of his theoretical 
ideas. Yet, many historians have recently highlighted, England was 
generally exceptional within Europe since the origin of modern, in terms 
of the great liberty that enjoyed by the individual.196 When Montesquieu 
arrived in England in 1729 to study the political and social system here, 
he suggested that the English have progressed the farthest of all peoples 
of the world in three important things: in piety (Protestantism), in 
commerce (trade), and in freedom (liberty). As he said, ‗I am here in a 
country which hardly resembles the rest of Europe,‘ he excitedly wrote, 
talking about how the English were ‗independent‘ ‗free people‘ that were 
passionately fond of ‗liberty‘ with a peculiar anti-authoritarian spirit.197 
Since the defining character of the liberal public/private distinction is 
premised on the very idea of economic freedom and individual liberty, the 
way in which the public/private distinction has been evolved in England is 
worthy examining. 
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Value 
This thesis addresses one of the most discussed political and legal 
conceptions at the moment, namely the public/private distinction by 
providing a coherent narrative of its historical genealogy. Secondly, this 
study would be of historic interest because it commits to an in-depth 
examination of several specific historical inquiries, including how the form 
of municipal corporation evolved from the traditional institution of 
franchise in common law, how the idea of the state transformed from the 
king‘s mystical body to an abstract public entity, and why the late-
nineteenth-century legal controversy over whether personifying the 
colonial governments as corporation was more than a mere legal 
technique issue, but should be read in context of the social, political and 
economic environment of that period. General speaking, it contributes to 
the intellectual history by juxtaposing the history of the idea of the 
public/private distinction, with those of the state and the corporation. 
Last but not least, this study would offer much the practical interest in 
terms of yielding some insights into various legal and political issues that 
associate with the problematic of the public/private distinction, such as 
how to rationalize the relationship between the welfare state and its 
citizens, how to keep privatization in democratic check, how to directly 
subject MNCs to international law. 
 
Structure  
This thesis is structured in seven chapters. The first chapter of 
Introduction situates the problematic of the public/private dichotomy in 
the current political and legal discourses. It explains its constitutive role 
in liberal legal and political thought, and delineates its developments 
since the twentieth century up to date. From Chapter II to Chapter VI, 
the paper has been arranged in a chronological order in telling the 
paralleled but closely-related intellectual histories of the state, the 
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corporation and the public/private distinction. Chapter II traces the origin 
of the public/private distinction to Aristotle‘s articulation of the distinction 
between the polis and the household, the origin of the state in the 
medieval theology of the king‘s two bodies, and the origin of corporation 
in the legal doctrine of franchise. Chapter III focuses on the early modern 
period and situates the inauguration of the modern distinction between 
the public state and the private property owner in the course of the 
nobility‘s enduring struggle against the king‘s arbitrary power. Chapter IV 
discusses the role that the emerging public sphere of the late-eighteenth-
century has played in questioning the East India Company‘s sovereignty 
in India. Chapter V focuses on Edmund Burke‘s public speeches in 
criticizing the East India Company and in impeaching Warren Hastings, 
which epitomized then public opinion requiring the public interest to be 
institutionally separated from the private interest. Chapter VI looks at the 
aftermath evolvement of the public/private distinction in the nineteenth 
century. It discusses how Adam Smith‘s laissez-faire doctrine finalized the 
public/private distinction into current liberal version, accompanied by the 
evidence found in American and English legal histories. The Conclusion 
chapter looks at the difference and the similarity between the state and 
the corporation by examining the ideology of individualism, the real entity 
theory of corporate personality, and Maitland‘s study of township. It 
shows how the focal points in rethinking the public/private distinction 
should be located on a renovated understanding of the complex 
interaction between the individual, the corporation and the state. Thus, 
tie thesis of the genealogy of the public/private distinction has come full 
circle to link up its historical evolution to its present predicament from the 
perspective of the relationship between the state and the corporation.  
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II. THE PRE-MODERN PHASE  
 
The public/private distinction is a conceptual category of ‗Greek origin 
transmitted to us bearing a Roman stamp‘.198 As is the case with many 
other long-lasting concepts, the current liberal interpretation of the 
public/private distinction has made use of the category that was inherited 
from earlier times. This chapter thus starts with examining the origin of 
the idea of the public/private distinction in the time of classical antiquity, 
and then moves on to discussing the dissolution of this distinction in the 
Middle Ages. Meanwhile, both the ideas of the state and the corporation 
inaugurated in medieval England in their antiquated forms, and at that 
time they were conceived neither as purely public, nor as purely private. 
Specifically, the earliest idea of picturing the state as 'body politic' might 
be originated from the theological concept of 'the King's two bodies', 
which was institutionalized in the common law by Tudor lawyers through 
personifying the Crown as 'corporation sole'. As to the prototype of the 
self-governing corporation in common law, it made use of the legal 
theory concerning the king's alienable prerogative right, known as 
franchise. In other words, the doctrine of franchise has been innovatively 
applied in the juristic conceptualization of the medieval township, whose 
modern version is the municipal corporation that are prevalent in America.        
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74 
6. The Origin of the Public/Private 
Distinction   
The earliest articulation of the public/private distinction could be traced 
back to Aristotle. In his Politics, Aristotle identified a division between the 
political association of polis, and the private association of household and 
family (oikos). 199  In the public sphere of polis, two human activities 
happened: one was Action (praxis), such as waging war and athletic 
competition, and the other was Speech (lexis), such as the consultation 
of and hearing the court of law.200 Action and Speech, had long been 
considered as the two highest human capacities and the only two 
activities that were considered as political activities. Political life in the 
polis had been considered to be the higher life by Aristotle, as it fulfilled 
the nature of man as a prior polis-animal.201 As to the private sphere of 
the household, each individual lived in his own domain, where ‗the 
reproduction of life, the labor of the slaves, and the service of the women 
went on under the aegis of the master‘s domination‘.202 The generally 
hostile or contemptuous attitude towards traders and merchants in the 
thought of antiquity reduced the economic life only to the necessity of life, 
which was sustained by the operation of the household.203  
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For many scholars, especially Hannah Arendt and her followers, Aristotle‘s 
polis/family opposition represents the ancient origin of the modern 
public/private distinction. 204  Others, however, argue that Arendt might 
oversimplify Aristotle‘s public/private construction by collapsing all 
household relationships into that of the despotism and by ignoring the 
intensive integration between the public polis and the private 
household. 205  Specifically, the need for the lifelong practice of virtue 
(agathos), which was crucial for citizens in the polis, should be developed 
earlier by the children in the household. In addition, Aristotle has 
carefully classified the art of household management into three types, 
namely slavery, parenthood and marriage, and has compared them with 
the relationships in the public realm. As he said, ‗the relation of the male 
to the female is permanently that in which the statesman stands to his 
fellow citizens. Paternal rule over children, on the other hand, is like that 
a king over his subjects.‘206 Nevertheless, the Hellenocentric separation 
between the polis and the household is still generally regarded as the 
origin of the public/private distinction. So does Arendt‘s interpretation of 
Aristotle have a wide currency in modern scholarship.     
 
The democratic polis  
Graeco-Roman Antiquity, including the early Hellenic polis and the later 
Roman res publica, represented the zenith of urban polity by its 
sophisticated city civilization. 207  Rather than being sustained by a 
corresponding urban economy, prosperous cities were the ‗urban 
congeries of agrarian proprietors‘, who relied overwhelmingly on the 
material wealth that drawn from rural agriculture (mainly corn, oil and 
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wine).208 Absolute in form and dominant in extent, the unprecedented 
predominance of slave-labor juxtaposed itself against the new Hellenic 
idea of liberty as and free citizenship. 209 The patrimonial slave economy 
and free citizenship were indivisible, as each was the structural condition 
of the other. As Anderson has concluded, ‗it was precisely the formation 
of a limpidly demarcated slave subpopulation that conversely lifted the 
citizenry of the Greek cities to hitherto unknown heights of conscious 
juridical freedom.‘210 
 
The prosperity of the city-state in ancient Greece brought every free 
citizen a sort of ‗second life‘ besides his private life, namely a public life 
(bios politikos). The public life was in the market (agora). The status of 
the citizen in the polis was premised upon his status as the unlimited 
master of the family. Being a master of the household meant a particular 
attachment to the certain house (the house was referring to its real 
physical form), and any exile, expropriation, or the destruction of the 
house would amount to the loss of his status in the polis. The control 
over moveable wealth and labor power was also necessary, as poverty 
and a lack of slaves would in themselves prevent the admission to the 
polis.  
 
The sphere of polis was considered much superior to that of the 
household not only because it represented the virtue of immortality, but 
because it was also a sphere of freedom without subordination, violence 
and force. Only in the polis that driven by the pursuit of virtue, freedom, 
transparency and permanence were possible. As Habermas wrote, ‗the 
virtues, whose catalogue was codified by Aristotle, were ones whose test 
lies in the public sphere and there alone receive recognition.‘211 The polis 
provided ‗an open field for honorable distinction‘: everything here became 
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visible to all equal citizens, who engaged in the competition for the best 
excellence, and gained their essence, which was the immortality of 
fame.212 People in the polis neither ruled nor were subjected to being 
ruled, and they dealt only with their peers. The central concern of all 
citizens in the polis was to talk with each other, as everything was 
decided through words and persuasion instead of through force and 
violence.213 Speech and only speech made sense here.214 
 
On the other hand, the driving force of the household were the 
necessities of life, the provision of wealth and health. It was an obscure 
sphere, as birth, life and death ‗shamefully‘ immersed themselves in the 
shadows. While the sphere of the polis represented the sphere of 
‗freedom‘, meaning to be free not only from the necessity of life (by the 
wealth and health that provided by the household), but also from the 
command of another. Life in the household, on the contrast, was 
characterized by its pre-political (as essentially barbarian) way of life, a 
life in which people might be forced by violence, or commanded rather 
than being persuaded. This was because that while in the polis there 
were ‗equal‘ relationships between citizens, the household was the center 
of the inequality with regard to the relationships between master and 
slave, parent and child, husband and wife. The household head was 
entitled to uncontested and despotic powers ruling in the sphere of 
household. This is the very reason why political life in the barbarian 
empires of Asia was frequently likened to the organization of the 
household.215 
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From explicating Aristotle‘s public/private distinction, Arendt further 
challenged contemporary political theories. For one thing, she argued 
that the idea of rulership that was prevalent in seventeenth-century 
political thought in fact originated from the private sphere instead of the 
public sphere as commonly assumed.216 This was because both rulership 
and government (especially in Hobbes‘s model) were essentially 
concerned with a monopoly of power and of violence, which was 
regarded as the only means for men to escape from the chaotic ‗state of 
nature‘. It was precisely the monopoly and violent nature of government, 
argued by Arendt, indicated that both government and power are by 
nature pre-political and belong to the private sphere. The same applied to 
the term ‗political economy‘. Arendt pointed out that the modern term 
‗political economy‘ is a self-contradictory term, since ―whatever was 
‗economic,‘ related to the life of the individual and the survival of the 
species, was a non-political, household affair by definition.‖ 217  In this 
sense, she pointed out that the function of the ‗social economy‘ was a 
mode of social housekeeping consisting of a collective subject of 
economic activity with a common purpose and values. Indeed, both 
Adam Smith and James Mill have also explicitly developed the analogy 
between how the individual runs his own household and how society 
operates.218  
 
It is important to be aware of that Aristotle‘s articulation of the 
public/private distinction was assumed to be a response to Plato‘s de-
householding plan. Although Plato and Aristotle are usually spoken of 
almost in one breath as the primary expounders of classical political 
theory, they were in fact divided on their views of the public/private 
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distinction. To Plato, his contemporary Greek city was marked by 
selfishness and ignorant inefficiency, dissolved by the ‗privatization of 
pleasures and pains‘.219 The best-governed city, according to Plato, should 
be like one person: all citizens rejoice and are pained by the same 
successes and failures, and people say the words ‗mine‘ and ‗not mine‘ 
about the same things in the same way.220 People ‗will think of the same 
things as their own, aim at the same goal, and, as far as possible, feel 
pleasure and pain in unison.‘221 However, it was the very existence of the 
private family that created exclusiveness. As Plato wrote, 
One would drag into his own house whatever he could separate from 
the others, and another would drag things into a different house to a 
different wife and children, and this would make for private pleasures 
and pains at private things.222  
 
In the worst case, a man even seize another man‘s property or seduce 
another man‘s wife. As a result, people would too busy wasting away 
their energies to fulfill the necessities of life, and would occupy 
themselves with material care and children. They have no time to think of 
the real life, the nobler life, which is the life of the spirit.223 ‗Pull down the 
walls,‘ Plato thus exclaimed, ‗they shelter at best a restricted family 
feeling; they harbor at the worst avarice and ignorance.‘ Plato‘s political 
plan for diminishing the individual household may be seen as a radically 
communal remedy to the deficiency of democracy, which eccentrically 
‗foresaw…an extension of the public sphere to the point of annihilation of 
private life altogether.‘224 
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Roman Law 
The polis for the Greeks was the res publica for the Romans. Unlike the 
Greeks, the Roman people never sacrificed the private life to the public 
life, although the private sphere was still viewed as a substitute for the 
public sphere. Taking slavery as an example: Roman slaves played a 
much more significant role in Roman culture and in the economic life of 
Roman people than in Greece. A Roman writer even believed that for 
slaves the household of the master was what the res publica was to 
citizens. Yet, a study of Roman later civilization would clearly show that it 
had abandoned the democratic ideals that embodied in the institution of 
polis. Montesquieu has demonstrated how the very successful predatory 
expansion of Roman Empire inevitable transformed itself from a republic 
into a despotic absolutism.225  As Montesquieu wrote, it was ‗the natural 
property of small states to be governed as republic, of middling ones to 
be subject to a monarchy, and of large empires to be swayed by a 
despotic prince…‘ 226  This famous summarization of the relationship 
between ‗the volume of the society‘ and the according political systems 
later has been signified by Durkheim.227  
 
Nevertheless, to some extend the distinction between the public and the 
private has been preserved by Roman Law. It stood at forefront of both 
Justinian‘s Institutes 228  and Digest 229  as the didactic distinction in the 
famous passages of the Corpus Iuris Civilis: ‗[h]uius studii duae sunt 
positions, publicum et privatum. publicum ius est quod ad statum rei 
Romanae spectat, privatum quod ad singulorum utilitatem.‘ ([t]his study 
has two aspects, public and private. Public law is that which concerns the 
Roman state, private that which concerns the well-being of individuals.) 
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However, this initiation was not of any technical significance to Roman 
lawyers, as there was nothing that provided, for example, for the 
immunity of magistrates or to the exemption of state from the rules of 
conveyancing.230  
 
This practical insignificance of the public/private distinction might be 
attributed to two features of the Roman law: for one thing, the casuistic 
and pragmatic Roman jurists were not minded to approach law 
systematically, nor to conceive of law as a whole, therefore they did not 
try to develop criteria through which to use the distinction effectively; for 
another, preoccupied with the private-law problems of inheritance, 
ownership, and obligations as a law of nature, the Roman jurists seem to 
avoid problems relating to the public ownership of law or public-law 
limitations on land ownership, which they regarded as time-bound, 
particular and thus unworthy of scholarly treatment. 231  In addition, 
public-law problems of magistrates were generally controlled through the 
senate and criminal prosecutions. For example, with reference to the 
example of Q. Scaevola, who had refused to give legal opinions on issues 
of public law, Cicero stressed that such opinions should be sought from 
practitioners – imperial administrators—rather than jurists.232 
 
Medieval Christianity  
If the public/private distinction was only formally visible in Roman Law, it 
lost even this last visibility during the Middle Ages. Arendt has claimed 
that during this time the private realm ‗devoured‘ the public realm in that 
the well-known antagonism of early Christianity towards the public realm 
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had reduced the significance of political activities from the pursuit of 
higher human ends to an unfavorable public burden. 233  Arendt has 
pointed out that after the downfall of the Roman Empire, it was the 
Catholic Church that supplanted the municipal government to offer men a 
substitute for citizenship. This was an attempt to recreate the imperial 
system of Rome under the patronage of Catholic Church, and thereby to 
unify and centralize the fragmented states of Western Christendom in a 
new Holy Roman Empire. Though it seems that the religious sphere 
replaced the polis as the new public sphere, there was a major difference 
between them: the medieval concept of the ‗common good‘, instead of 
implying the idea of public discussion or political community, only 
indicated the acknowledgment that private individuals have some shared 
material and spiritual interests that required the designation of someone 
to take care of. The otherworldliness of Christianity entailed a tendency to 
lead a life removed from the public realm as far as possible. Christian 
morality insisted that everybody should mind his own business and that 
political responsibility was regarded as an extra burden that cannot get 
rid of. At this point, the significance of public life was almost consciously 
weakened to the point of extinction.  
 
Habermas, on the other hand, has argued that the private realm and the 
public realm were simply fused together into one single unified authority, 
which was inseparable from the land in the feudal context. 234  The 
manorial authority known as private dominion (dominium), according to 
him, was comparable to the domestic authority of the household head, as 
they were only lower and higher ‗sovereignties‘ with eminent and less 
eminent prerogatives. According to him, the contrast between private 
dominion (dominium) and public autonomy (imperium) had not been 
developed until the eighteenth century, when manorial authority has been 
transformed into private landed property. The secular realm under the 
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rule of the feudalism was exactly what the private sphere of the 
household had been in the time of classical antiquity. The place of lands, 
as ‗fiefs‘, was the focal point in feudal lord-vassal relationship (as the cell 
form of political rule): they were granted by a lord to the vassal on 
limited tenure in return for their military services. The vassal exploited 
these tenures economically through the labor of a dependent peasantry, 
who was tied to the land and required to give their labor services, rents 
and dues in money and kind. Therefore, the vase population of the 
peasantry, which was at the base of the whole pyramid of feudalism, was 
only the object of rule and never the subject of any political relationship. 
The only significant difference between the feudal lord in medieval time 
and the master of the household in classical antiquity, perhaps, was that 
the feudal lord could render justice whereas the ancient household head 
didn‘t, even though he might exert a milder or harsher rule from time to 
time.  
 
Almost all secular activities were absorbed into the household sphere 
bearing only private significance. This related closely to the fact that the 
feudal system of production was centered in the household, for at its 
base, each individual household formed an independent center of 
production for itself. As Marx has described, Medieval England was 
basically a ‗natural economy‘, which meant that production is mainly for 
direct use rather than for exchange. In this basically subsistence and 
non-monetized society, a ‗peasant family‘ produced for its own use, not 
‗commodities‘ services and payment, when they were made to the lords, 
they were in kind. In fact, the modeling of all human relationships upon 
the example of the household reached so far that even medieval 
professional organizations in the cities, such as the guilds, confreries, 
compagnons, and the early business companies, were all molded on ‗the 
original joint household‘.235  
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7. The Origin of the State: From 'Body Politic' 
to the Crown as Corporation Sole  
The origin of the idea of the state has been constantly contested and 
brought about in a circular debate. Hobbes' Leviathan has been most 
mentioned with respect to the idea of conceiving the state as a 'body 
politic' (corpus politicum), and the inauguration of this idea was certainly 
inseparable from both the early corporation doctrine and the revival of 
Aristotle (owning to Aristotle, the state was not only interpreted as a 
'body politic', but also was also qualified as a 'moral' or 'ethical' body). 
But it has also been argued that the earliest conceptualization of the 
state as body politic might have originated in the medieval theology of 
the king's two bodies.236 Specifically, during the early stage of forming the 
secular idea of the state, the idea of the Church as the 'mystical body of 
Christ' (corpus Chriti mysticum) was inflated with secular idea of the state, 
transforming the latter one into the 'mystical body' of the King. The state 
as the 'mystical body of the King' was later conceptualized by Tudor 
lawyers as the legal institution of 'the Crown as corporation sole' to 
designate the earliest legal personality of the state in the common law.      
 
The state as ‘body politic’ 
The origin of the idea of 'body politic' could be traced back to the notion 
of the corpus mysticum, which defined the church as the 'mystical body 
of Christ' in the medieval ecclesiology.237 It not only signified the fact that 
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the church embodied transcendental and eternal values, but also 
underscored the totality of the Christian society as a ‗body‘ composed of 
both the head and the members. It was this organological/corporeal 
aspect of the church that later acquired certain legal connotations: the 
church has been endowed a corporate character to signify it as a 
'fictitious' or 'juristic' person. In fact, Aquinas had already used the term 
persona mystica as an alternative to the corpus mysticum, which hardly 
differed from the persona ficta of the jurists. 238  The notion of 'body 
politic' became popular during the thirteenth century.  
 
The English idea of the secular state as body politic was uniquely 
formulated analogously to ecclesiastical church as 'mystical body' (corpus 
mysticum).239 England's greatest jurist of the Lancastrian period, Sir John 
Fortescue has used the terms of corpus mysticum and body politic 
without discrimination in his famous De laudibus legume Angliae. 
Fortescu further argued that in this sense, the kingdom in England was 
ruled 'politically' by the whole body politic of the realm, which was 
opposed to the kingdom in France that ruled 'regally' by the king alone. 
This eventually resulted in Fortescue's famous definition of England as a 
dominium regale et politicum: it implied a kind of government in which 
not the king alone but the king and the polity together bore the 
responsibility for the commonweal. Fortescue used the customary 
analogy between the social and the human body to support his argument. 
As he said, 
Just as the physical body grows out of the embry, regulated by one head, 
so does there issue from the people the kingdom, which exists as a 
corpus mysticum governed by one man as head...for just as the body is 
held together by the nerves, so is the corpus mysticum [of the 
people/joined together and united into one by the Law.  
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Corporation sole  
This political idea of the secular state as a ‗body politic‘ was later 
institutionalized in the common law by the Tudor lawyers, who 
personified the Crown as 'corporation sole'. In examining the legal history 
of the corporation sole, English legal historian F. W. Maitland argued that 
the creation of this legal institution was just an expedient solution to 
conceptualize, and account for, the parson‘s right to the glebe.240 The 
parson‘s relation to the glebe had become a controversial legal issue 
when the ownership of the glebe became complicated after the twelfth 
century. It was hard to find an ordinary ‗niche‘ within the existing system 
of tenancies to fit the property relation of the parson to the glebe, as the 
ownership of the glebe had been split between the parson, the patron, 
and the ordinary. As Maitland has described, ‗at least with the consent of 
patron and ordinary, the parson can do much that a tenant for life cannot 
do; and, on the other hand, he cannot do all that can be done by a 
tenant in fee simple.‘241  
 
As a result, the parson and his glebe, as a whole, was reconstructed as a 
legal personality of ‗corporation sole‘, on which the full fee simple of the 
glebe have been reposed. Whilst the practical issue was temporarily 
solved by the creation of the ‗corporation sole‘, it left a serious theoretical 
pitfall. According to Maitland, this ‗corporation sole‘ was not a persona 
ficta, because when the only member - the parson - died, the ownership 
of the property fell into abeyance until the next successor was appointed 
to fill the vacancy, indicating that the corporation sole did not exist in the 
interval. This countermanded any suggestion that the fundamental 
character of the corporation sole was a persona ficta, whose two 
essential features are the corporateness of an organized group and the 
permanent existence in law regardless of the birth, the death and the 
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change of its members. The corporation sole thus failed to achieve the 
basic tasks of constructing a permanent legal subject with a plural nature. 
In short, there was simply no plural members, no permanence, and thus 
no corporateness.242  
 
As Maitland wrote, ―I ventured to say that this corporation sole has 
shown itself to be no ‗juristic person‘, but is either a natural man or a 
juristic abortion‖. 243  Maitland thus does not share the view of his 
predecessor Blackstone, who speaks of ‗corporation sole‘ admiringly as 
the unique and genius refinement in English Law of the inherited Roman 
fiction theory.244 Quite the opposite, Maitland called the ‗corporation sole‘ 
the ‗curious freak of English law‘, the ‗miserable being‘ and the ‗mere 
ghost of a fiction‘.245 According to him, the ‗corporation sole‘ failed to 
provide ‗…the first service that we should require at the hands of any 
reasonably useful persona ficta‘ and ‗if our corporation sole really were an 
artificial person created by the policy of man we ought to marvel at its 
incompetence.‘246  
 
The Crown as corporation sole 
In the sixteenth century the Crown of England was classified by the 
English common law alongside the parish parson of the ecclesiastical law. 
The Crown, accordingly, has been endowed a legal personality of the 
corporation sole.247 Although Maitland did acknowledge the long political 
tradition of making an analogy between the king and the parson, he 
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nevertheless contended that applying the corporation sole to the King 
resulted in a worse consequence than applying it to the parson. In his 
words, ‗the attempt to play the same trick with king seems to me still 
more abortive and infinitely more mischievous‘.248 This was because this 
legal construction, apart from juristically continuing the political discourse 
of the ‗king‘s two bodies‘, refused to do ‗any real work in the cause of 
jurisprudence‘.249 It didn‘t result in any clear separation of the money and 
land between what is owned by the king as natural person and what is 
owned by the King as ‗corporation sole‘. Nor did it solve the problems 
associated with the renewal of delegations or litigation that might 
accompany the demise of the Crown. Instead, all the constitutional 
changes had to be worked through each individual statutes.  
 
The worst consequence, however, was the failure of the State to be 
recognized as a legal subject to have private rights. Maitland wrote ‗what 
we see in England, …, is, not that the State is personified or that the 
State‘s personality is openly acknowledged, but that the king is 
―parsonified‖‘.250 For Maitland, it was vital that the state be represented 
as a legal person. People cannot live a life without state. And the state, 
besides being ‗the wielder of public power‘, will inevitable become a legal 
subject in order to borrow money, own property and make contracts. The 
‗business‘ side of the state and the private duties and rights of it are 
something that cannot be ignored by law. Instead of turning a blind eye 
to this issue, law should recognize this fact by attributing to it a 
substantial legal personality. As Maitland said, ‗since the feat was 
performed, we have been, more or less explicitly trying to persuade 
ourselves that our law does not recognize the personality or corporate 
character of the State or Nation or Commonwealth...‘251 
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Personifying the Crown as corporation sole also represented the point of 
departure from which English law divorced itself from its political ideology 
that had continued since the medieval time, which conceiving the State 
as ‗body politic‘ and the king as its head.252 The notion of ‗the Crown‘ 
used to present the whole ‗body politic‘ of the State. However, when the 
Tudor lawyers re-constructed the Crown as ‗corporation sole‘, they 
replaced the ‗body politic‘ of the State with the ‗body politic‘ of the King, 
resulting a division between the People and the King in common law. ―It 
is true that ‗The people‘ exists, and ‗the liberties of the People‘ must be 
set over against ‗the prerogatives of the King‘; but just because the King 
is not part of the People, the People cannot be the State or 
Commonwealth‖253 For Maitland, and for many modern legal historians, 
the legal institution of the Crown as corporation sole was to be blamed 
for blocking the common law the chance to naturally evolved into a 
modern model of sovereign state as ‗corporation aggregate‘.254 
 
Maitland‘s critics of corporation sole has also been understood as his 
attempt to substantiate the German-Gierkian real entity theory of the 
corporation with the English practice.255 Maitland was often regarded as 
the first English writer that contributed to the movement of political 
pluralism in political thought.256 But even for Maitland this commitment to 
the ontological speculation of group personality was a new territory, since 
up to this point he had not ventured beyond the ‗legal plain‘ into the 
‗philosophical summits‘. 257  As a legal historian, Maitland had always 
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confined himself to the specific doctrinal legal research: he self-
consciously denied his intention of inquiring to any philosophical question 
related to ‗the very nature of things and the very nature of persons‘ and 
refused to speculate or express any views beyond his expertise.258  
 
But Maitland did explicitly express his approval of the ‗real group 
personality‘ in a lecture he delivered, the title of which is ‗Moral 
Personality and Legal Personality‘. In this lecture, Maitland also quoted 
A.V. Dicey that ‗when a body of twenty, or two thousand, or two hundred 
thousand men bind themselves together to act in a particular way for 
some common purpose, they create a body, which by no fiction of law, 
but by the very nature of things, differs from the individuals of whom it is 
constituted.‘ 259  He deliberately emphasized twice the last part of this 
quotation: ‗not by fiction of law, but by the very nature of things‘. 
Maitland also indicates this idea in his study of the corporation sole. For 
example, when he talked of the common law denying the existence of 
colonies as juristic persons, he said ‗but can we—do we really and not 
merely in words—avoid an admission that the Colony of New Zealand is a 
person?‘ In this sense, the critique of the ‗corporation sole‘ is expected 
from Maitland if he has ever intended the theory of real group personality 
to be accepted in Britain. As Maitland himself acknowledged, the 
‗corporation sole‘ supposes the personification of offices and thus 
‗prejudice‘ English people in favor of the fiction theory, which was the 
opposite to ‗real group personality‘ theory.   
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8. The Corporation: Franchises, Townships, 
Municipal Corporations and Corporate 
Colonies  
A corporation is a particular form of human association, which stands 
separated from its individual members and has a distinct identity of its 
own. It is essentially a legal concept that allows such an association to 
have its own rights and perform its own duties. Legal historians generally 
trace the origins of the corporation back to the universitas in classical 
Roman texts, and it was codified in Corpus Juris Civilis during the sixth 
century. However, some argue that the concept of the corporation was in 
fact foreign to the Roman jurists and was fabricated by the fourteenth 
century commentators, who used liberal interpretative methods to read 
into the Roman texts. The importance of the church context has also 
been stressed in tracing the origin of corporation, as the name 
‗corporation‘ was only adopted after the fifteenth century to replace a 
number of ecclesiastical names including universitas, societas, collegium, 
civitas, populous, respublica and a whole series of con- and com- terms, 
such as congregation, conventus, communitas, confraternitas, concilium 
and conjuratio.260  
 
Indeed, to some extent, the entire Christian world operated through 
corporate entities, for the form of corporation has been applied to 
bishops, deans, chapters, abbots, convents and other ecclesiastical 
bodies. Sinibald Fieschi, who became Pope Innocent IV in 1243, was the 
first to proclaim that universitas is persona ficta. In the fifteenth century, 
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a clear distinction between the borough community and the village 
community was evident from expressions by canonists. They included a 
sentence in the Digest, which sharply distinguished between the debts 
due to or from the universitas and the debts due to or from the singuli 
and formulated a theory that the corporate body is a ‗fictitious person‘ 
and owes its personality to some act of sovereign power. It was naturally 
followed by the idea that incorporation must be the outcome of royal 
charter. The royal charters that were granted to the towns began to use 
definitely creative words by the King, who constituted and erected a 
‗body corporate and politic‘.261   
 
As to English legal history, since the right to incorporate was regarded as 
a kind of royal prerogative and any royal prerogative was categorized 
under the bracket of ‗franchise‘, the earliest legal institution of 
corporation thus was always associated with franchise. In the 1642 
edition of Termes de la ley, a franchise was defined as ‗a French word 
and signifies in our Law an Immunity or Exemption from ordinary 
Jurisdiction; as for a Corporation to hold Pleas within themselves to such 
a value, and the like.‘262  In the Prerogatives the King, dated between 
1640 and 1660, Hale referred to franchises exclusively as the meanings of 
boroughs, counties and corporations. However, he did state that the 
franchises, in the wider sense, encompass the subjects of jurisdictionum 
(jurisdictions), potestatum (powers), liberatum (liberties), franchises, 
privileges, and exemptions of all sorts.263   
 
                                        
261 FW Maitland, Township and Borough: The Ford Lectures 1897: With an Appendix of 
Notes Relating to the History of Cambridge (Cambridge University Press 2011) 18. 
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263 Hale PC. 
 
93 
The theory of franchise 
The word ‗franchise‘ was adapted from the French word fraunchise. 
Bracton first theorized the doctrine of franchise in the thirteenth century. 
264 Since his treatise was written in Latin, it is commonly agreed that 
what he had called ‗linbertatibus‘ (liberties) were synonymous with 
‗fraunchise‘. In 1628, Edward Coke stated that liberties had three 
significations. The first was ‗the Laws of the Realme‘. The second was ‗the 
freedomes, that the Subjects of England have‘. The third signification was: 
‗…the franchises, and privileges, which the Subjects have of the gift of 
the King, as the goods and Chattels of felons, outlawes, and the like, or 
which the Subject claim by prescription, as wreck, waife, straie, and the 
like.‘265 In 1766, William Blackstone confirmed that ‗franchise and liberty 
are used as synonymous terms: and their definition is, a royal privilege, 
or branch of the king‘s prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a 
subject.‘266  
 
Legal historians nowadays often distinguish between feudal jurisdiction 
and franchisal jurisdiction (private jurisdiction) in the Middle Ages.267 The 
rights of private jurisdiction had long existed outside of the feudal ruler 
system, apart from a few ancient ecclesiastical franchises in the south 
and east (such as Beverly, Westminster and Glastonbury). The greatest 
franchises were located in the north and west, whose franchises derived 
originally from either pre-Conquest or pre-feudal custom. This meant that 
their privileges were not tenurial in character, but were the consequence 
of an express royal grant of prescriptive right.268 The rights of private 
jurisdiction were often conveyed by a charter that written in unclear 
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terms such as ‗sacu and scon‘, ‗toll and team‘ and ‗infangenethof‘. 269 
However, these traditional franchises were often associated with 
irresponsibility, abusive authority and other notorious assertions toward 
their administrations, mostly claimed by the enfranchised commons 
within the territories. It has often been argued that not only were murder, 
treason and robbery left unpunished but that the right of franchise was 
also abused by offering permanent asylum to fugitive criminals. In some 
most serious cases, it has even been argued the franchise threatened the 
authority of the monarchy, as it became a refuge for political offenders 
who were pardoned treason. 
 
In the thirteenth century, Bracton formulated a clear-cut legal doctrine of 
franchise to tackle these problems. He distinguished the regalia rights of 
the Crown in matters of peace and justice from rights that arose out of 
the contractual relationship of a lord to his tenants. According to him, 
matters of justice and of peace belong exclusively to the crown and the 
royal dignity. They cannot be separated from the crown since they make 
the crown what it is. Such rights and jurisdictions cannot be transferred 
to persons or lands, unless this has been granted as a delegated 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, they can only be delegated in such a way that 
the ordinary jurisdiction remains with the king. Based on Bracton‘s theory, 
Edward I established Quo Warranto proceedings, or enquiries by justices 
in eyre. Quo Warranto constituted a form of proceeding against those 
who exercised any public franchise without the king‘s grant.270 Edward I 
insisted that such rights could only arise naturally from royal license, 
                                        
269 Opinions differ on whether the grants in these terms conveyed a right of actual 
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whether explicit in a charter or implicit in long-tolerated exercise. The 
objective was merely to insist that these franchises were not held 
absolutely, but conditionally, to prevent future usurpation and to fix 
responsibilities for the due performance of public duties. Edward I‘s Quo 
Warranto policy was a response to petitions from the commoners within 
franchises, who asserted that criminals went unpunished in their 
franchises, and the king‘s writ did not run there. If the responsibility of 
the franchise were not duly kept by the franchise-holder, then the king 
could take back the privilege and fulfill the responsibility himself. The 
legal basis of title to franchise was further restricted under Henry VII. His 
interpretation of the law of Quo Warranto was far stricter than that of 
Edward I‘s or Edward II‘s justices and in fact the very existence of the 
franchises had come to be threatened well before Henry VIII and 
Cromwell launched their direct attack upon franchises in parliament. 
 
In fact, what Bracton did was transformed the franchise into a kind of 
royal prerogative. He created a new generic term, palatinate, with 
reference to the independence of the county of Chester. It was in the writ 
of 1351, granted by Edward III in creating the county palatine of 
Lancaster for his cousin Henry of Lancaster, that the term was officially 
established. This appears to be the first deliberate creation of a private 
chancery. New franchisal privileges were developed, corresponding to the 
new powers and functions of the monarchy. The purchase of them from 
kings willing to supplement their revenues, and the registration of them 
in the royal archives, secured the protection of rights, both judicially and 
administratively, for their holders. The king's government became both 
the mentor and the supporter behind the liberty enjoyed by the franchise. 
The franchise holder were growingly integrated within the royal system of 
government.  
 
The sixteenth century witnessed the creation of an effective Crown 
monopoly over incorporation following the strengthening of the 
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centralized government and the royal court. An explicit and direct 
authorization by the Crown was the only mode of incorporation. This 
authorization was normally given in the form of charter (or letters patent), 
and occasionally by way of an Act of Parliament bearing the King‘s explicit 
consent or a combination of an act and a charter. By the late Tudor 
period, the grant of incorporation was firmly established as an essential 
component of the King‘s exclusive and voluntary prerogative, and could 
not be acquired by long usage or prescription. The law of the corporation 
was classified by contemporaries as part of the law of the King, the core 
of the English Constitution. The employment of franchises in general, and 
specifically corporations, was still subject to judicial review by the 
prerogative writs of Quo Warranto and Scire Facias. Unauthorized 
corporations could be dissolved, and abused charters could be forfeited 
by the court through these prerogative judicial writs. The legal 
relationship between the corporation and the Crown was thus constructed 
by the franchise theory since then and maintained in place for a long time.  
 
Medieval townships 
The existence of township with its independent exercises of local 
jurisdiction could be traced as early as to the ancient republics of Greece. 
Although these ancient cities might bear some similarities to medieval 
towns in terms of their civil and political institutions, there was one major 
difference between them: whereas the inhabitants of the ancient 
republics were chiefly composed of the proprietors of land, the 
inhabitants of the medieval towns were mainly inhabited by tradesmen 
and mechanics, who were in servile condition. This essential difference 
made any attempted comparison hard to have any practical value or 
insight. Indeed, the inhabitants of the medieval towns seem to have been 
‗a very poor, mean set of people, who used to travel about with their 
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goods from place to place‘.271 In England, taxes used to be levied upon 
them when they carried their goods through certain manors, going over 
bridges, entering into a fair, and building a stall. These different taxes 
were known as passage, pontage, lastage, and stallage. When they were 
exempted from such taxes by paying their protector (a king or a great 
lord), a sort of annual poll-tax, they became what were called free-
traders.  
 
Britain, when subjected to Roman rule (and for a relative long period 
after the withdrawal of the Roman power), was divided into thirty-three 
townships with a certain degree of local self-government and quasi 
municipal institutions. At the time of the Norman Conquest, these towns 
and boroughs were dependent upon the uncertain protection of the king 
or lord by paying them annual tax. Since these tradesmen possessed no 
political and few civil rights, the towns and boroughs were not 
incorporated, nor considered as a constituted body politics at that time. 
None of them enjoyed the right of representation in the council of the 
nation, or the right of self-government. The establishment of the feudal 
system significantly changed the condition of towns, as the towns were 
enclosed within the fief of the proprietors and were subject to their 
arbitrary oppression. But the germs of liberty had long been sown in 
these towns. As the towns gradually prospered, many of them went into 
insurrection, sometimes with the aid of the king. When successful, the 
town would normally acquire a charter of the burghers from the Crown, 
which conferring it extensive municipal immunities and rights to relieve it 
from oppression of the feudal lord. These charters were in nature the 
‗treaties of peace‘ between the commons and their lords and the ‗bills of 
rights‘ for the people. It has been said that it was the institution of 
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municipal corporations that conduced, more than any other circumstance, 
the emancipation of Europe from the thralldom of the feudal system.272  
 
These exceptional free trading and manufacturing towns brought order, 
rational and wealth to an agrarian landscape, which otherwise would be 
characterized solely by the predatory feudal system. Maitland has 
described the towns as ‗a photograph of English life as it was early in the 
thirteenth century in its most vital parts—the system of local government 
and police, the organization of county, hundred and township.‘273 Having 
managed to escape the tension between the King and his feudal nobles, 
those towns were gradually erected into a commonality or corporation. 
They were generally bestowed by the Kings, the privileges of having 
magistrates and a town-council of their own, of making bye-laws for their 
own government and local affairs, of building walls for their own defense, 
and that of ruling all of their inhabitants under a sort of military discipline 
by obliging them to watch and ward (that is to guard and defend those 
walls against all attackers by day and night).274 As the ‗islands in the sea 
of feudalism‘, those independent towns, filled with a large and wealthy 
merchant class, skilled craftsmen, artisans and wage-earning laborers, 
marked the entrance of a third political force into the shifting equilibrium 
between the territorial ruler and his feudatories. The feudal lord despised 
the burghers, whom they considered almost as of a different species from 
themselves. The wealth of the burghers never failed to provoke their 
envy and indignation and they plundered them on every possible 
occasion without mercy or remorse.275 But it was the interest of the king 
to render the burghers, who were the enemies of his enemies, all means 
of security and independency of the barons.  
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The towns typically asserted themselves an institutional novelty in the 
sense that they involved the creations (or reactivations) of ‗centers of 
solidary action by singly powerless individuals‘, which meant that they 
were constituted collectivist and attached to individuals only by virtue of 
their membership and ability to operate as a unitary entity.276 As Maitland 
has described, ‗these old county towns do not pass through the manorial 
phase, [their] king was their lord, but not their manorial lord; in the 
eleventh century hardly their landlord; the land on which they stood was 
not Terra Regis.‘277 Since feudalism was the chief force at that time, the 
primary concern of the townsmen was to create a distinctive juridical 
space ‗immune‘ from the ruling system of feudalism, especially from the 
jurisdiction of the feudal courts. Above all, the juridical status of free men 
was granted to all townsmen, including those who were free slaves, who 
had left their masters and lived in these towns without being claimed.278 
In England, this meant that they were generally exempted from suit to 
the hundred and county courts. All pleas that arose among them, except 
for the pleas of the crown, were left to the decision of their own 
magistrates. The novelty of township as a corporate body and its political 
independence, however, could be reconciled at that time with the legal 
institution of franchise. Based on their corporate nature, they claimed 
prerogatives of rule (as a matter of ‗immunity‘) as franchises.  
 
The township in Europe could be further differentiated into three types, 
according to whether the concession of the franchise was before the 
formation of a collective consciousness. The first type concerns the 
formation of a collective consciousness and precedes chronologically the 
concession of the franchises. The second concerns the ‗new towns‘, which 
are founded and chartered with the express intent of attracting a 
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population by promising it certain privileges. Here the privilege itself 
serves largely as the basis for the development of collective 
consciousness, since the concession to the town dwellers of a distinctive 
legal status marked them out from the outlying rural environment. In the 
third type, probably the most frequent type, the inhabitants evolved a 
collective consciousness on the basis of shared interests. That 
consciousness was presupposed by the concession of franchises, though 
it could also be strengthened by it.279 Such a development was amazing 
for Smith, as it was hard to imagine that the sovereigns voluntarily 
erected a sort of independent republic in the heart of their own 
dominions.280 
 
The institutional feat of creating a collective township through voluntary 
agreement had to be backed by military might. The towns generally 
disposed of two significant military resources: city walls and other 
fortifications, and the urban militia. The former were purely defensive, 
the latter could be used for either defensive or offensive purposes. Both 
of them were sustained by the towns‘ growing economic strength.281 But 
the typical member of a town militia was not a profession solider, just as 
the typical townsman who was involved in the political administration of 
township did not regard it as his identity. The focus of the townsman was 
always the commercial and productive pursuits. This constituted a further 
novelty in the township with respect to the territorial rulers in a feudal 
context, for whom, the leadership, the exercise of rule, and the practice 
of governance always constituted their original vocation, the focus of 
their identity and of their mode of life. But the townsmen, on the other 
hand, demanded the right to rule no one but themselves, and their 
requirement for safeguarding always revolved around their productive 
pursuits, never the practice of leadership and the experience of war. They 
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were just chiefly constructing a context of rule and a juridical 
environment that would make their profitable autonomy and military self-
sufficiency possible.   
 
Economically, the main reason for the existence of the towns was the 
division of labor. This was not only a characteristic of the towns‘ internal 
economy, but also the wider division of labor between town and 
countryside. There was also a further division of labor between the 
different towns, as traffic flowed not just between each town and its 
countryside, but also between towns. The towns developed as 
‗ecologically distinctive settings‘, the ‗dense settlements of people 
attending to specifically urban productive and commercial pursuits‘. 282 
They proved to be extremely important to the growth of national wealth 
and later the development of capitalism. The fact that the king could 
impose no tax upon them without their own consent gave rise to the 
greater security of the towns‘ industry and the accumulated stock. Thus 
‗order and good government, and along with the liberty and security of 
individuals, were, in this manner, established in cities, at a time when the 
occupiers of land in the country were exposed to every sort of 
violence.‘283 
 
The danger to the existence of these townships, however, was that 
sometimes they might go too far for their independence and lose the 
allegiance with their original ruler, that was the king. As a result, they 
might prosper for a while but in the long run they were too small to be 
viable and were finally crushed by foreign invaders. This is exactly what 
happened in Italy and Switzerland, where the cities generally became 
independent republics, and they conquered all the nobility in their 
neighborhood, obliging them to pull down their castles in the country and 
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to live in the city. But in France and England, however, the cities had no 
opportunity to become entirely independent.  
 
Municipal corporations  
The municipal corporation is the township in a modern sense. It could be 
defined as ‗the body politic and corporate‘ constituted by the 
incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or town for the purposes of local 
government.284 This kind of corporation has a natural existence: its unity 
has a geographical character, which is based upon the local dwelling and 
the ownership of land. In an attempt to explore the nature of the 
municipal corporation, English legal historian Maitland started from 
examining a ‗not very high-value‘ case, where the lordship over some 
1,200 acres of land went a-begging. 285 In this case, there were five 
claimants, including the municipal corporation of Cambridge, the Merton 
College of Oxford, the Jesus College and the St John‘s College of 
Cambridge, and Sir Charles Cotton, the squire of a village called 
Madingley. The municipal corporation of Cambridge was successful in 
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claiming the land, which, however, opened up a large question: ‗What did 
King John mean, or rather, what did he really do when he granted the 
town of Cambridge to the burgesses of Cambridge and their heirs forever? 
Did he mean to place upon the community of the burgesses the feudal 
ladder of land-tenure, as the owner of the tenanted land? Or, the 
community merely to step into the sheriff‘s shoes as collector and farmer 
of certain royal revenues, house rents, land rents, market tolls and the 
profits of mills and courts?‘ Maitland believes that the king did not mean 
to abandon his hold upon the land in the first place, but there was slowly 
emerging the idea since the middle of the fourteenth century that the 
Town is the lord of all the houses within. 286 And at the beginning of the 
sixteenth century the corporation obtained an important recognition of its 
lordship.  
 
This transition from ‗community‘ to corporation has been accomplished 
naturally, as Maitland wrote:  
The Town which has rights and duties, the Town which owes and is owed 
money, the Town which can make a contract even with one of the 
townsmen, the Town which can be landlord or tenant, the Town with 
which the treasurer can keep an account, slowly struggles into life. If we 
are to understand the process we must study at close quarters the 
methods in which the affairs of the borough are conducted, the growth 
and expenditure of a revenue, the incidence of profit and loss. We must 
watch carefully for the first appearance of the common chest, for the 
appearance of a treasurer, and for the appearance of a council that 
administers property beside or in the stead o the old moot that deemed 
dooms. What I may call the business side of municipal life must come by 
its rights. Political and constitutional history will thereby gain a new 
reality. If we fail to see this, it is because we carry our methods of 
business into an age which knew them not and our thoughts in to an age 
which did not and could not think them.287 
 
In addition to the common chest, a treasurer, and a council, the 
communal element of the township could also be found in the 
community‘s power of forcing a man to serve a bailiff. Furthermore, if the 
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bailiff made a profit, the money was to be spent for the public good of 
the town. And, in the days without free libraries and electric lighting, 
there was but one obvious way of spending it, that is a banquet, or at 
least a small drinking, for all townsfolks.288  
 
One of the most essential legal features that distinguishes municipal 
corporation from the state is that municipal corporation is subject to 
private law relations. On the one hand, it is in need of property, and the 
opportunity for the acquisition of property; on the other hand, it could be 
arraigned before a court of justice for violation of contract. The creation 
of the modern municipal corporation is based on the belief that, in 
respect of local affairs, it would be better to be dealt by the people 
concerned than by the distant central power. The power of local self-
governing, including the powers to levy taxes and to expand taxes in 
projects that are necessary for the common interests, such as projects of 
health, welfare, safety, and convenience of the inhabitants, is the most 
distinguishing feature that differentiates the municipal corporation from 
the general corporations that created for pursuing business interest.  
 
The concept of the municipal corporation was familiar to Roman Law 
under the bracket of Juristic Person. There might be strikingly close 
analogy and even identity between the concept of Roman Corporations 
and modern municipal corporations.289 But to conceive of ancient Rome 
as the capital of Italy in the same sense as London is the capital of 
England would be a great mistake. This is because the ancient city of 
Rome was a great corporate body, holding sovereignty over the whole of 
Italy. The Roman government divided civic communities into three types: 
municipal towns, prefectures, and colonies. Only municipal towns 
received the full Roman franchise right of self-government. Having been 
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conquered by the Romans, the colonies were obliged to erect cities, 
called municipia. In municipia, the Romans established fixed governments 
and imparted their arts, sciences, languages, and civilization to their new 
subjects. The Roman world was a vast congeries of municipalities bound 
together by the central power of Rome. Therefore, observations have 
often been made that the history of the conquest of the world by Rome is 
the history of the establishment of a vast number of cities.  
 
The city of London perhaps could be considered as the oldest municipal 
corporation in England. Henry I. has granted to London the original 
charter conferring many municipal privileges, including the right to 
choose some of its own officers, such as sheriff, justice, and so on. But it 
was not until the time of John that the right of local self-government was 
officially conferred upon English towns and boroughs. The political power 
acquired by boroughs and cities rendered them generally exempt from 
suits to the hundred and country courts, except for the pleas of the 
crown. All remaining pleas were left to the decisions of their own 
magistrates. In this sense, Maitland‘s claim should be justified when he 
challenged the common assumption that the fields of the boroughs had 
some manorial lords in the first place, whose proprietary rights should be 
compensated by the boroughs. Maitland argued that ‗these old county 
towns do not pass through the manorial phase, their king was their lord, 
but not their manorial lord; in the eleventh century hardly their landlord; 
the land on which they stood was not Terra Regis.‘290   
 
Edward I was the first to grant the boroughs the right to elect 
represented members of parliament. This was generally regarded as the 
most significant democratic feature of borough in England, since 
previously the commonalty of England had no voice or part in the 
legislature, which was vested entirely in the king and the council, 
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constituted of the spiritual and lay peerage. Edward I granted this 
unprecedented privilege was, of course, out of the fiscal consideration. 
This wise and politic prince was greatly distressed for money. Instead of 
attempting to raise it by the levy of taxes, which were submitted to with 
murmurs and yielded sparingly, he enjoyed the fact that large sums of 
money were being voluntarily sent to him, with less trouble than in the 
former way, by issuing writs on about hundred and twenty cities and 
boroughs. As the experiment proved successful, the practice was 
continued. This was the definite commencement of popular 
representation, and of the House of Commons itself.  
 
The Crown, as a check upon the nobles, began to encourage popular 
elections in municipal corporations. However, in the course of time, these 
representatives of the municipal corporations were proved to be more 
formidable adversaries to the crown than the nobility to it. In Elizabeth‘s 
reign, the judges decided that, although the right of election was, by the 
original constitution or charter, in the whole assembly, a by-law may be 
presumed giving the right of election to a select class instead of the 
whole body (this selected class was more readily controlled by the crown). 
Later, to further increase the power of the Crown, James incorporated 
towns or boroughs, endowing them with the parliamentary franchise, but 
confining the exercise of the right to vote to select classes. Ironically, the 
immense power of popular representation in municipal corporations 
turned out to be a most active agency in the overthrow of Charles I.  
 
At Restoration, Charles II found the principal opposition to the court 
came from the cities and boroughs. He therefore reconstructed the 
corporations by filling them with his own judges, who aided him to 
acquire absolute control over these corporations. Started from London, 
which was then the largest and most influential municipal corporation, a 
quo warranto was issued in 1683 to abrogate the charter of this city. As a 
condition of its restoration, it was provided that the mayor, sheriff and 
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clerk, should not exercise their office without the king‘s consent, and that 
if the king twice disapproved of the officers elected by the corporation, he 
might himself appoint others. This meant that the city of London was 
deprived of the right to choose its own officers and was made to 
dependent upon the Crown. Such also was the fate of most of the large 
municipal corporations in England. The whole power was therefore 
centered in the hand of the crown. This was not confined to England. In 
1683, writs of quo warranto and scire facias were issued for the purpose 
of abrogating the charter of Massachusetts. Patriotism and religion 
combined in their defence, but in vain. In 1684, one year after the 
judgment against the city of London, the charter of Massachusetts was 
conditionally forfeited. The charter government was displaced, and the 
popular representation was superseded by a commission. In 1687 similar 
writs were issued against the charter of Rhode Island and Connecticut, 
when the people of the latter colony unsuccessfully tried to preserve the 
charter by concealing it in the Charter Oak. Yet, these colonies, as a 
result of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, had their charters restored.  
 
It is said that no political institution can endure forever, although it may 
exist long after it ought to cease. But ‗if ever an institution outlived its 
usefulness—lived long after it became a positive evil—it was the 
municipal corporations of England, prior to the reform act of 1835.‘291 The 
abuses in the corporations arising out of selected bodies continued after 
the revolution of 1688, and until act of parliament in 1835. During the 
time of Elizabeth, the controlling power of corporations was virtually 
vested in ‗selected bodies‘. The system of municipal corporations no long 
committed itself to self-government and economic prosperity. In many 
places, the principal function of the corporation was to elect members of 
parliament, and the number of their corporators ranged from as low as 
ten to thirty. No longer representing the public will of the burgesses, the 
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councils of the municipal corporations were frequently controlled by a 
single party. There was no check upon maladministration. The property of 
the municipal corporation was wasted, but the expenditure of the money 
was extravagant. Officers were elected by the councils for their devotion 
to the party. In a large majority of the municipalities, the corporations 
were close to each other, which meant that the governing body had the 
power to determine who should be admitted to freedom or membership. 
Lord Henry Brougham devoted himself faithfully to the promotion of the 
reform of the municipal corporations and to the passing of the Reform 
Act. He proposed abolishing the current self-elected and perpetual 
councils of the municipal corporations, and replacing them with a short 
and fixed-period council that was selected by the votes of the 
burgesses. 292  John William Willcock, in concluding his treatise on 
Municipal Corporation recommended a similar reform, but it took ten 
years for this to become reality.293  
 
The 1835 Reform Act allowed Parliament to take the municipal 
corporations in hand and to ensure their revenues were to be expended 
for the public benefit of the inhabitants of the towns. ‗The public, not the 
common, benefit‘, wrote Maitland. To Maitland, this change indicated the 
decline of the township in England and it seemed disgraceful to him. The 
commons were ‗drained‘: the green commons were apparently ‗utterly 
neglected‘ and ‗everybody turned out what beasts he pleased, taking the 
risk of having to drag them from a dismal swamp‘.294 ‗Morally the Town 
loses its personality; for it loses the sense of duty‘, Maitland 
disappointedly concluded. 295  According to him, this meant that the 
corporation of medieval burgesses became a ‗masquerade‘, a persona 
ficta, instead of a real moral body politic. By entrusting the communal 
                                        
292 Henry Brougham Baron Brougham, Speech of Henry Lord Brougham: In Defence of 
the Absent Commissioners, on the English Municipal Corporation Reform Bill, August 12, 
1835 (Ridgeway & Son 1835). 
293 See John William Willcock (1800-1851), The Law of Municipal Corporation (1827).  
294 Maitland (n 277) 95. 
295 ibid.  
 
109 
property to other bodies, such as groups of commissioners and the like, 
Parliament fostered the notion that it was morally the property of the 
corporators, not the property of the township, matters such as the 
watching, the paving and the lighting of the town were no longer affairs 
of the corporation. Neither did it have duties to provide relief for the poor. 
It was a ‗vicious circle‘: ‗the corporation was untrusted because 
untrustworthy, untrustworthy because untrusted.‘296 
 
Corporate colonies  
Although the city of London was the oldest municipal corporation in 
history, modern municipal corporations are most commonly found in 
America as a form of local government. In general, all American cities, 
towns and counties are public corporations, full or quasi. Created by the 
legislature and invested with the power and freedom to decide and 
control their local matters, municipal corporations mark one of the 
fundamental features of American federal government system. Municipal 
corporations are subject to the legislature of the State. If their acts are in 
violations of law or private rights, they are also subject to judicial 
judgment. As a renowned American judge has stated,  
From time immemorial, the counties parishes, towns and territorial 
subdivisions of the country have been allowed in England and required 
to lay rates on themselves for local purposes. It is most convenient that 
the local establishments and police should be sustained in that manner; 
and indeed, to the interest taken in them by the inhabitants of the 
particular districts, and the information upon law and public matters 
generally thereby diffused through the body of the people, has been 
attributed by profound thinkers much of that spirit of liberty and 
capacity for self-government, through representatives, which has been 
so conspicuous in the mother country, and which so eminently 
distinguishes the people of America.297  
 
The American ideas of establishing universal elective franchises as the 
basic unite of its government system, and of investing the citizens with 
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the power of self-government in local affairs, run back to the earliest 
period of its colonial history. 298  The earliest establishment of three 
‗corporate colonies‘ in North America, namely the colonies of 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, were the only titled 
colonies in British imperial history that were legally chartered as private 
corporations.299 In this respect, it has been generally accepted that these 
three colonies constitute a unique category by themselves amongst 
British colonies, regardless of the divided opinions on the classification of 
colonies.300  
 
Scholarship on studying the ‗corporate colonies‘ highlights how the 
corporation as a form of governance has resulted the unique mechanism 
of American administration, characterized by 'technique‘ and ‗systematic 
minds‘. Especially in the late nineteenth century, there was an identified 
trend of in studying the American colonial history, known as ‗the imperial 
school of American historiography‘. 301  The historians of the ‗imperial 
school‘ shared an unusual interest in these three ‗corporate colonies‘ of 
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paperback print, University of Oklahoma Press 1990) 210-238. 
 
111 
New England, and brought a richness of detail in understanding them. 
According to them, these three corporate colonies most represented the 
‗evolutional‘ governmental forms of American legal and political 
institutions, though whose beginning was similar to that of other British 
colonies under the same colonial policy and based on the same English 
common law. One of the leading figures, Herbert Osgood, particularly 
admired the stable operation of the corporate colonies, especially when 
compared to the other proprietary provinces that constantly suffered from 
turbulence due to the inefficient administration of the proprietors. 302  
 
Researching on these unique corporate colonies, the historians of the 
Imperial School were endeavoring to formulate a treatise of American 
colonies.303 The fundamental credo that shared by them was that the 
development of the colonies in America was driven primarily by the 
motivation of economic pursuit. All the other motives were subsidiary to 
this economic consideration. For example, Beer has defined it as the 
complex colonial system of regulations, ‗whose fundamental aim was to 
create a self-sufficient commercial empire of mutually complementary 
economic parts'. 304  In his opinion, British colonization of America was 
‗fundamentally an economic movement‘, although it ‗was not solely 
economic in nature, for no extensive development can be reduced to so 
simply a category‘. 305  Similarly, Andrews has argued that ‗the colonial 
governments in New England represent the system of a trading company 
applied to the political organization of a state.‘306 Baldwin also suggested 
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that a sufficient familiarity with the knowledge of the corporate 
organization was manifested in ‗all the relations of their life‘.307 
 
One of the governmental institutions that was mostly characterize of the 
corporate colonies was their township system. Many historians have 
admiringly written about the democratic character of the townships in 
these corporate colonies.308 It has been revealed that their democratic 
nature related closely the fact that they have innovatively used a planned 
method in in distributing land, which was ―far different from the 
‗indiscriminate location‘ prevailing in most of the other colonies‖.309 This 
was often known as the ownership system of the land corporation.310 The 
political rights and responsibilities of the individuals to the town closely 
related to their shares of the land corporation. In John Martin‘s word, the 
township system of corporate colonies was ‗a complex public sponsorship 
of private enterprise‘.  
 
It is also well known that Tocqueville once was very much impressed by 
the institutions of New England towns (he even coined the term 
‗American Exceptionalism‘ to denote this phenomenon). He considered 
them as small independent republics forming the principle of American 
liberty. As he wrote,  
Local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. 
Municipal institutions are to liberty what primary schools are to science; 
they bring it within the people’s reach; they teach men how to use and 
how to enjoy it. A nation may establish a system of free government, but 
without the spirit of municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of 
liberty.311  
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What Tocqueville descripted as ‗a system of free government‘ in 
municipal corporations, or in other words, the concept of self-government 
and decentralized government system, has long been established by the 
Articles of Confederation, which predates the U. S. Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights‘.312 This has been confirmed later by the Tenth Amendment 
of the Constitution, which was formulated in the context of the Age of 
Enlightenment, when political philosophers, such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, 
John Locke, and Thomas Paine, all authored many writings proposing 
decentralized representative government. The established federalist 
structure of the Constitution protects the individual self-determination 
where citizens lived and worked by delegating the federal government 
only few and defined power, ensuring ‗the necessity of providing more 
effectually for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation 
of Justice.‘313 
 
But the American municipal corporations also had their drawbacks. 
Sometimes, the charters of these municipal corporations were carelessly 
worded and loosely construed, resulting in allowing municipal 
corporations to engage in extra-municipal projects (such as the building 
of railways), incurring debts and thereby creating huge financial burdens 
for its citizens. The remedy was often setting up the constitutional 
limitation to prohibit such extraordinary and extra-municipal projects. As 
to the franchises who had been granted the privilege to use the streets 
and public property of municipalities for railroad and other public utilities, 
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a popular demand has arisen that such franchises should be granted only 
for limited periods, accompanied by periodical revaluations, and full 
compensation to the city should be ensured. Some argued that the public 
utilities of all kinds should be ultimately returned, owned and operated by 
the municipality for the common good of the inhabitants. Nevertheless, 
every municipal corporation in America is subject to the power of 
common law, which prevents the abusive of municipal corporations while 
encourages freedom and self-government within them. As John Dillon has 
argued, ‗the common law, as well as the institutions which it developed 
or alongside of which it grew up, is pervaded by a spirit of freedom, 
which distinguishes it from all other systems and peculiarly adapts it to 
the institutions of a self-governed people.‘314 There has been not so much 
structural change until today, American citizens are still interacting most 
with their municipal departments and remain very much local. 
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III. THE EARLY MODERN PHASE 
 
In the late sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, the public/private 
distinction re-emerged as the modern separation between the ‗public‘ 
state and the ‗private‘ property ownership. The 'public' nature of the state 
denotes, on the one hand, the abstract and impersonal form of the 
centralized state, separated from both the ruler and the ruled. On the 
other hand, it refers the formulation of the rational-technical 
administrative ethos that regulated the acts of the sovereign authority. In 
terms of the 'private' character of the property ownership, it 
corresponded to the collapse of the old feudalist system: the ownership 
of the land has been reduced from the political indication of manorial 
authority to a mere personal occupation and usage with only economic 
significance. John Locke's labor view of property helped this transitional 
process in establishing the unlimited right of the private property owner 
over their lands. The property owners further organized themselves as 
civil society to coordinate their individual interests and, together, to 
request the government's protection for their properties.  
 
During this period, the form of corporation has been innovatively applied 
to the area of business as the trading company, an unprecedented form 
of incorporation that combined private and public interest together. This 
unprecedented business companies have acquired extraordinary success 
in overseas trading. The importance of these early business companies, 
especially overseas joint-stock corporations, has been signified by 
scholars as 'bridg[ing] the medieval concept of the corporation as an 
essentially public body with an industrial model of enterprise acting 
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primarily in the interests of its shareholder‘.315 They has also been viewed 
as the progenitors of modern multinational corporations.  
 
9. The Public State 
The formulation of the modern idea of an abstract and impersonal state, 
which was separate from both the rulers and the ruled, was directly 
linked to the nobility‘s struggle against the Absolutist Monarchy in the late 
sixteenth century. The emergence of the Absolutist Monarchies, which 
mainly including the centralized monarchies of France, England and Spain 
in Renaissance Europe, represented a decisive rupture from the previous 
pyramidal and parcellized mediaeval sovereignty with its estates and 
liege-systems. It was a response to the difficulties that were caused by 
the outdated feudal mode of production and the emergence of middle-
class society. This centralized form of the state system entailed a 
systematic and hierarchic division of labor within the unprecedented 
modern administrative government: this consisted of standing armies, a 
permanent bureaucracy with clergy, a codified law and judicature, 
national taxation, and an unified market.316  
 
Yet, it has been argued that the whole structure of the absolutist state 
was paradoxical in nature, whose superficial modernity (apparently 
capitalist) was contradicted by the subterranean feudal domination.317 
Rather than being a mediator between the old feudal nobility and the 
new urban bourgeoisie, or being a prototype of the bourgeois state that 
representing mainly the middle-class interests over those of the nobility, 
the absolutist monarchy was still fundamentally an apparatus for 
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protecting aristocratic property and privilege. 318  Since the aristocratic 
agrarian property still blocked a free market in land and the mobility of 
manpower, the rural relations of production remained feudal and that the 
fundamental means of production remained in the hands of the noble 
landowners. But the new form of absolutism indicated that instead of 
continuing to maintain a decentralized administration, the feudal 
aristocracy had to be restructured as a reinforced apparatus to clamp the 
double threats, namely both the threat posed by peasant unrest and the 
threat posted by mercantile or manufacturing capital. 
 
The significance of the new paradoxical apparatus thus should not be 
minimized, especially in terms of recognizing its centralized structure was 
‗secondarily over-determined by the rise of an urban bourgeoisie'. 319 
Anderson cited both Engels and Althusser in emphasizing this transitional 
feature: Engels has concluded that ‗the political order remained feudal, 
while society became more and more bourgeois‘; Althusser wrote 
similarly that ‗the political regime of the absolute monarchy is only the 
new political form needed for the maintenance of feudal domination and 
exploration in the period of development of a commodity economy.‘320 
This double character of the absolute monarchy was also reflected on the 
Renaissance reintroduction of Roman Law. It introduced an unconditional 
system of private property right, which timely answered to the vital 
interests of the commercial and manufacturing bourgeoisie. It also 
renovated the Roman conception of Imperium (public autonomy), which 
responded to the constitutional exigencies of the new royal governments 
for increased central powers. It provided the juristic protocols for the 
kings and princes in overriding medieval privileges, ignoring traditional 
rights, and subordinating private franchises. As Anderson concluded, ‗the 
enhancement of private property rights from below was matched by the 
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increase of public authority and discretionary powers available to the 
royal ruler from above‘.321   
 
The indivisible sovereignty  
The new centralized political regime naturally required the conception of 
a new understanding of sovereign power as the ultimate source of all 
coercive (feudalist) power. The application of such a concept to concrete 
reality, though, was always controversial, since political power was never 
a clear-cut hegemony. This task was achieved by Jean Bodin‘s celebrated 
principle that sovereignty is indivisible, which basically meant that ‗the 
high powers of government could not be shared by separate agents or 
distributed among them, but all had to be entirely concentrated in a 
single individual or group.‘322  
 
Before Bodin, to say that a magistrate had a certain power (the 
possession of merum imperium) meant that, based on the right of office, 
he could exercise that power according to his own discretion without 
direct reliance on the king. 323  With the growing centralization of 
Renaissance monarchies, this view of merum imperium by right of office 
was increasingly under attack, most detrimentally so by Italian legal 
humanist Andrea Alciato. Alciato held that every power in the state was 
merely a right of exercise derived by delegation from the prince. Despite 
his preference for a strong monarchical authority, Bodin however, did not 
follow this line of argument. Instead, he divided the merum imperium 
into two parts, one held by magistrates, and the other held only by the 
prince (the sovereignty). This differentiation led to the most theoretically 
momentous question concerning the definition of this exclusive right of 
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the prince, which marked the essence of sovereignty. According to Bodin, 
the exclusive rights of the prince was the right to suspend a valid law 
(the valid commitment of the prince to the estates, or the people) under 
the condition of urgent necessity, the case in which it became necessary 
to violate such commitments, to change laws or to suspend them 
entirely.324  
 
According to Bodin, if in an emergency the prince had to consult a senate 
or the people before he could act, he would have to be prepared to let 
his subjects dispense with him. Since the people were not above law, 
they in turn would have to permit their prince to dispense with them. 
Sovereignty would thus become an absurd play between the two parties: 
sometimes the people would rule, and sometimes the prince would rule. 
This would be contrary to all reason and all law. Bodin thus concluded 
that sovereignty is indivisible and in the hands of the king.325 He then 
came to his most impressive achievement: by considering sovereignty to 
be indivisible, he reduced the relationship between prince and estates to 
a simple question of the emergency and finally settled the ultimate power 
in the hand of the prince. He, thus, standing at the beginning of modern 
theories of the state, laid the cornerstone for the typology of modern 
political power. Nevertheless, the ruler and the state were yet to be 
distinguishable, as there was still no difference between the ‗office-holder‘ 
and the ‗office‘. The affairs of the state were still considered to be the 
secret and private affairs of the prince. 
 
The abstract state  
For the Absolute Monarchy to acquire 'public' character, it, firstly, required 
a distinction between the office and the office-holder, or between the 
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personal king and an abstract and impersonal form of the state as the 
embodiment of sovereignty. Secondly, it demands the absolute monarch 
to not rule arbitrarily but to rule according to reason and persuasion with 
an internal coherence. This constitutional requirement was encapsulated 
by the notion of raison d‘État (governmental reason), which means ‗an 
absolutely specific art of government‘ with ‗its own reason, its own 
rationality, its own ratio.‘326 Taking the economy and public opinion as its 
two objects to work on, this new knowledge of the government set the 
framework for modern bureaucracy. Though the complex character of the 
modern state should not be reduced to the ways in which the institutional 
machinery of a government functions, it was precisely in ‗the 
phenomenon of bureaucracy and the formation of the rational-technical 
administrative ethos of large-scale government‘ in which this ‗public‘ 
character of the state materialized.327 
 
The idea of the ‗public‘ state, as an abstract artifact separate from both 
the ruler and the ruled, was part of ‗the general movement of ideas of 
the mid-seventeenth century‘. 328  It came from previous constitutional 
upheavals in British politics: as the constitutional crisis deepened, a new 
voice cut through all the old well-worn debates, arguing that the true 
subject or bearer of sovereignty was neither the natural person of the 
monarch nor any corporate body of the people, but was rather the 
artificial person of the state. The concurrent centralization both of royal 
power and of noble representation in English polity resulted in the 
increasing confrontation between the centralized monarchy and the 
uniquely unified parliament in the early modern period. 329  Although 
without fiscal control over the king nor the rights of regular convocation 
that later characterized some of the continental estates systems, the 
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unitary parliament in London somehow managed to secure control over 
royal legislative power: no monarch could decree new statutes without 
the consent of the Parliament. The monarchy in England thus was not 
only limited by the divine or natural law according to Bodin‘s theory of 
sovereignty, but also by the ‗positive‘ law that set by the parliament.330 
 
However, it was in the political theory of Hobbes, and in other theorists of 
de facto sovereignty in the English Revolution, that this abstract notion of 
the state was theoretically completed. 331  In his Leviathan of 1651, 
Hobbes first crystallized the idea of viewing the state as an artificial 
person carried by those who wield sovereign power. As he wrote, the 
state or commonwealth ‗is One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude… 
have made themselves every one the Author‘ and that ‗he that carryeth 
this Person, is called soveraigne.‘ 332  ‗That great Leviathan, called a 
Commonwealth or State,‘ Hobbes thus claimed. Hobbes‘s ambition as a 
political theorist had always been to demonstrate that the fullest powers 
of sovereignty must be vested neither in the people nor in their rulers, 
but always in the figure of an ‗artificial man‘. Hobbes‘s idea of the 
Leviathan announced the beginning of a new era, which manifested by 
the emergence of the modern usages of terms such as état, stato, staat, 
and state.333 This new understanding of the state was widely accepted 
and articulated by the English writers of the next generation. For example, 
Bacon suggested a similar understanding of the sovereign power, when 
he argued the rulers as well as their councilors as having a duty to 
consider the weal and advancement of the state which they serve. 
Nevertheless, to what extend a clear legal separation of the state (the 
office) from its actual incumbent (the office-holder) was achieved in law 
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was still a contentious topic, since it is well remembered that the useless 
legal institution of ‗the Crown as corporation sole‘ at common law has 
been criticized severely by F.W. Maitland. 
 
The rationalized government   
The modern state is essentially a government administration that based 
on the efficient systems of various institutions, such as armies, taxation 
or justice (the system of taxation, namely the bureaucracy of the treasury, 
is of course at the true core of modern state). But Foucault has argued 
that, when we are speaking of the emergence of the modern state at the 
end of the sixteenth century, we do not specifically refer to the real 
historical moment when such a set of modern institutions came into 
being.334 Instead, what has been talking about was the specific historical 
phenomenon when these institutions, as a whole, entered into ‗reflected 
practice‘. As he said,  
The state began to be projected, programmed, and developed within 
(this) conscious practice…became an object of knowledge and 
analysis…became part of a reflected and concerted strategy…began to 
be called for, desired, coveted, feared, rejected, loved, and hated. In 
short, it is the entrance of the state into the field of practice and 
thought…335  
 
The so-called state, in this sense, was first and foremost the regulatory 
idea of that form of thought, that form of reflection, of that form of 
calculation. It was just ‗a schema of intelligibility for a whole set of 
already established institutions, a whole set of given realities‘.336 
 
Amongst these newly-emerged regulatory ideas of the state, the common 
law was rediscovered as a powerful lever by the aspiring nobility to limit 
the powers of the king, who was then claiming to rule on divinity with no 
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constraint. By insisting that the ruler must be responsible to the common 
law, which based on custom and tradition, the nobility set up the 
common law as the objective criterion to measure the king‘s actions. The 
king‘s actions, accordingly, became publicly known and acknowledged, 
supposed for all to see through public processes. The affair of the state 
was thus considered as ‗public matter‘, and no longer the private concern 
or personal property of the king. Since the king‘s actions began to be 
subject to public scrutiny, it therefore became necessary to distinguish his 
actions as either private or public, or to distinguish his personality as 
either the King (the official holder of the Sovereignty) or the king (a 
private person with divinity).  
 
This differentiation of the public/private actions of the king occurred 
simultaneously with the intensified problematic of conduct for the 
individual. At that time, the individuals were increasing scrutinizing the 
actions of themselves by asking what rules of conduct one must give 
oneself in daily life conduct in relation to others, which include questions 
such as how to conduct oneself, how to raise one‘s children, and how to 
properly behave in the family. A similar set of questions also arose with 
regard to the problematic of the public actions. As Foucault has described, 
these questions of ‗how and to what extent can and must the exercise of 
the sovereign‘s power take upon itself these previously unacknowledged 
tasks of conduction‘, indicated that ‗we enter the age of forms of 
conducting, directing, and government.‘337  
 
By asking what made the coercive force of the state legitimate, the 
problematic of the sovereign‘ conduct represented the beginning of the 
process of rationalizing the state and the government. This process 
embodied in the articulations of raison d‘État (governmental reason) in 
the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Situated in the general 
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context of upheaval and revolutionary processes, which included the 
development of science, the Protestant Reformation, and the 
inauguration of mercantilist phase of capitalism, Raison d‘État epitomized 
a whole new way of ‗thinking power, the kingdom, the fact of ruling and 
governing; a different way of thinking the relationships between the 
kingdom of Heaven and the kingdom on Earth.‘338 It was also part of the 
‗very complex phenomenon of the transformation of Western reason, of 
Western rationality which also associated with Kepler, Galileo Descarte.‘339 
The evolutionary significance of raison d‘État, according to Foucault, was 
not a retrospective imputation by modern historians, but had been 
immediately realized by the contemporaries themselves in the late 
sixteenth century and the early seventeenth century.  
 
Clearly, raison d‘État is not a new concept that only emerged in the 
sixteenth century, but it has been renovated to the employ in constituting 
the unprecedented discourse of the rationale of the modern government. 
Foucault cites Chemnitz in particular, who wrote during the Peace of 
Westphalia 1647-48 (which dealt with the relations between the German 
Empire and the different states): ‗Every day we hear an infinite number 
of people speaking of raison d‘État. Everyone joins in, those buried in the 
dust of the schools as well as those with the responsibilities of public 
office.‘ 340  After tracing down the texts from Palazzo (Italy), Bacon 
(England), and Chemnitz (France), Foucault observed one of the most 
significant achievements in the discourse of raison d‘État was that instead 
of continuingly treating the public as a purely passive existence on which 
ideas and laws can be imposed, this new knowledge of government 
aimed at modifying public opinion, or at actively making use of it, or at 
instrumentalizing it.341 
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In essence, raison d‘État was a kind of skill, or art, whose purpose was to 
preserve states against their natural tendency towards decadence and 
corruption. This included identifying what was necessary and sufficient 
for the state to exist and to maintain its integrity, how to re-establish its 
integrity in the case of its having been damaged. This was because it was 
generally believed at that time that the state was under the inevitable 
threat of revolutions, perceived as the natural cycle of birth, growth, 
maturity, and then decline. However, precisely because of this natural 
cycle, in the name of state salvation, raison d‘État might also lead to a 
coup d‘État, which referred to ‗a suspension of, a temporary departure 
from, laws and legality‘.342 Though it was part of the idea of raison d‘État 
to generally respect the laws, including the natural laws, the positive law, 
and the law of God‘s Commandments. This respect, however, did not 
originate from viewing law as superior, noble or representing the ultimate 
justice, but from the idea of that the state could make use of the laws to 
function well. In other words, the state treated the laws as the 
instrument of rule. This also meant that at a certain points in time, due to 
a pressing and urgent event, the state could and must free itself from 
these laws for the necessity and safety. At this point, the state prevailed 
over any laws, acting by itself without the rule of law, establishing a 
direct relationship with itself and therefore manifesting itself. In this 
sense, coup d‘État was an assertion of the essence of raison d‘État, 
confirming that the nature of the latter was politics, concerned mainly 
with the rational, existential necessities of rule, rather than legality or the 
maintenance of a system of laws.  
 
The rise of governmental reason, as a means to control government, 
perhaps was also related the fact that during the early modern period the 
idea that government was ‗a necessary evil‘ was inherited from medieval 
political theology and became part of the mainstream idea in Western 
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political thought. While in classic antiquity, government was believed to 
be as ‗natural‘ as the family or as society, 343  medieval theologians 
believed government arose as a consequence of the Fall of Man and 
original sin, and the sole reason for its existence was to discipline the 
sinful man. 344  Hobbes secularized this idea by his famous account of 
man‘s chaotic and violent state of nature. According to Hobbes, life 
outside the state was an anarchic and nonpolitical war of all against all. 
In the absence of a supreme power, each of the actors remained ‗in 
continual jealousies and in the state and posture of gladiators‘ towards 
each other. Life inside the state, on the other hand, was a realm of peace 
and secure, fenced off from anarchy. Since then, this view of government 
was repeatedly presented by theorists, including John Locke, David Hume, 
and Adam Smith. Perhaps, the most famous iteration was from Thomas 
Paine. In Common Sense, he argued that‗[Natural] Society is produced by 
our wants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our 
happiness positively by uniting our affections, the latter negatively by 
restraining our vices…Society in every state is a blessing, but government, 
even in its best state, is but necessary evil… Government, like dress, is 
the badge of lost innocence.‘345 Later, American federalist James Madison 
also expressed the same view, when he was saying that ‗if men were 
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern 
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be 
necessary'.346       
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10. The Private Property Owner 
The capitalist era in England begins in the sixteenth century with 
agricultural revolution as its prelude, when the peasantry was forcibly 
driven from their lands. Opposite to the socio-economic structure of 
feudal society, capitalism transformed the feudal titles into individual 
property ownership by removing all the political and social conditions that 
originally had been attached to the lands. John Locke‘s theory of absolute 
property right entailed the individual property owners to do whatever 
they wished to do, and hence enabled them to exploit their lands in a 
purely economically ‗rational‘ way. Civil society was later established by 
these property owners as the realm of commodity exchange and social 
labor, and was assumed to be governed by its own laws immune from 
state intervention. For a relatively short period in the decentralized 
capitalist society, the public/private distinction could be viewed as a rough 
approximation of the social reality as the separation between the 
government and civil society. It has been argued, though, that liberal 
theorists have long neglected how such distinction dealt with people 
without property, namely the working classes. 
 
The Labor View of Property 
In the time of antiquity, property originally indicated one‘s particular 
location in the land and one‘s belonging to certain body politic, 
representing one‘s status as the head of a family and as a citizen of the 
public realm. The expulsion of a citizen was identical with the confiscation 
of his estate and the destruction of the real building in the physical sense. 
Equally, to lose one‘s property meant to lose citizenship and the 
protection of the law. The exterior appearance of the physical property 
represented the boundary between the private household and the public 
realm. As Arendt has argued, ‗all civilizations have rested upon the 
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sacredness of private property.‘ 347  Property has long been the central 
condition for admission to the public realm, and feudalism maintained this 
inherent political meaning of property.  
 
However, when the process of general expropriation began (the 
expropriation of the Church and monastic property after the Reformation, 
and the expropriation of the peasant class), property lost both its fixed 
location and its political meaning. Emancipated from all kinds of old 
manorial customs, it gained the new trait of exchangeability by relating 
itself to the common denominator of money. As the owner of money, the 
owner of property also acquired the unlimited and absolute right over the 
property. This was achieved mainly by a labor view of property, which 
was first famously illustrated in The Second Treatises of Government by 
John Locke, who viewed both land and money equally as ‗capital‘.    
 
In an effort to refute the traditional argument of absolutism that all 
property belonged to the feudal king, Locke invented a new justification 
for owning a property by claiming that individuals had the right to keep 
anything that they have mixed their labor with. According to Locke, ‗Men, 
being once born, have a right to their Preservation, and consequently to 
Meat and Drink, and such other things, as Nature affords for their 
subsistence.‘348  It was self-evident that everyone, in order to preserve 
himself, had the natural right to appropriate anything given to mankind 
by God. But Locke inflated this natural right to an unprecedented extent 
by suggesting that man had the right to ‗own‘ whatever he has worked 
on. As he said, ‗this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the 
Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joined 
to.‘349 Locke‘s argument proved to be very convenient for newly emerging 
social classes, since it radically erased all the traditional social obligations 
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that attached to the feudal fiefs, and thus rendered the property ‗assets‘ 
of purely economic significance. In short, he transformed the land into 
exchangeable ‗capital‘, as easy come and easy go as money. 
 
The new belief that the individual had the unlimited and absolute right 
based own their labor was widely accepted, which can be observed in the 
adoption of new definition of property by law. The Roman law used to 
define property as the right to use and abuse one‘s property within the 
limits of the law. In The Declaration of Rights, property was defined as 
‗the right to enjoy and dispose at will of one‘s goods, one‘s income, and 
the fruit of one‘s labor and industry.‘350 According to the Napoleonic Code, 
article 544, ‗property is the right to enjoy and dispose of things in the 
most absolute manner, provided we do not overstep the limits prescribed 
by the laws and regulations.‘351 
 
To what extend Locke‘s labor view of property is reasonable is very 
questionable. As early as the nineteenth century, Proudhon already 
exposed the deceptive nature of this view of property, arguing that the 
property only exists in the product, not the means of production. 
Proudhon discussed Cicero‘s comparison of the earth to a vast theatre 
and argued that, when each one occupied a place during the 
entertainment, this does not necessarily mean that the place was owned 
by them. Just as the theatre is always common to all, the possessor of 
land should not automatically acquire the right to his land and the land 
should remain common to all. Proudhon further asks ‗does the skill of the 
fisherman, who on the same coast can catch more fish than his fellows, 
make his proprietor of the fishing-grounds? Can the expertness of a 
hunter ever be regarded as a property-title to a game-forest‘352 If the 
industrious cultivator has made improvements in the soil, he has the 
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possessor‘s right of preference, since he obviously found the reward of 
his industry in the abundance and superiority of his crop. Never, under no 
circumstance, should he be allowed to claim a property-title to the soil 
which he cultivates, on the ground of his skill as cultivator.353 According to 
Proudhon, the labor view of property was a delusion, and the process of 
gaining and losing property through the lapse of time is fatal. Proudhon 
thus claims fiercely: ‗Property is Theft!‘354 
 
Nevertheless, as mercantilist as Locke was, national wealth, rather than 
individual wealth or justice, was the issue about which he was most 
concerned. Almost a Hobbesian, in a note written in 1674, he included 
both agriculture and industry in the term ‗trade‘. His labor view of 
property was partly due to the fact that he took a pretty modern view of 
both money and land as ‗capital‘, the accumulation of which would greatly 
benefit the nation.355 When talking about the difference between money 
and land, although he did not reject a traditional barren view of money, 
that is, that money is not like land in terms of that it cannot naturally 
produce something new and of value to mankind. He pointed out that 
money and land are alike insofar as they yield interest based on unequal 
possession. As he said,  
...the unequal distribution of money; which inequality has the same 
effect too upon land, that is has upon money...For as the unequal 
distribution of land, (you having more than you can, or will manure, and 
another less) brings you a tenant for your land;…the same unequal 
distribution of money, (I having more than I can, or will employ, and 
another less) brings me a tenant for my money…356 
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Civil Society  
According to Locke, property owners established civil society by consent 
and thus subjected themselves to government rule in order to protect 
themselves from the inconveniences, insecurity and violence of the state 
of nature. His famous dictum was that ‗government has no other end but 
the preservation of property‘. Adam Smith, similar to Locke, has said that, 
‗till there be property, there can be no government, the very end of which 
is to secure wealth [i.e., to make wealth secure] and to defend the rich 
from the poor.‘357 Although it is plain for all to see that Smith‘s sympathy 
laid with the poor and the lowly, and for the general masses rather than 
the privileged few, he still thought that the government was necessary in 
the absence of a better instrument, since people needed to rely upon 
government for fulfilling many tasks which individuals would not, or could 
not, do, or could only do badly. He had little trust in the competence of 
government, since he knew that whoever controlled it would try to serve 
their own interest. As he wrote, ‗civil government, so far as it is instituted 
for the defense of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some 
property against those who have none at all.‘358 Smith also emphasized 
that the most critical role of government was to establish ‗an exact 
administration of justice‘ in maintaining the society. He compared, in that 
regard, beneficence with justice in society, and concluded that ‗society 
may subsist, though not in the most comfortable state, without 
beneficence; but the prevalence of injustice must utterly destroy it.‘ 
Beneficence ‗is the ornament which embellished, not the foundation 
which supports, the building… Justice, on the contrary, is the main pillar 
that upholds the whole edifice.‘359 
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Yet, one should be aware that there were two levels of consent in Locke‘s 
theory: one was the consent to use money between free, equal and 
rational men in the state of nature, secured by commercial contracts; the 
other type of consent was the agreement of someone to hand over all his 
power to the majority to establish civil society. The first kind of consent is 
valid without the second. But although the ownership of property was 
morally established by the first consent, they were practically difficult to 
enforce, for the consent still occurred in the state of nature. Therefore, 
ultimately, the sequence of consent involved three stages in all: two 
stages in the state of nature (one before and one after consent to using 
money and unequal possession), followed by one stage in civil 
society. 360 Nevertheless, Locke‘s usage of the term ‗property‘ is 
inconsistent. Sometimes he meant ‗Lives, Liberties and Estates‘ and at 
other times he only meant estates. This led to the question whom he 
considered to be members of civil society. Did he include people without 
property in civil society? It has been argued that Locke did include 
everyone in civil society, that is, anyone who has an interest in preserving 
his life and liberty, but only those with ‗estate‘ were eligible for a full 
membership.361 
 
Locke‘s separation of society from government was slowly eroded after 
the Glorious Revolution, as the term ‗society‘ was gradually fused with 
both parliamentary representation and the so-called high society of 
manners and tastes. The thinkers of the Scottish enlightenment, including 
Ferguson, Hume, and Smith, also came to understand the essential 
feature of civil society ‗not in its political organization but in the 
organization of material civilization‘.362 Thus they eventually reduced civil 
society to economic society, and exclude the public engagement of 
politics from it. Though engaged in parallel universe of discourse, both 
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Marx and Foucault, the two peerless critics of modern civil society in the 
nineteenth century and the twentieth century respectively, have showed 
us that far from immune from the hegemony power, the construction of 
civil society, in fact, strengthened it by inventing a new and pervasive 
form of domination and stratification.363 Nevertheless, Locke‘s view of the 
emergence of separate realms of the public and private as an essential 
condition of the liberal democratic state, has often been regarded as the 
most important idea that transmitted from the Glorious Revolution in 
Britain to the drafters of the Constitution in American.364  
 
11. The Overseas Trading Corporation: 
The Hybrid of the Public Interest and the 
Private Interest 
The sixteenth century witnessed the birth of an unprecedented form of 
incorporation, as the traditional form of the self-governing political entity 
has been applied to a business purpose specialized in overseas trade. 
This new form of corporation as the private-public hybrid was the joint-
stock corporation. However, the legal relationship between the joint-stock 
corporation and the British Crown still continued to be based on the 
medieval franchise theory, and the law of corporation was still classified 
as part of the king's exclusive prerogative. This meant that the joint-stock 
companies could only be created by the authorization from the Crown, 
either in the form of a charter (or letters patent), or, occasionally, in an 
act of Parliament bearing the King‘s explicit consent, or a combination of 
an act and a charter. Nevertheless, the Glorious Revolution caused some 
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inconsistencies in this: there was a constant struggle between the Crown 
and Parliament over the privilege of granting incorporation, as the 
interests of these overseas joint-stock corporations became in contrast 
with those of the Parliament. The Bubble Act in 1720 forbade the 
formation of further joint-stock companies without an explicit approval 
from Parliament, a ban that remained in force for the next 105 years.  
 
These trading companies were unexpectedly successful in overseas 
business. During the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, as they 
have established strong commercial relationships worldwide, ranging 
from Africa (the Royal African Company, originally the Company of Royal 
Adventurers Trading to Africa), Asia (the East India Company), Turkey 
(the Levant Company), to Russia (the Muscovy Company). The form of 
trading companies has also been used in establishing sustainable English 
settlements in North America (the Virginia Company, the Massachusetts 
Bay Company and the Hudson Bay Company). These overseas trading 
companies were involved deeply in both imperial politics and party politics. 
They played essential roles in issues with regarding to foreign policy, 
public exchequer and the politics of the native. Because of their 
constitutionally contentious activities and their entitlements to the re-
negotiable privileges (their charters would be expired after the due date), 
they were the focal points of the metropolitan parliament debates all the 
time, especially during the eighteenth century. 
 
Joint-stock companies vs. regulated companies   
Before the emergence of the joint-stock corporation, overseas trade 
generally took the form of the regulated company. Regulated companies 
were common in cities and towns since early modern time. By joining the 
company and agreeing to submit to the regulations of the company, an 
inhabitant of a town was allowed to engage in a certain kind of trade. 
The regulated company collected entrance fees, annual payments, and 
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duties on imported and exported goods from its members. The collected 
money of the regulated company was used to provide facilities for its 
members, such as factories, embassies and consulates, and convoys. The 
most significant difference between the joint-stock company and the 
regulated company could be found in how they shared risk. While in the 
joint-stock company, members traded on a joint-stock account, sharing all 
of the company‘s business activities, both profits and losses, in proportion 
to their share in this stock. In the regulated company, each member 
traded on his own account, taking risks and liabilities individually to an 
unlimited extent. 
 
The English overseas regulated companies were the ancient merchant 
adventurers‘ companies, including the Hamburg Company, the Russia 
Company, the Eastland Company, the Turkey Company and the African 
Company. As these companies inherited ‗the usual corporation spirit‘, 
which meant that ‗wherever the law does not restrain it‘ and ‗they have 
been allowed to act according to their natural genius‘, ‗they have always, 
in order to confine the competition to as small a number of persons as 
possible, endeavored to subject the trade to many burdensome 
regulation.‘ 365  For example, Adam Smith describes several regulations 
(bye-laws) of the Turkey Company, which regulated that British 
manufactures could only be exported to Turkey in the general ships of the 
company, those ships could only sail always from the port of London, and 
the membership could only be granted to those who were free and living 
within twenty miles of London. These restrictions thus confined the trade 
to that expensive port, and the traders to those freemen of London. In 
addition, as the loading and sailing of those general ships depended all 
upon the directors at that time, they could easily fill with their own goods 
and those of their friends. They normally would exclude the others by 
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claiming that they had made their proposals too late. In this state of 
things, they were thus strict and oppressive monopolies in every respect. 
Those abuses and oppressive regulations gave occasion to the acts of 
parliament, which tried to reduce the fine for admission into theses 
regulated companies, to loosen the restrictions to admissions, and to 
break up the monopoly. In this sense, Smith wrote, ‗to be merely useless, 
indeed, is perhaps the highest eulogy which can ever justly be bestowed 
upon a regulated company; and all the three companies above mentioned 
[the Eastland Company, the Russia Company and the Hamburg Company] 
seem, in their present state, to deserve this eulogy‘.366 
 
In terms of foreign affairs, while joint-stock companies often maintained 
forts and garrisons in the countries to which they traded, regulated 
companies could only support ambassadors and consuls. 367  Smith has 
explained the reason behind this difference. According to him, the 
directors of a regulated company had no particular interest in the 
prosperity of the general trade of the company, and thus had no incentive 
to maintain forts and garrisons for the sake of the trade. In fact, the 
decline of that general trade may even contribute to the advantage of 
their own private trade, that is, by diminishing the number of their 
competitors, it may enable them both to buy cheaper, and to sell dearer. 
The directors of a joint-stock company, on the other hand, were 
concerned with the prosperity of the general trade of the company, and 
with the maintenance of the forts and garrisons for its defense. Therefore, 
they were more likely to make continual and substantial effort in taking 
care of the necessary maintenance. Even when the colonial regulated 
company might attempt to maintain forts and garrisons sometime, it 
seldom had the same ability to acquire a large amount capital as the 
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joint-stock company did, since the directors of a regulated company had 
no common capital in hand to render this attempt effectual.368 
 
The 'public' nature of the colonial corporation  
The major aim of establishing overseas trading corporations, at least from 
the general perspective, still was primarily to promote the ‗public interest‘, 
and they were continually defined as public institutions. Charters could 
only be awarded for ventures that mixed the broader public purpose for a 
better government with the private interest of its members. Colonial 
corporations, as national projects, were mainly established for exploring 
overseas trade with the objective of protecting national commerce and 
bringing back valuable commodities from overseas to England. For 
example, in the 1600 chapter of the East India Company, it was stated 
that the public goal of the Company was to ‗the advancement of trade‘, to 
ensure that private profits upheld the public good.369  
 
Given the high risks of overseas exploration, there were often clauses in 
the charters of joint-stock corporations that granted them monopolies 
over English trade with a specified territory abroad. In order to protect 
their monopoly and the rights over English subjects within their overseas 
territory, they were also generally empowered the semi-sovereign power 
to have armies and to fortify territory. Sometimes, they even had the 
right to coin money and to impose customs duties.370  Overseas joint-
stock corporations therefore shared a considerable part in the English 
public exchequer. They were not only paying for various privileges that 
had been granted to them by the Crown and the parliament, such as the 
fees for the charters, monopoly, franchise, licenses and so on. But they 
                                        
368  Though the parliament later had allotted an annual sum to some regulated 
companies for the purposes of maintaining the forts and garrisons. ibid.  
369 James Mill, The History of British India (first published 1817, Associated Publishing 
House 1972) vol 2, ‗The Chapter of the East India Company‘.  
370 See generally MF Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in 
International Law (Longmans, Gree & Co 1926). 
 
138 
also were saving public expenses by taking over some of the state‘s 
responsibilities regarding foreign policy such as sending embassies, 
building fortifications, and maintaining naval and military facilities. In 
addition, the Crown often reserved a share of the potential interest of 
these corporations. For example, in the charters of the London and 
Plymouth Companies, the Crown has reserved a fifth of all the gold and 
silver that would possible be found by these companies.371  
 
In the later days, almost all the controversies surrounding colonial 
companies in the metropole stemmed from the issues regarding their 
semi-sovereign powers and their relations to the public exchequer. It was 
publically criticized most influentially by Edmund Burke in his 
parliamentary speeches, and crystalized later by the two Mills.372   For 
Adam Smith, although it was always the interest of commerce that first 
rendered it necessary to introduce the custom of keeping ambassadors 
and maintaining forts and garrisons. It should be, ultimately, the 
responsibility of the state to perform such duties of diplomacy, as part of 
the sovereignty, in an enduring and consistent way.  
However, in the greater part of the commercial states of Europe, it was 
the companies that had successfully persuaded the legislature to entrust 
to them the performance of this part of the duty of the sovereign, 
together with all the powers which are necessarily connected with it. 
These companies by making at their own expanse, an experiment which 
the state might not think prudent to make, have in the long run proved, 
universally, either burdensome or useless, and have either mismanaged 
or confined the trade.373  
 
This was particular obvious in the situation where the local government 
was weak or out of order. When talking about the forts of East India 
Companies, Smith wrote, ‗the disorders in the government of Indostan 
have been supposed to render a like precaution necessary even among 
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that mild and gentle people; and it was under pretense of securing their 
persons and property from violence that both the English and French East 
India Companies were allowed to erect the first forts which they 
possessed in that country.‘374 In other words, if the local government in 
India had been strong enough, then it would not have been allowed 
strangers to possess any fortified place within its territory. What is 
reasonable then, according to Smith, was to only maintain ambassador, 
minister, or consul. Whenever there was a dispute either among their 
countrymen, or among them with the natives, these officers would decide, 
interfere with, and offer the powerful protection based on their distinctive 
public authority. 
 
At the international level, the controversy over the sovereign power of 
the colonial corporation continued when they acquired territories, waged 
wars, and made treaties in the name of the Crown. Since the legal 
relationship between the companies and the Crown was conceptualized 
as a feudal relationship, lands that were acquired by the companies in the 
overseas territories were to be held by the companies in the name of the 
Crown, under the assumption that they formed part of an English 
manor. 375  It was until the turn of the twentieth century that the 
international lawyer John Westlake proposed a special status for these 
companies as ‗the mediate sovereign‘.376  Westlake did not continue to fit 
the colonial corporations' land into the pattern of the traditional feudal 
system. Instead, he defined the colonial company as ‗the creature of the 
state to the law or to the government of which it owes its corporate 
existence and powers‘, ‗a technical person having an existence in law‘ and 
‗a technical subject of the state which has called it from nothingness into 
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that mode of being in law‘. 377  It was ‗as much an organ as the 
department of its government ostensibly entrusted with the conduct of its 
foreign affairs, or as the commanders of the forces which the state 
employs in its own name.‘ The doctrine of ‗the mediate sovereign‘ further 
defined that if any of these companies acquires territory, the territory and 
the international sovereignty over it belong to the British Crown, though 
they may be held ‗mediate‘ by the company. On the other hand, the 
Crown could not escape the responsibility for any treaties, wars, crimes, 
and misdemeanors in which the Company was involved.378  
 
Westlake‘s narrative of the colonial companies as ‗mediate sovereign‘ has 
been widely adopted by political and legal discourse. Until recently, there 
has been a renewed interest in early modern colonial trading companies, 
which challenge this traditional doctrine of 'mediate sovereign' by 
emphasizing on the autonomy of these companies as independent 
political entities. This academic resurgence resonates profoundly with the 
increasing global concerns about multinational corporations (MNCs) as a 
form of neocolonialism in the age of globalization, and about the 
potential dangers foreign corporations might bring to the local people and 
economy. Those concerns have also renovated the old researches on how 
the East India Company ‗drained‘ India.379 Modern MNCs share strikingly 
similarities with the colonial trading companies. The concerns over 
executive malpractice, stock market excess, and corporate abuse of 
human rights were worries of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as 
much as today.  
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Specifically, traditional observers view colonial trading companies as 
instruments of the state (or, as the intermediary, outsourced, and 
privatized bodies of the government), and stick to a strict public/private 
state/non-state division (or the division between the government and the 
colonial trading company) in interpreting the European expansion into the 
New World. 380  Recent works, however, have stressed the political 
independence of colonial trading companies, and their independent 
agency in international relationships, especially in the extra-European 
world, becomes the new academic focal point in the historiography of the 
companies. 381  The relatively independent role the colonial company 
played in the trilateral interaction of power between the company, the 
British Crown and the local power overseas thus has been rediscovered 
by historians, who replace the simplified bilateral dynamic depicted by 
Westlake's ‗mediate sovereign‘ with the trilateral model. The ambiguity of 
the legal status of the colonial companies has also been widely discussed. 
Scholars offer different explanations regarding this: some believes that 
the Company took advantage of its ambiguous status in order to avoid 
contractual debts to local rulers. 382  Others observe the pragmatic 
convenience for taking the ambiguous legal status of the corporation in 
avoiding the complex diplomatic issues and in constructing a relatively 
flexible system of international law.383 
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The monopoly of the joint-stock corporation  
The royal monopoly granted to the overseas joint-stock corporations has 
long been at the center of debates on the relative virtues of monopoly 
forms of organization and free trade. Supporters of these monopoly 
corporations argued that monopoly rights were necessary to create and 
maintain the expensive infrastructure that made long-distance trade with 
Asia both possible and profitable. Free trade advocates, on the other 
hand, attacked these monopoly corporations as limiting the expansion of 
commerce. Arguments over the efficacy of the overseas joint-stock 
corporations‘ monopoly continue to this day by historians. 384  More 
importantly, the history of joint-stock companies and their monopolies 
also become the focal point for neoliberal debates. As Foucault has 
argued, neoliberalism should not be identified with the doctrine of laissez 
faire, but is about ‗discover[ing] how far and to what extend the formal 
principles of a market economy can index a general art of government‘.385 
What follows is that the opinions towards monopoly significantly changes: 
monopoly used to be regarded as an unavoidable consequence of 
capitalist competition, which in turn resulted attenuating and even 
nullifying competition; now it has been demonstrated that monopoly 
could only take place by the intervention of the public power. In this 
sense, the question of what inheritance practices of the functioning of 
law that gave rise to joint-stock companies and their monopolies has 
become a new research interest.  
 
Adam Smith has explicated the specific historical situation in which the 
monopolies of the colonies and the joint-stock corporations were 
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operating.386 According to him, every European nation has endeavored 
more or less to monopolize the overseas commerce, but they attempted 
to do so in different manners. Some nations gave the whole overseas 
commerce to an exclusive company to sell and buy. Some confined the 
entire commerce to a particular port of the mother country. Since in the 
second case it would finally result in all merchants joining their stocks 
together to fit out the licensed vessel, the second case in fact differed 
little from the first. Others, such as Great Britain, left the trade of the 
colonies free to all, who may carry it on from all the ports of the mother 
country (provided it was in British ships or in Plantation ships, whose 
owners and three-fourths of the mariners were British subjects). There 
was no other license other than the common dispatches of the 
customhouse. This third way, according to Smith, would generate the 
competition that hindered the traders from making exorbitant profits.387 
Nevertheless, in the export of the surplus produce from the colonies to 
England, there were certain commodities, enumerated in the act of 
navigation and in some other subsequent acts, which were confined only 
to the market of Great Britain. The enumerated commodities often 
included products that could not be produced, or could not be produced 
in good quantities. Also, the liberality of England towards colonial exports 
was only confined to those goods which were either in their natural, 
unprocessed state, or in the very first stage of manufacturing.388            
 
The relative liberality of trade between Britain and its colonies might have 
been beneficial for matured colonies, but for the colonies in their infancy, 
the monopolies granted to certain colonial joint-stock companies were 
both necessary and essential. Adam Smith admitted that it was 
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reasonable to grant joint-stock companies the monopoly of trade for 
certain years, since they undertook, ‗at their own risk and expense, to 
establish a new trade with some remote and barbarous nation.‘ 389 
Monopoly is ‗the most natural way to compensate them for hazarding a 
dangerous and expensive experiment, of which the public is afterwards to 
reap the benefit.‘ ‗A temporary monopoly of this kind may be vindicated 
upon the same principles upon which a like monopoly of a new machine 
is granted to its inventor, and that of a new book to its author.‘ But in the 
long run, according to him, the monopoly should expired and it should be 
the government to maintain the forts and garrisons to provide adequate 
protection to the trade.  
 
A perpetual monopoly, in Smith‘s view, would ‗result all the other subjects 
of the state are taxed very absurdly in two different ways: first, by the 
high price of goods…; and secondly, by their total exclusion from a 
branch of business.‘390 It was merely to enable the company to support 
the negligence, profusion, and malversation of their own servants‘. With 
the case of the East India Company in mind, he further wrote that ‗how 
unjustly, how capriciously, how cruelly they have commonly exercised 
[their monopoly], is too well known from recent experience.‘ In the long 
run, without an exclusive monopoly privilege, a joint-stock company could 
not carry on any branch of foreign trade for long and could seldom 
compete against private adventurers. Nevertheless, in the trading areas, 
where the practice was capable of being reduced to strict rules and 
method, was of greater utility than common trade, and was requiting a 
greater capital, the join-stock company without a monopoly was possible 
to survive.391 Such areas included trades of banking, insurance from fire, 
from sea risk, and capture in time of war, making and maintaining a 
navigable cut or canal, and supplying water for a large city.   
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It is also important to note that monopoly and free trade were not 
dichotomous, for sometimes the free private trades within the monopolies 
were almost identical to free markets. Overseas joint-stock companies 
often ceded several of its monopoly privileges to their employees, who 
often engaged in the so-called private trade of their own. This meant that 
while they were in the employ of these companies, they could trade on 
their own account and in their own interest. It has been argued that it 
was precisely the existence of the private trade that sustained the 
success of these overseas companies. Its organizational decentralization 
has greatly benefited the exploration of new market opportunities and 
the creation of a powerful internal network of communication, which 
effectively integrated Company operations across these overseas 
territories.392 The contemporaries of the colonial joint-stock corporations 
at that time even took the success of the private trade as the evidence of 
the superiority of free markets.  
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IV. THE LIBERAL TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE 
DISTINCTION I: The Public Sphere 
and the East India Company   
 
The emergence of the bourgeoisie public sphere in the eighteenth century, 
as the communicative platform between the private civil society and the 
public state, fundamentally transformed the idea of the public/private 
distinction. Private property owners presented in the coffeehouses to 
debate their opinions about the state‘s regulations on the market. Critical 
publicity superseded the secrecy and privilege that traditionally regulated 
political communication. The public opinion, both constituted and invoked 
by critical journalism and printed petitions, thus was elevated from mere 
common sense to a source of legislative power, subordinating politics to 
popular will. As the communicative intermediate and institutional 
arrangements of democracy, the discursive public sphere epitomized the 
restoration of the ideological template of the Hellenic polis. It injected the 
critical element into public debate and public opinion, which supposed to 
base entirely on reason and rationality. Habermas describes the historical 
development of the discursive public sphere as the long path towards ‗the 
parliamentarization of state authority‘.393  
 
The eighteenth-century metropolitan public discussions included not only 
domestic political affairs but also foreign policy regarding the colonies and 
the colonial companies. The East India Company, as one of the most 
heated topics in the public sphere, catered to the public appetite 
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impeccably for various reasons.394 Those included its mysterious success 
in India, the sudden enrichment of its servants, the thrilled overseas 
explorations, and the exotic imagination. But the most important reason, 
perhaps, was that the East India Company worked as the mediator 
between the public and the private interest: on the one hand, its trading 
business conflated the public trade of the Company with the private trade 
of the Company servant; one the other hand, its shares on the stock 
market worked as the financial liquidation between the private property 
and the public debts, boding the two sides together.  
 
The discussion on the Company has particularly occupied the English 
metropolitan public sphere since 1765, the year when the Company 
officially acquired sovereignty in India from the Mughal Emperor.395 The 
controversy was provoked over whether the Company was competent 
enough to rule in India. This also echoed deeply to the complicated 
domestic economic and political conflicts, as the merchants in England 
were trying to break down the commercial monopoly of the Company in 
order to participate in the lucrative commerce with India. While the East 
India Company excluded the common people from commerce with India, 
the House of Commons excluded the Company from Parliamentary 
representation, though rich nabobs that came back from India was trying 
to intervene in parliament politics.396 Nevertheless, taking advantage of 
the Company‘s financial trouble, the British Parliament successfully 
absorbed the Company‘s power and achieved direct rule in India. A series 
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of Parliamentary Bills and Acts were enacted during the course of this 
taking-over process, the most important two of which were the 1773 
India Act and the 1784 India Act. Since then, as Karl Marx has identified, 
the India question was no longer a great political question and turned 
into a ministerial problem.397  
 
12. The Discursive Public Sphere 
In the eighteenth century, a discursive public sphere began to emerge in 
the English metropolitan public in order to reflect the political demands of 
the ‗bourgeois‘.398 The bourgeoisie was a newly rising social stratum of 
‗capitalists‘, which included not only commercial and financial capitalists, 
such as merchants and bankers, but also a growing group of industrial 
capitalists, such as entrepreneurs, manufacturers, and factory owners. 
Embodied in the form of companies, its influence outgrew the traditional 
self-governing township and directly addressed against then the ruling 
group that consisted of the parliament and the king.399 As the constituent 
body of the reading public, each bourgeois envisaged himself as entitled 
to participate in the decision-making processes of certain state 
regulations, especially those that concerned ‗the general rules of social 
intercourse in their fundamentally privatized yet public relevant sphere of 
labor and commodity exchange‘. 400  Instead of directly asserting their 
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interests against the existing ruling group, they resorted to the discursive 
power of public opinion to ‗put the state in touch with the needs of 
society‘.401 
 
The traditional norms of secrecy and privilege in political communication 
were superseded. Political discourse from this point became transparent 
and debatable, and it took the form of rivaling appeals to public opinion. 
Such appeals to public opinion animated the transformation of literary 
journalism from being mere institutions for the publication of news to 
being bearers and leaders of public opinion. The minority that did not get 
its way in Parliament could always sought refuge in the public sphere and 
appealed to the judgment of the reading public; the majority also 
legitimated its authority by appealing to reason against the opposition‘s 
claims to the contrary. It became apparent that the same rule, which 
granted parliament the right to critical judgments about the crown, 
should similarly justify the right of the public to make critical judgments 
of Parliament.  
 
The institution of the public sphere also epitomized the core liberal value 
of equality. The public sphere gained its legitimation from claiming that 
anyone who was capable of reflexive self-questioning and knew the rules 
of rational discourse could participate in public debates, regardless of 
social status. However, this ostensibly equal public participation has been 
challenged by many feminist scholars recently in exposing the limitation 
of the public sphere. By asking ‗whether certain subjects in bourgeois 
society are better suited than others to perform the discursive role of 
participants in a theoretical public‘, feminist scholars have revealed that 
the universalized subject of the ‗public sphere‘, who, unsurprisingly, 
displays all the characteristics of the benchmark man, leaves virtually no 
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space for ‗others‘. 402  Specifically, within a system of ‗western cultural 
representation‘, there is a strong association between feminine discourse 
and particularity, interest and partiality, whilst masculine speech is 
associated with truth, objectivity and reason. The former is also aligned 
with the private sphere and the latter with the public sphere. This 
exclusion is not only operated in terms of gender: the ‗feminine‘ here is 
constructed not only as one of the two sexes but as a totality of what the 
masculine is not, which could be embodied as woman, non-white, 
Aboriginal, homosexual and disabled and so on. 403  Landes has 
exemplified this argument in concrete history. As she argues, when 
women during the French Revolution and the nineteenth century tried to 
express their interests publicly, they were assigned to a place in the 
private domestic realm rather than the realm of the public. 404  In this 
sense, the dark side of the public sphere was that it was devised as a 
technique to exclude ‗the other‘ by ostensibly including it, ruling out the 
interests of the disadvantaged group in society by denying their 
subjectivity in legal or political discourses. 
 
However, according to Habermas, the twentieth-century public sphere 
has been ‗re-feudalized‘, which means that the public sphere has once 
again been reduced to the status of spectator, to passive consumers of 
information whose only role is to acclaim expert opinions, which in fact 
represent the ruling elites‘ decisions. 405  This manipulation of public 
opinion (or the rise of a passive consumption mentality amongst the 
masses) is due to the commercialization of the public sphere: the triumph 
of corporate capitalism (manufactures) in advertising and public relations 
has drastically curtailed the potential for critical discourse by cultivating a 
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mass commercial culture. Landes describes this process as ‗a sorrowful 
voyage from reason to mediatized consumption‘.406 Landes also aligns this 
account of the decline of the public sphere with Foucault‘s description of 
‗the once autonomous and rational subject [who] ended life as a 
candidate for the disciplinary society of total surveillance‘.407 Scholars call 
for the revival of public life as a means of protecting independent cultural 
and social life and resisting the limits of corporate governance and 
politics. 408  The discursive public sphere ultimately became part of the 
organ of the state and public opinion became part of the opinion of 
government.  
 
Recently, the concept of the public sphere has been applied in a global 
context. It has been suggested that the emergence of an international 
public sphere would resolve the long-standing conundrum with regard to 
the democratization of global governance. Among the most common 
critiques of globalization is that ‗this process sacrificed democratic politics 
to the demand for functional international cooperation and economic 
liberalization‘.409 Traditional debate about democratic governance beyond 
the nation state often runs into a predicament. On the one hand, it is a 
utilitarian liberal viewpoint which holds that as long as the result of global 
rules are market-enhancing, international legal regimes such as the WTO 
are legitimate. On the other hand, there is the ‗demos‘ view which 
attempts to extend democratic political participation from the national 
level to the global level in order to safeguard the global rules from the 
usurping of market. As a result, ‗while libertarians deny that there is a 
problem, demos theorists deny that there can be a solution‘.410  
                                        
406 Landes (n 388).  
407 ibid. 
408 James Carey, ‗The Press, Public Opinion, and Public Discourse‘ in Theodore Glasser 
and Charles Salmon (eds), Public Opinion and the Communication of Consent (Guilford 
Press 1995) 373; Angela M Crack, ‗Transcending Borders? Reassessing Public Spheres in 
a Networked World‘ (2007) 4 Globalizations 341. 
409 Patrizia Nanz and Jens Steffek, ‗Global Governance, Participation and the Public 
Sphere‘ (2004) 39 Government and Opposition 314.  
410 ibid. 
 
152 
 
Yet, the emerging global public sphere seems to provide a possible 
solution to reconcile these opposite views by emphasizing the role of non-
state actors either as agents seeking to influence the behavior of states 
and intergovernmental negotiations or as substantial participants in 
global governance. 411  However, this emerging global public sphere is 
argued as no longer conterminous with the Westphalian nation-state 
system that was established in 1648. The post-Westphalian political-
economic system has not yet developed the adequate conception and 
vocabulary to be used as the analytical parameters of this new global 
public domain. A ‗governance gap‘, as Habermas terms it, indicates this 
lag of the international legal framework behind the developments of the 
global market and political reality.412  
 
The coffeehouse discussion, the press and the petition  
The earliest modern public sphere in England was exemplified perfectly 
by the eighteen-century English coffeehouses. 413  The first British 
coffeehouse was founded in 1650 in Oxford, and the first one in London 
was in 1652. Its distinctive gentility, as the exemplar of a post-
Restoration middle-class ‗culture of politeness‘, soon set it apart from 
other common drinking places, such as the tavern, the alehouse, and the 
inn.414  On the other hand, the prevalence of the coffeehouses, which 
stood in opposition to the crown with its noble and clerical culture, also 
indicated the decline of the court as a center of elite sociability.  
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Even before the coffeehouse has fulfilled any political functions, the 
crown and the government have already considered it as the seedbed of 
potential politic unrest due to its association with the dissemination of 
rumors and ‗false news‘. Charles II went to great lengths to suppress the 
coffeehouse culture entirely in December 1675, but failed in the end. The 
failure of the crown to wipe out the people‘s coffeehouses was commonly 
regarded by many earlier English historians and philosophers (including 
David Hume, James Ralph, and Henry Hallam) as an indicator that 
England could not be ruled in an arbitrary, despotic manner by its 
monarchs. This victory for the coffeehouses, which worked a necessary 
outlet for the English people‘s natural desire for the power of reasoning 
and reflection, was thus regarded as a key victory for individual liberty in 
terms of the freedom of speech and the press. 415  Thomas Babington 
Macaulay has particularly termed it the ‗fourth Estate of the realm‘, 
arguing that the coffeehouses were ‗the chief organs through which the 
public opinion of the metropolis vented itself‘.416   
 
The elimination of censorship and the resulting proliferation of political 
journalism greatly encouraged the coffeehouse discussions to develop 
into a grand and polemical style. Traditional norms of secrecy and 
privilege in political communication were thus replaced by public debates 
in a highly visible manner. It was not the Whigs, however, who were in a 
dominant position with its mouthpiece, London Journal (the most widely 
read journal at that time), but the Tories, as the opposition, that first 
created this publishing platforms for public opinion and fostered a climate 
of political criticism. The Tory journals, the Craftsman and the 
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Gentleman‘s Magazine, ‗for the first time established as a genuinely 
critical organ of a public engaged in critical political debates: as the 
fourth estate.‘ 417  Later, the London Magazine began to report on 
parliamentary debates.  
 
This emergence of independent political journalism, which provided 
continuing critical commentary and public opposition against the Crown‘s 
actions and (Whig) Parliament‘s decisions, created a direct confrontation 
between the government and the press. A great deal of satirical articles 
were published with the aim to reveal the political machinations and 
conspiracies between the King, the minister, the top military men, and the 
jurists. The parliament tried to protect the secrecy of the proceedings 
based on the old decrees of its privilege, but in this new political climate 
of criticism, it was difficult to exclude the public from parliamentary 
deliberations. It had to repeatedly renew the injunctions against 
publication to the extent that even a publication of its debates between 
sessions would be deemed a breach of privilege. More importantly, the 
discussions in the press and coffeehouses went beyond the concrete 
issues of the day to include the general political ideas of governance such 
as, the separation of powers, liberties, patriotism, and corruption. 418 
Sometimes, it even included moral philosophy, such as the question of 
pleasure and happiness, passion and reason.   
 
Amongst the wide range of publications in the public sphere, the 
innovative use of printed petitions as political propaganda brought the 
political maneuvering to a new level. Unlike critical journals and 
newspapers, which presumptuously represented the nominal (anonymous, 
fictional as well as literary) collective public opinion, the printed petition 
                                        
417 Habermas (n 393) 60.  
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instantiated the abstract public opinion as a real individual entity.419 The 
petition was not only an indicator of public opinion, but also sought to 
influence public opinion and to further lobby elites on behalf of a 
legislative agenda. This complexity reflects the dual nature of public 
opinion as a nominal and real entity. In an effort to obtain signatures or 
marks, printed petitions were often read aloud and discussed among 
people in the public space. The coordination of the proceedings in 
Parliament with the procession of citizens bearing the petition to West-
minster was then a political art practiced to perfection.  
 
In the practical experiences with political petitioning in the public sphere, 
there emerged several speculations that took political theory into a 
liberal-democratic direction. 420  Firstly, in their defense or attack of 
opinions in rival printed petitions, commentators began to adopt some 
modern principles of public debates. A rough consensus was achieved on 
the importance of informed consent, on the open exchange of ideas, and 
on using reason as the ground of opinions in political petitions. The 
validity of the institutions of the petition would be greatly undermined by 
fraud and the use of force to increase subscriptions. ‗Free and voluntary‘ 
subscriptions promised to exclude the possible economic threats. 
Secondly, when petitions competed to claim the authority of public 
opinion, they confronted the question of whether the sheer number of 
signatories or the supporters‘ social status gave more authority to the 
opinions advanced in rival petitions. While traditional views on petitions 
valued more on the social status of the supporters, the contemporaries 
sometimes cited the number of signatories to justify or discredit a petition. 
This new importance placed on the number of signatories might to some 
extent express egalitarian beliefs that underpin modern democracy.   
 
                                        
419 David Zaret, Origins of Democratic Culture: Printing, Petitions, and the Public Sphere 
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The tension-charged political balance and the public 
opinion 
Based on these practical experiences with political petitioning, there 
emerged a new idea that endowed public opinion with some 
unprecedented legislative authority. During this period, the political 
dynamic of metropolitan Britain was caught by triangular interactions 
between the Parliament, the informed public, and the King. The 
parliament at that time was still mainly composed of a homogeneic 
aristocracy. The King, since his royal power was limited by the parliament, 
now tried to secure for himself a firm following within the Parliament in 
order to rule indirectly. The bourgeois strata of the public, not being 
represented in parliament as part of a ruling group, attempted to install 
public debates as a kind of ‗pre-parliamentary forum‘ to influence the 
decision of state authority. The already established culture of coffeehouse 
discussion easily facilitated the substantiation of their attempts. 
 
One interesting question would be why the public sphere in Britain arose 
so much earlier than on the Continent, despite the fact that both of them 
had an active literary public sphere as the precondition for developing a 
political public sphere. Habermas ascribes the English peculiarity to the 
advanced capitalist mode of production in post-revolutionary Great Britain, 
which brought in a broader stratum of the population into the conflict.421 
The rise of the industrial capitalists, who in securing the low costs of 
production had to fight against the landlords and the merchants. This 
new conflict of interest between the emerging manufacturing capitalists 
and then dominant financial capitalists thus replaced the traditional 
opposition between landed and moneyed interests to become the major 
antagonism in Great Britain. Although this new class conflict was still 
falling into old patterns as a tense between the interests of the 
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established generation and the interests of the new-comers in the market. 
It was however embedded in a relatively balanced political situation. The 
general division and balance of political power preferred the discursive 
public sphere as the most advanced way to resolve political confrontation. 
Institutional innovations were also essential for the rise of the public 
sphere. Three major preconditions have been identified by Habermas as 
aiding this rise: firstly, the founding of the Bank of England (the 
consolidation of capital system), secondly, the elimination of the 
institution of censorship (free publication and press), and, thirdly, the 
establishment of the first cabinet government (the first step towards a 
modern parliament).422  
 
Within the parliament, the same kind of tension-charged political balance 
was evident. Especially in the late eighteenth century, the end of the era 
of ‗Whig Oligarchy‘ (1714-1783) gave rise to the balanced political powers 
of the two parties, namely the reconstituted Whig Party under the 
leadership of Charles James Fox and the new Tories under William Pitt 
the Younger. It was an easy step for the weaker party to appeal to the 
new authority of the public opinion by carrying the conflict into the public 
sphere and making their ‗party interest‘ into a ‗public interest‘. It was in a 
speech given by Fox in the House of Commons, opposing Pitt‘s war 
preparations against Russia, that ‗public opinion‘ for the first time has 
been introduced into Parliament and received sanction. As Fox said: 
It is certainly right and prudent to consult the public opinion…if the 
public opinion did not happen to square with mine; if, after pointing out 
to them the danger, they did not see it in the same light with me, or if 
they conceived that another remedy was preferable to mine, I should 
consider it as my due to my king, due to my Country, due to my honour 
to retire, that they might peruse the plan which they thought better, by a 
fit instrument, that is by a man who thought with them…but one thing 
is most clear, that I ought to give the public the means of forming an 
opinion.423  
                                        
422 For the first time the King appointed a cabinet composed entirely of Whigs (1695-
1698).  
423 Habermas (n 393) 65-66.  
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The significance of the public opinion related closely to the fact that 
England entered into a period of ‗conservative‘ (if not cynical) liberalism 
at that time. As the rapid industrial development of the country expanded 
it into a great imperialist power, England was no longer in need of an old 
antiquated rationalization of liberalism, which had led to dangerous 
revolutionary conclusions. The French Revolution had given English 
capitalists a great scare, all sections of the ruling class united together to 
extinguish any signs of radicalism. Represented by David Hume, 
liberalism, now tired of strife, became more conservative as well as 
uncertain. With Hume, no truth was eternal but depended on the point of 
view, and any abstract idea is prejudice and not worth arguing about, 
which also included the theory of social contract. For example, in contrast 
to Locke, who based property on labor, Hume founded property on 
seizure and pointed out that government was founded solely on 
usurpation and conquest and not on the voluntary subjection of the 
people. 
 
Since there was no eternal truth, but only opinion, the public opinion has 
been elevated from a pure ‗opinion‘ to a sensible ‗judgment‘. As it has 
been said, a right sentiment would only alive in the mass of the 
population, the public opinion, at least representing the people‘s common 
sense, would represent a direct and undistorted sense for what was right 
and just. It has been glorified as curtailing the corruption of those in 
power, identical to the enlightened ‗Spirit of Liberty‘ in ‗the knowledge of 
the millions‘. But it was Edmund Burke who first endowed the public 
opinion with clear legislative power. In a letter to the electors regarding 
the affairs of America (after the Declaration of Rights was published), he 
wrote: 
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I must beg leave to observe that it is not only the invidious branch of 
taxation that will be resisted, but that no other given part of legislative 
right can be exercised without regard to the general opinion of those 
who are to be governed. That general opinions is the vehicle and organ 
of legislative omnipotence.424   
 
It is worth mentioning that whereas the English used public opinion as an 
authority that could compel the ruler to legitimize themselves to some 
extent, the French limited the absolutist ruler by the force of reason and 
persuasion, namely the rationalization of sovereignty. It was not until 
Rousseau, who provided the full foundation for the public‘s democratic 
self-determination, that the public opinion (or in Rousseau‘s words, the 
general will) became the sole legislator, which, however, arguably 
eliminated the public‘s rational-critical debates in the public sphere at the 
same time. It was because, for Rousseau, the general will was more of a 
consensus of hearts than of arguments, and long public debates (as 
manifested in the press and in the salon discussions), always influenced 
by particular interests, would irritate the people and corrupt the healthy 
simplicity of the established morals and the good soul.425 
 
In short, Rousseau wanted democracy and public opinion without public 
debates, which means that he eliminated the critical element from the 
public sphere. This was where the French version of the public sphere 
was radically different from the British version. For Jeremy Bentham, it 
was the very critical capacity of the public sphere that made it an 
incorruptible tribunal to supervise the exercise of political power through 
the publicity of parliamentary deliberations.426 
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13. The East India Company   
Initially entitled The Governor and Company of Merchants of London 
Trading into the East Indies, the English East India Company was 
established in 1600 by a charter granted by Queen Elizabeth I, who in the 
last years of her reign endowed the Company with a monopoly over all 
overseas trades within the extensive area of the East Indies (the entire 
area from the east of the Cape of Good Hope to the west of Cape Horn). 
The royal charter also granted the company a series of semi-sovereign 
privileges, including the right to raise armies, to wage war, to rule its 
overseas territories, to mint coin in subsidiaries, and to exercise justice in 
its settlements. At that time, a charter would only be awarded to an 
overseas venture if it served a broader public interest, instead of only 
serving the private interests of its members. In the case of the East India 
Company, it was established with a ‗national object‘ to ensure that 
England would gain a slice of the lucrative Asia trade, as the India market 
had already been taken by other European countries, including the 
Portuguese, the Dutch, and the French.427  
 
Generally, the Company consisted of the Court of Proprietors, the Court 
of Directors, and the servants of the Company. The Company was self-
governing organization, like all the other forms of corporation at that time. 
The Company‘s shareholders had to have over £500 of nominal stock to 
be able to vote on corporate policy and to hear the directors‘ reports, in 
the quarterly meetings of the Court of Proprietors held in March, June, 
September and December. More importantly, at the annual meeting in 
April, which was described as ‗little parliaments‘ by William Pitt and 
                                        
427 Portuguese traders were the first to establish a presence in India in 1535, but their 
privilege was replaced by the Dutch a century later. The English came yet later. However, 
‗John company‘ (the British East India Company) had gradually replaced ‗Jan Compagnie‘ 
(the Dutch United East India Company/VOC), becoming the master of Europe‘s trade 
with Asia.  
 
161 
Elder,428 they would gather to elect 24 directors. ‗No matter how large a 
shareholding, each individual with more than £500 in stock only had one 
vote, a surprising expression of financial egalitarianism.‘ 429  Only 
shareholders with over £2,000 in stock—the mercantile aristocracy—could 
put themselves forward as candidates for the office of director. These 
shareholders also had the right to override executive decisions taken by 
the directors up until 1784. 
 
The central power of the Company was in this elected Court of Directors. 
There was no chief executive, which means that the distinction between 
executive and non-executive directors did not yet exist. The 24 directors 
met weekly on each Wednesday. Each director was assigned to one of 
ten committees that looked after different aspects of the Company‘s 
operations. Among these, three committees were regarded as supreme: 
Correspondence, which handled all the communications with the 
Company‘s geographically remote subsidiaries; Treasury, which managed 
relations with the financial market, buying bullion and paying dividends; 
and Accounts, which aimed to maintain financial discipline. In addition, 
there were committees for buying commodities, warehousing, shipping, 
managing the East India House, and regulating (and preventing) private 
trade and lawsuits. Alongside these was the all-powerful Secret 
Committee, which defined the Company‘s political and military strategy in 
times of war. 
 
The Court of directors also controlled the Company‘s patronage system. 
The patronage system referred to the system wherein the Directors of 
the East India Company had the right to appoint offices in the East India 
Company‘s administration in India, such as those of civil servants, writers, 
and so on. Each Director was said to have at his disposal at least six or 
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429 Nick Robins, The Corporation That Changed the World: How the East India Company 
Shaped the Modern Multinational (Pluto Press 2006) 31. 
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seven appointments a year, and they sometime sold their patronage to 
buy and maintain seats in Parliament.430 This system enabled them to 
place friends, relatives, and business partners in key positions, a ‗gift‘ 
that became increasingly valuable in the second half of the eighteenth 
century.  
 
The Company’s trade   
After the initial explorations in a desultory fashion, it was the Company‘s 
demonstration of its naval superiority over the Portuguese taking off 
Surat in 1612 that paved the way for its first trade concession from the 
Mughal Emperor Jahangir. It was also in this year that the Company 
turned into a joint-stock company after the first twelve voyages.431 In 
1689, new subscribers made a proposal to parliament to advance two 
million at an interest of eight percent in exchange for the establishment 
of a new East India Company with exclusive privileges. The proposal was 
accepted and a new East India Company was established. However, the 
old East India Company still had the right to trade until 1701, which gave 
rise to the intense competition between the two companies. It had 
‗miserable‘ effects on both ‗the cheapness of consumption‘ and ‗the 
encouragement given to production‘, which were precisely the two effects 
that ‗the great business of political economy to promote‘.432 This situation 
did not continue for long. In 1702, the two companies were united by an 
indenture tripartite, to which the queen was the third party. In 1708, they 
merged and became The United Company of Merchants trading to the 
East Indies. At this point, the Company fully established the monopoly of 
English commerce in the East Indies.   
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Meanwhile, in India, despite the keen rivalry of the Dutch and the French 
and the growing competition of interlopers and private traders, the East 
India Company gradually consolidated its position as a powerful trading 
body. The Company‘s trade consisted of both the public trade and the 
private trade. In the public trade, the Company maintained its own 
organization for the acquisition of goods concerning imports and exports 
between Europe and India, that is, mainly the necessary supply of piece-
goods, either first hand from the producer or through a middleman. The 
private trade refers to the interport trade and the trade between India 
and the Further East. This trade was largely carried out by the Company‘s 
servants and by free merchants as their private trade. The prospect of 
amassing a fortune in the private trade attracted many men to the 
Company‘s service. They were allowed by the Company to use the 
dustocks for private trade. Dustocks were a kind of passport signed by 
the president of the Company which exempted the goods from the 
customs officers of Bengal. This was one of the privileges awarded by the 
Mughal Emperor Farukhsiyyar (who became Emperor in 1713) to the 
Company.433 It was this very privilege that led to frequent complaints, on 
part of the revenue officials, that the payment of inland duties was 
largely evaded, and finally drove the Company into wars with local 
authorities.      
 
The Company annually exported great values in silver, gold, and foreign 
coins to India, in exchange for Indian manufactures. In an age in which 
                                        
433 The chief privileges that were granted to the Company by the Emperor in 1717, in 
return for the payment of a fixed sum, included: all duties upon goods entering Surat on 
behalf of the Company should be remitted; the three villages adjoining Madras which 
had been withdrawn from the Company by the Government at Arcot should be restored 
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the customs officers of Bengal; and the Company should be allowed to purchase the 
zemindary of thirty-seven towns in Bengal as they had already purchased that of 
Sutanati, Kalikata, and Govindpur. CJ Hamilton, The Trade Relations between England 
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these precious metals were the only real source of wealth, this trade with 
India was justified favoring the exporting nation in the sense that 
commodities imported from East India were mainly re-exported to other 
countries to obtain a much greater quantity of bullion. 434  The Indian 
manufacturers remained excluded from the English market itself, as the 
industrial class repeatedly petitioned for parliamentary intervention, 
claiming that the importation of East India cotton and silk stuffs would 
ruin the poor British manufacturers.435 As early as the late seventeenth 
century, the competitive actions of the New and Old East India 
Companies flooded the English markets with Indian goods and the 
popular writer of the day began to prophesy disastrous results to the 
home manufacturers. In 1681, the outraged silk weavers of London 
unsuccessfully petitioned the House of Commons against wearing East 
Indian silks and cottons. The trade policy of England was later directed 
against the East India Company and favoring the interests of home 
manufacturers. In order to encourage the English silk industry, in 1700, 
Act II, William III, cap. 3, imposed further duties on wrought silks, muslin, 
and some other commodities of the East Indies.436 The Prohibitory Acts 
followed. For example, the Act 11 and 12 in William III Cap. 10 enacted 
that the wearing of wrought silks and of printed or dyed calicoes from 
India, Persia, and China should be prohibited, and a penalty of £200 was 
imposed on all persons having or selling the same.437  
 
The Company‘s takeover of Bengal in 1765 resulted in an extraordinary 
turnaround in terms of the reverse of the flow. The Company‘s purchase 
at Canton used to be made almost entirely in bullion, with only the 
limited exception of the Company‘s raw cotton from Western India. 
Mughal revenue-raising practices had routinely included state monopolies 
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on the production and distribution of certain commodities. Following this 
example, in 1773, the Company assumed the monopoly of opium growing 
in Bengal and sold it in China. 
 
The public finance  
The Company‘s presence became significant in public finance from 1688 
onwards, the beginning of the so-called ‗long eighteenth century‘. In this 
year, the English stock market was established, and the most prominent 
stock shares traded on Exchange Alley were by the East India Company. 
On the other hand, the Revolution gave the East India Company the 
opportunity to buy its liberty through providing financial support to both 
the constitutional Monarchy and the parliamentary government. 438 
Especially for the king, the strict parliamentary control over taxation 
required him to seek new potential lenders that had considerable liquid 
capital, and the East India Company with its permanent capital therefore 
soon became the primary choice.  
 
At every epoch when the Company‘s charter was expiring, it could only 
effect a renewal of its charter by offering loans of enormous sums at the 
lowest interest and by direct bribery, either in cash or in Company shares. 
For example, in 1693, the year when the Company‘s charter was 
technically forfeited, the annual expenditure of the Company reached  
£90,000 under the head of ‗gift‘, which had rarely amounted to more than 
£1,200 before. In the parliamentary investigation, the Duke of Leeds was 
impeached for accepting a bribe of £5,000, and the King himself was 
convicted of having received £10,000. The New East India Company lent 
the Exchequer £2,000,000 in 1698. The old and the new companies took 
out a loan of an additional £1,2000,000 when they merged to form the 
                                        
438 The Glorious Revolution resulted in new regulation concerning the creation of a new 
corporation: in addition to a royal charter granted by the Crown, a company‘s 
incorporation also needed to be authorized by the sanction of parliament. 
 
166 
United East India Company in 1708.439 The United Company also gave 
further loans of £200,000 in 1730 and £1,000,000 in 1744 to the king in 
order to secure extensions of its charter.  
 
These loans were unprecedented, since in earlier generations, it was 
more customary to make one-time payments rather than to develop a 
continuous credit relationship. These long-term loans laid the foundation 
for a continuing financial and political relationship between the state and 
the Company, indicating that the latter became a steady source of wealth 
for the government and the king. This was a constitutive part of the new 
system of credit, which, during the larger process known as the Financial 
Revolution (1688-1739), fundamentally transformed England.440 This new 
mechanism allowed for a significant expansion of the public debt and a 
concomitant increase in state capacity by featuring the active securities 
market, the widely circulating credit currency, and the chance to invest in 
public loans. This modern financial system enabled England to create a 
powerful fiscal and military state, which later actively engaged in imperial 
expansion.441  
 
Nonetheless, the successful implementation of financial revolution 
depended not only on the larger political changes for creditors to trust 
that the government would honor its debts, but also on the existence of 
moneyed merchant corporations, such as the Company, with access to 
fungible capital. The Company‘s ability to supply large funds to the 
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government, in turn, relied upon the concurrent development of the 
London Stock Market and the creation of new financial instruments. The 
Company, together with the Bank of England (founded in 1694) and the 
South Sea Company, became one of the three most dominant 
corporations at that time, known as the moneyed companies.442 As the 
shares of the Company could be traded on a public market, the Company 
was able to transfer its public debt to third parties through the creation 
and sale of India bonds, which increased the liquidity of public debt 
tremendously. In this sense, the Company greatly facilitated the transfer 
of funds between private investors and the government‘s exchequer, 
through which the financial and merchant classes now had a direct stake 
in the continued success of the government. The government, in turn, 
had a direct stake in responding to the needs of the merchants and 
financiers.  
 
14. The Controversy over the Company-
State     
In the mid-eighteenth century, the Company launched a political 
government in the subcontinent of Bengal. In every respect, this was 
unexpected and unplanned by the British government and even the 
Company‘s London headquarter. As one historian writes,  
With the benefit of hindsight, it is known that the British came to 
dominate the sub-continent over the next hundred years, yet it should 
be acknowledged that the initial advance lacked precise deliberation or 
forethought. On the contrary, the company’s expansion in the mid-
eighteenth century most frequently arose from events dictated by native 
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power in India, and without direction from London or the 
presidencies.443  
 
Indeed, before this, the Company had long given up on its attempt to 
develop an imperial foothold after the early unsuccessful attempt when 
the Mughal Empire of Maratha was at its peak of power in the 
seventeenth century.  But by 1750, the Mughal Empire was in a state of 
collapse. Although emperors continued to possess the legitimacy to rule 
over the country, the rise of regional states throughout India brought 
unforeseen opportunities for the Company to become a participant in the 
power politics of the successor to the Mughal Empire. The British had 
also been involved in an open conflict with the French, which in turn 
dragged the Company into alliances with Indian rulers in the Southeast. 
The East India Company was continually engaged in war ever since. As 
Adam Smith later commented: ‗the spirit of war and conquest seems to 
have taken possession of their servants in India, and never since left 
them.‘444  
 
Acquiring sovereignty  
In the canonical account, the famous Battle of Plassey in 1757 was the 
turning point in the Company‘s history, as it marked the inauguration of 
British political establishment in India.445 In 1756, Siraj-ud-Daula, the new 
young Nawab of Mughal, took the Company‘s settlement at Calcutta, as 
the Company refused to stop strengthening its fortifications against 
possible French attacks. The Company‘s army in South India, which had 
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been engaged in a battle with the French for many years, was recalled, 
and they recaptured Calcutta. The Company‘s forces under Robert Clive 
finally defeated the Nawab of Bengal at Plassey, 90 miles north of its 
trading base in Calcutta. Instead of declaring themselves the new 
sovereign of Bengal, the Company persuaded the Mughal emperor, Shah 
Alam II, to grant it the status of Diwani (tax revenue collector) of Bengal, 
Bihar, and Orissa under the treaty of Allahabad, upon the payment of a 
small annual tribute to him. 
 
On the other hand, the Company quickly installed Mir Jafar, an elderly 
general who had betrayed the defeated Nawab, as the first of a series of 
puppet rulers of Bengal. In return, Mir Jafar made a personal payment of 
£234,000 to Robert Clive. Ambition and greed fuelled these episodes of 
king-making to serve British interests as much as possible. Mir Jafar was 
deposed by the Company in 1760 in favor of the supposedly more pliable 
Mir Kasim, who paid £200,000 to the Bengal Council for this privilege. He 
did not turn out to be so pliable and went to war against the Company in 
alliance with the Emperor at Delhi and the ruler of Oudh. Overall, there 
was a continuing duel sovereignty in Bengal: the de jure sovereignty of 
the Mughal emperor (the puppet ruler) and the de facto sovereignty of 
the Company (with the real controlling power). Accordingly, there were 
two governments: one was the East India Company as the machinery of 
revenue collection, and the other was the original ruler of Bengal, 
continuing to bear the responsibilities of maintaining law and order and 
criminal administration.446  
 
From a legal perspective, the Company‘s control over the gained territory 
was legitimated by an integral of two higher sources: firstly, by the Royal 
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Charter that was authorized by the British Crown,447 and secondly, by 
several grants (decrees and Diwani) that they received from the emperor 
of the Mughal. While the Royal Charter from the Crown gave birth to the 
Company and equipped it with monopoly privileges and military force, it 
is the grant of the Diwani of Bengal from the Mughal emperor in 1765 
that endowed the Company with sovereign powers. Though it has been 
argued that the 1765 appointment was just an official affirmation of the 
Company‘s long-established political power in the local politics and its 
series of territorial conquest. 
 
Nonetheless, it is generally agreed that this was the climactic but 
contentious historical turning point, officially transforming the Company 
from a trading company to a sovereign power. As historian P. J. Marshall 
wrote, ‗the formal assertion of British sovereignty over India was to be 
delayed until 1813. Yet whatever its right to do so, there could be no 
doubt that from 1765 the East India Company possessed de facto power 
over the administration of justice in its provinces.‘448  This was a near 
‗revolution‘, which transformed the Company from being a ‗client‘ of the 
Mughal Empire to being its ‗principal agent‘ in north-east India. From this 
point on, a new way thinking about British‘s role in the East has been 
provoked.449  
 
John Morrison and his proposal  
John Morrison‘s work, The Advantages of An Alliance with the Great 
Mogul, was one of these voices in the public sphere that explicitly 
expressed the disapproval of the transformation of the Company into a 
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sovereignty.450 As he claimed, ‗to account for this step, on the principles 
of justice, was impossible‘.451 He further wrote ‗such a dishonorable blow 
to the law of nations and to the British faith struck me in the most 
forcible manner; and I could not help looking forward to the baneful 
tendency of this disregard to all truth, and the most sacred of 
engagements.‘ Instead, he proposed that the British government should 
directly align itself with the Mughal emperor and prevent the Company 
from meddling in affairs concerning the sovereign power of the Mughal 
empire. Reflecting on the difficult financial situation of the Company at 
that time, whose dramatically decreased revenue also faced increasing 
expenses at the same time, he argued that the problem was owing to the 
fact that the adjacent districts of the Company, the provinces of Bengal, 
Behar, and Orissa, consistently committed ‗barbarism, plunder, and 
carnage‘. He emphasized the importance of peace in India as a whole for 
the financial well-being of the Company. Such peace, according to him, 
would be hard to achieve if the British government continued its 
indifferent attitude and its generally non-aggressive policy in India, as the 
inadequacy of the Company in dealing with the major power in Asia, 
especially the Mughal Empire, was apparent. A direct alliance between 
the sovereign British Crown and the sovereign Mughal Empire, according 
to Morrison, would be a better solution. 
 
In addition to his considerations of the utility and the expediency of such 
an alliance, Morrison also explained his motivation for such a proposal 
based on his personal experience in India. Perhaps, given that he was 
working for the Mogul emperor as the ‗General and Commander in Chief 
of the Great Mogul‘s forces, he thought it was necessary to explain the 
circumstances that brought him there. According to Morrison, he first 
                                        
450 John Morrison, The Advantages of an Alliance with the Great Mogul (1774). This 
monograph so far has received little attention mostly because Morrison‘s suggestions 
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conceived of the idea of a direct alliance between the two empires as 
early as 1769, when he was first introduced to the prince of the Great 
Mughal, one year after his arrival in Bengal as the Major in the 
Company‘s force. He described the prince as ‗a prince of amiable 
manners, of tried fortitude, courage, and ability‘, but in an embarrassing 
situation: the prince was ‗sitting in a hut covered with straw, hardly large 
enough to hold above twelve people; yet this hut was called the Durbar 
or Court of the Great Mogul; and this while protected by the English East 
India Company.‘452  
 
Two years later, Morrison resigned from the Company when Captain Eyres 
was ‗unjustly‘ appointed to the rank of the oldest Major on the Bengal 
establishment. Disappointed by the illiberal and unjust system of the 
Company, Morrison believed that the Company‘s system raised men to 
think that ‗interest at home will outweigh services abroad‘, forcing them 
‗in despair to grasp at any immediate opportunity of improving [their] 
fortune‘, and informing them ‗all powerful gold will cover a multitude of 
sins‘.453 He even regarded it as the most complete system ever known of 
fraud and violence by uniting the functions of merchant, soldier, financer, 
and judge in the same person. His self-confession, as an important part 
of the book, gives the reader the perceptions of an unbiased author 
struggling in the corrupted system of the Company. These perceptions 
are shaped by Morrison‘s strong sense of humanity and justice.  
 
Parliament’s taking over the Company 
At every epoch when the Company‘s charter was expiring, the renewal of 
the charter would generally ensue some political drama leading up to the 
parliamentary inquiry into the India affairs. These inquiries often ended 
up with the Company‘s agreement to offer loans of enormous sums at the 
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lowest interest to the parliament, which also generally included bribes, 
either in the form of cash or Company shares. The 1767 renewal session 
was not an exception. The situation in 1767, however, was 
unprecedented not only because, in 1765, the Company had acquired the 
sovereign power in Bengal, but also because, over the years 1763-84, the 
Company had lost control over its financial problems and jeopardized 
British interests and investments both at home and abroad. Furthermore, 
the image of the Company had lost its glamour in the eyes of the 
nation.454  Negative feelings about the Company began to grow in the 
metropolitan population: documents alleged abuses of the Company 
servants, the Company‘s despotic rulership in India, the catastrophe of 
the Bengal famine, and the evidence of corruption in the form of 
‗presents‘ to the Company‘s head.   
 
The news that the Company became a de facto sovereign was initially 
received with relative enthusiasm by the Company‘s administrators and 
the general investors in London, as the Company‘s stock value and 
dividend payments more than doubled by early 1767. 455  As some 
optimistic speculations circulated that the Diwani acquired by the 
company would tremendously enhance Company‘s revenue, the 
Company‘s territorial acquisition in India was generally viewed as a 
successful step in the process of recovering the Company‘s fortune. 
Parliament wanted to claim their share in these imagined treasures, and 
consequence, the Company successfully saved its existence by agreeing 
to pay £400,000 annually to the National Exchequer from the year 1767 
to the year 1773, ‗in respect of the territorial acquisitions and revenues 
lately obtained in the East Indies‘.456 
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But the reality was that the military actions of the Company had already 
cost a vast amount of money that could not be covered by the normal 
operating capital of the Company. In order to make up this shortfall, the 
Company had to extract more money from London by convincing the 
investors of future profits. In 1769, conflicts in south India rattled nervy 
investors, sending its share price into free fall. Initial stock market 
euphoria quickly gave way to excess, mismanagement, and collapse. As 
local oppression became the norm, drought turned to famine, the 
company‘s military spending spiraled out of control. Finally, in 1772, the 
Company not only failed to fulfill its agreement with the English people, 
but also got itself into serious financial and credit crises too.  
 
Consistently on the brink of bankruptcy, it had to appeal to the 
Parliament for the financial aid. The British government, taking this 
chance, began its enduring agenda for transforming the Company from a 
commercial enterprise into an administrative organ, serving solely the 
British national welfare. Besides, the Company was simply too big to be 
allowed to fail, as its shares were widely held by the public at that time. 
In exchange for the loan, some serious alterations needed to be made in 
the Company‘s Charter to redefine its relationship with the government. A 
series of parliamentary debates and inquiries into the Company‘s affairs 
thus started, the first of which was the establishment of a Select 
Committee of the House of Commons in 1772 that started parliamentary 
inquiries concerning the personal activities and acquisitions of Robert 
Clive. As the Commander-in-Chief of the Company, he was accused of the 
‗unabashed‘ extraction of loot and collection of ‗presents‘ in India, the 
most notable of which was a jaghire (land grant) from the nawab Mir 
Jafar.458 Although the House of Lords finally rejected this condemnation, 
it still helped changing the general opinion against the Company and its 
                                        
458 Clive later convinced the public that it was a present from the Mughal emperor, 
instead of an underhanded thank-you gift that came at the expense of Company profits. 
See Nichola Dirks, The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain 
(Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2006) 10. 
 
175 
corruption, paving the road to the later Lord North‘s Regulating Act of 
1773.  
 
While parliament, led by Lord North, agreed to provide financial 
assistance of £1,400,000 to the Company in 1773,459 in return, it also 
enacted the India Act 1773 to acquire some control over the Company‘s 
Indian administration. Even though Warren Hastings could continue to be 
the chief of the Company, he should be renamed as Governor-General, 
which was the same denomination used for the head of other British 
colonial governments. The Act also established a four-man Supreme 
Council, nominated by the Crown, to serve with Hastings. This soon 
resulted in a state of virtual civil war between Hastings and the majority 
of the Council. One of the councilors, Philip Francis, held different views 
from those of Hastings over a wide range of issues regarding the 
Company‘s administration in India.460 In addition, the Act provided that a 
Supreme Court of judicature should be set up at Calcutta to apply English 
law to all cases in its jurisdiction. This court was independent of the 
Governor-General and the Council. Later, much evidence was collected 
that portrayed the Supreme Court as trampling upon Indian traditions 
and customs, which was a recurring theme in Burke‘s writing and 
speeches.461 
 
Since 1780, Indian affairs came before parliament with increasing 
frequency, and alarming reports about the discreditable conducts of the 
Company in India were also accumulating. This was because that both 
the Company‘s Charter and the Regulating Act of 1773 were going to 
expire, it was now high time for the negotiation between the Treasury 
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and the East India House. Conflicts were mainly concerning two points: 
the first was about whether the right to the Indian territory belonged to 
the Crown or to the Company; the other was what proportion of the 
proceeds from the Indian territory by the Company should be made as 
the remunerations to the public. 
 
Meanwhile, under political pressure, North‘s government had to 
compromise to let Philip Francis leaving Bengal in 1780. Warren Hastings, 
therefore, ‗almost for the first time in his career‘, ‗was given unreserved 
support from the administration, the Courts of Directors, and his 
colleagues‘.462 Yet, the complaints and representations of Francis made in 
the metropolis had filled the public mind with ideas of injustice and 
crimes on the part of Hastings and the misconducts of his agents.463 The 
metropolitan public sphere had strong fears that the ruin of English 
interests by the Company was at hand. As the English nation 
simultaneously lost their colonies in America, the necessity of maintaining 
the power of the great Empire became imperative. In 1783, the 
Shelburne administration fell. Charles James Fox, in coalition with Lord 
North, became the Secretary of State and George III‘s minister.  
 
Thinking the opportune moment had arrived, Fox introduced his India 
Bills, which were regarded as a significant attempt by the government to 
strengthen its intervention in the Company‘s affairs after the Regulation 
Act 1773. As James Mill later commented, ‗no proceeding of the English 
government, in modern times, has excited a greater ferment in the nation, 
than these two bills of Mr. Fox‘.464 There was much evidence indicating 
that Burke was the principal author of the Fox‘s Bills.465 Fox‘s India Bills 
included two Bills. The first Bill dealt with the administration of the 
Company at home. Based on the principle that the Company‘s commercial 
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affairs ought to be separated from its governmental functions, it 
appointed seven commissioners, nominated by the parliament, to control 
the Company‘s territorial possessions and nine assistant commissioners to 
manage the commercial affairs of the Company. The second Bill was ‗for 
the better government of the territorial possessions and the 
dependencies in India‘, which included the rules that the Company‘s 
servants from then on were to follow. Overall, the essence of Fox‘s Bills 
was to establish that the Board of Director, consisting of the seven 
commissioners, should be chosen by the House of Commons and not by 
the owners of Company‘s stock.466  
 
However, the bill also provided that the patronage system of the 
Company should be completely removed, which alarmed the king. The 
principal business of the Company in the eighteenth century was really 
about exporting men to India, and everyone agreed that the opportunity 
to appoint servants constituted a vast resource. The idea circulated that 
by vesting the power to appoint offices entirely in the Company‘s board 
of commissioners, which, in turn, was appointed by Fox, ‗the power of 
Fox would be rendered absolute over both the king and the people‘.467 
The suggested removal of the patronage system also received strong 
opposition which claimed that the Bills violated the Company‘s charter 
rights by seizing private property without due process and without 
adequate compensation. In fact, it was this very proposal for the removal 
of the patronage that formed the foundation of the furious opposition to 
Fox‘s Bills. 
 
As a result, due to the personal influence of King George III over the 
House of Lords, not only were the Bills defeated, but Fox‘s political life 
had also come to an end. William Pitt the Younger placed him at the head 
of the government. In 1784, Pitt pushed a bill through both Houses which 
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established the Board of Control, consisting of six members of the Privy 
Council. Comparing the 1783 Fox Bill and the 1784 Act, James Mill wrote,  
In passing that law two objects were pursued. To avoid the imputation of 
what was represented as the heinous object of Mr Fox’s bill. Mr. Pitt’s 
bill professed to differ from that of his rival, chiefly in this very point, 
that while the one destroyed the power of the Directors, the other left it 
almost entire. Under the act of Mr. Fox the powers of the ministers 
would have been avowedly held. Under the act of Mr. Pitt, they were 
held in secret and by fraud. The bill of Fox transferred the powers of the 
Company to Commissioners appointed by Parliament. The bill of Mr. 
Pitt transferred them to Commissioners appointed by the King.468 
 
Based on the Act 1784, Lord Cornwallis, who was outside the Company‘s 
service system, was appointed as the new Governor-General of Bengal. 
The Company was finally brought under the control of the British 
government. As a result, the public criticism of India softened, since it 
was generally believed that Cornwallis had extended ‗the essentials of 
civil society, secure property and the protection n of law… to millions [of 
Indians] who had previously quaked under oriental despotism‘.469 
 
From 1784 on, Indian finances continued to deteriorate. There was an 
existing national debt of 50 million pounds, a continual decrease in the 
resources of the revenue, and a corresponding increase in the 
expenditure. Previously this was balanced by the dubious income from 
the opium tax, but now the finances were threatened not only by fact 
that the Chinese beginning cultivate the poppy themselves, but also by 
the heavy expenses in the Burma War. 470  In 1813, the Company‘s 
monopoly of Asian trade was only limited to China, which was abolished 
later in 1833. Nevertheless, the Company lingered on as the proxy 
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administrator of British rule in Asia. The shattering revolt of its Bengal 
Army in 1857 was followed by the final abolition of the Company in 1858, 
and the British Crown assumed the mantle of a British Raj. Since then, 
the colonial sovereignty in India started establishing the public/private 
dual project by a comprehensive legal regime: on the one hand, the 
market was standardized to promote the free circulation of capital; on the 
other hand, the private realm under personal law was created to preserve 
the indigenous culture. 
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V. THE LIBERAL TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE 
DISTINCTION II: Edmund Burke on 
the East India Company 
 
Let my endeavors to save the Nation from that shame and guilt, be my 
monument; The only one I ever will have. Let everything I have done, 
said, or written be forgotten but this.471 
 
Based on the essential measures of the India Act 1784, the British 
government assured effectual control over the Company in India by 
establishing a Parliamentary Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of 
India to revise and control all the Company‘s political decisions. Lord 
Charles Cornwallis was also appointed to replace Warren Hastings as the 
Governor General of Bengal. However, if the Act was more than a 
contingent result of party politics and power struggle, the regulatory 
concerns behind it needed to be further elucidated and justified in the 
public. One central question, perhaps, required to be answered: how the 
direct rule by the British government in India would be more preferable 
than the mediate rule by the Company? 
 
This chapter argues that the answer to this question was most 
influentially articulated by Edmund Burke in his parliamentary public 
speeches on India, especially in his four-day opening speech to the 
impeachment of Warren Hastings. Edmund Burke is commonly regarded 
as one of nine patriarchs of modern conservatism, and his reputation 
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stems from his vehement opposition to the French Revolution. It has 
been argued that Burke‘s speeches on the affairs of India carry less 
authority, because his extreme hostility to Hastings personally sometimes 
deviated his speech from the usual good sense to something more akin 
to 'raving vulgarity'. Indeed, in these speeches, Warren Hastings has 
been described excessively by Burke as a criminal that corrupted to the 
very core.  Before returned from India, Warren Hastings had been the 
Governor General of the East India Company for thirteen years. He was 
then accused by the British House of Commons for ‗high crime and 
misdemeanour‘ in front of the House of Lords in 1788. The impeachment 
has often been regarded as one of the great political trials in British 
history and the first major public event of its kind in England (arguably in 
Europe as well). It was on this very occasion, Burke emphasized the 
importance of an institutional separation between public governance and 
private commerce by demonstrating that part of Warren Hastings's 
misrule in India might have been the structural consequence of the 
Company as 'mercantile sovereign'.  
 
However, rather than a solid argument built on convincing evidence and 
logical analyses, Burke‘s accusation of the East India Company relied 
heavily on his skillfully rhetoric, deploying various literature techniques 
including the narrative pattern that borrowed from the popular gothic 
novel of that time, and the rhetorical ornamentations informed by his 
readings of Cicero. It was later revealed that in order to demonize Warren 
Hastings's rulership in India, some of Burke‘s charges were exaggerated 
and fabricated, 'trading on the enormous ignorance of his audience'.472 In 
addition, the success of his speeches also because they catered perfectly 
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to the imperial sentiment of that transitional period from the first British 
Empire to the second British Empire. A new imperial ideology was calling 
in order to bring civilization and justice all over the world. More 
importantly, Burke‘s speeches resonated deeply with the changing public 
opinion on the relationship between the public and the private at that 
time. It could be argued that during this period, there was inaugurating a 
general awareness that the public and private interest should be 
organizationally separated. Much evidence shows that before the 
impeachment a large discussion over the relationship between the public 
and the private interest took place in the early eighteenth-century public 
sphere, especially in terms of what was the best way to harness the 
private interest to benefit the public interest. In this sense, Burke's 
articulation of the institutional separation of the public governance and 
private corporations could be read against Bernard Mandeville's Fable of 
the Bees, best known for its aphorism 'private vices, public virtues'.473  
 
 
15. The Impeachment of Warren Hastings 
When the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings opened before the 
House of Lords in 1788, Burked was giving a four-day speech, which was 
often descripted as ‗one of the Greatest oratorical achievements of their 
age‘.474 In many respects, the impeachment of Warren Hastings that was 
initiated and led by Edmund Burke was just a natural continuation of his 
support for Fox‘s 1783 India Bills and his enduring obsession with India. 
Back then, Burke had already been more and more fixated on Hastings as 
the epitome of the intolerable abuses perpetrated by the Company in 
India. Although his rhetorical ability was widely acknowledged, he was 
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not considered by Warren Hastings and his supporters as a real threat, 
due to Burke‘s insufficient knowledge about India. They commented on 
Burke that he ‗hath not yet knowledge sufficient of Indian affairs; he hath 
taken things superficially without distinguishing between glamour and 
realities‘.475 However, Burke‘s association with Philip Francis proved to be 
a turning point. Francis had just returned to England from India after 
serving as one of the four members of the supreme council for seven 
years, during which he was in forceful opposition to Hastings. Francis had 
provided Burke a large amount of inflammatory material directed against 
Hastings. Marshall has particularly signified this involvement of Francis, as 
he said, ‗it is very hard to believe that the attack on Hastings could have 
been either so violent or so quick to develop if the Committee had not 
been provided with a most articulate witness anxious to inflict on 
Hastings as much damage as he could.‘476  
 
The unexpected defeat of the 1783 Bill and the overthrow of the Fox-
North Coalition left Burke little power, but he decided not to abandon the 
battlefield, leaving it entirely to his enemy. At that time, although 
Hastings‘ crimes and the notorious activities of the Company had already 
been exposed to the public, there was no clear established record yet. 
Fearing that Hasting might be again received as a national hero, Burke 
felt that he had no choice but to counter-attack. He chose to initiate an 
impeachment because at the beginning of an impeachment, all charges 
with their material support would be published in the Journals of the 
House, which would allow the public judge by itself.477 Still, Burke was 
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extremely pessimistic from the outset, hardly expecting any tangible 
success on the impeachment. As he said, it was ‗vain and idle‘ to think of 
what might happen in a trial, since ‗we know that we bring before a 
bribed tribunal a prejudged cause‘.478   
 
At that time, Warren Hastings (1732-1918) had just returned to Britain 
after thirteenth years as Governor General of Bengal from 1772 to 1785. 
Hastings was the first Governor General of Bengal, and he had 
substantial control over the Company in India for fourteen years. Called 
in Calcutta‘s first newspaper as ‗the Great Moghul‘, Hastings has endured 
an unstable public reputation that often rested on various seemingly 
irreconcilable assertions. As Macaulay has concluded, no public figure has 
ever ‗so singularly chequered with good and evil, with glory and 
obloquy‘. 479  Grown up in Oxfordshire as an orphan with only his 
grandfather as his guardian, Hastings went to the village school, ‗where 
he learned his letters on the same bench with the sons of the 
peasantry‘.480 At the age of eight, he was sent to London by his uncle to 
receive an education. After his uncle died, he was arranged, by a friend 
of his uncle, a writership in the East India Company. Hastings sailed to 
Bengal in 1750. He then joined Robert Clive‘s army and became a soldier 
in the war. In 1772, when Hastings started to serve as the head of the 
government of Bengal, Bengal was still governed by the two governments 
devised by Clive, one was the Company and the other was the local 
government. Hastings carried out the revolution that dissolved the double 
government and gave the Company full reign over Bengal.481 The great 
similarity between what had happed to Lord Clive during 1772-73 and 
what happened to Warren Hastings has often been identified: both of 
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them dealt with the financial crisis of the Company, both faced the public 
pressure about the Company‘s scandals, and both took on the legal 
charge as head of the Company.  
 
Burke started the impeachment in 1785 with an inquiry into the despotic 
and arbitrary rule of Warren Hastings. To his surprise, the House of 
Common (that elected in 1784) received his speech much more positively 
than he had anticipated. The commonly held beliefs about the strength of 
an ‗Indian‘ faction in parliament turned out to be an illusion, since 
Hastings failed to rally a party to support him. Pitt and Dundas, who 
gained office by exploiting the controversial Fox‘s Bill, still wanted to be 
regarded by public as Indian reformers, standing against an older India 
administration of corruption and abuse.482 Warren Hastings was therefore 
charged of ‗high crime and misdemeanors‘ by the House of Common in 
1788 for misruling in India and for abusing the rights of the indigenous 
population. The trial was then passed on to the House of Lords for a 
verdict. The opening of the trial before the House of Lords has been 
described as a pomp public event. Taking place in Westminster Hall, its 
tickets were sold out and the attendees include the Prince of Wales, 
Queen Charlotte, and other members of the London ‗haut ton‘ (a term 
referring to the fashionable elite of Georgian society). Fanny Burney, the 
celebrated novelist, also attended and kept a diary of the proceedings. 
This elite audience proved to be gratifyingly responsive.  
 
The impeachment, however, went at a snail‘s pace from 1789 onward, 
and, surprisingly, lasted for another six years. The length and dreary trial 
caused the public disenchantment with Edmund Burke, who then also 
delved into the controversies of the French Revolution. The tide of 
popular expressions of compassion for native Indians soon receded when 
Hastings‘s barristers adapted their trial strategy and directed the trail into 
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wearying arguments about legal technicalities.483 The press publication 
that was once manipulated by Burke now turned against him. Burke 
accused Hastings of ‗buying up all the newspapers‘, a charge that was 
possibly true, as Hastings apparently outspent during the trial. The 
protracted trial became a draining undertaking for Burke, who eventually 
lost any substantial influence over the press due to his isolation from the 
Whig party. All he could do was to complain about the ‗scandalous 
paragraphs and gross misrepresentations‘ of the venal press.484  
 
But it has also been argued that there was a general change of public 
opinion about the British Empire in India, when the role of the British 
Empire in India was firmly established in the nineteenth century. 
Hastings‘s contribution was recognized and his conduct was justified, to 
some degree, by the difficult circumstances he had faced. The press 
might have simply reflected this changing opinion rather than bringing it 
about. King George III continued in his steadfast support of Hastings, 
and Hastings regained public respect and restored his reputation during 
the later phase of the trial. As a result, in 1795, twenty-nine members of 
the House of Lords eventually (and predictably) acquitted Hastings on all 
counts. 
  
The anomaly of the company-state 
Earlier, in 1772, when Burke engaged in the parliamentary inquiry of the 
Company, he still insisted on maintaining the integrity of the Company‘s 
corporate property and its legal rights to conquer and wage war. He 
believed that the problems of the Company‘s rule in India were simply 
regulatory and personnel issues. The Company needed to improve its 
management and operations in order for it to serve better the British 
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national interest, and an external judicial regulation was also necessary in 
controlling the possible abuses of the Company. The main problem, he 
argued, was that the Company‘s charter ‗was well enough calculated for 
the purposes of a factory‘, yet was ‗totally insufficient upon the 
acquisition of extensive territories. 485  Therefore it lacked ‗a 
comprehensive and well-digested code of laws, for the rule of every 
man‘s conduct‘ and ‗appropriate institutions to enforce them‘.486 Without a 
proper legal framework, unlimited authority would fall into the hands of 
the Company‘s governors in India, as the directors of the Company in 
London did not have sufficient time or capacity to oversee its government 
in India. Later, in 1781, when he was consulted about the ministry‘s plan 
concerning the Company, he was still intensely suspicious of any concrete 
proposals that might threaten the independence of the Company, though 
he was no longer opposed to a stronger government intervention.487  
 
During the impeachment, Burke continued this line of argument by 
endeavoring to expose the enormity of Warren Hastings‘s crimes and the 
unprofessional, illegal behaviors of the Company‘s servants. According to 
Burke, junior and senior officers in the Company‘s service could not be 
trusted, had no dignity, and knew no honor. They tried to enrich 
themselves as much as possible in order to compensate for their low 
salary. What was lacking in them was the ‗glory, family reputation, the 
love, the tears of joy, the honest applause‘, which were often bestowed 
upon British officers stationed in other territories. 488  However, Burke 
began to realize that the main problem of the Company was more than a 
regulatory issue. It was, in fact, systemic and independent of the 
performances of the individual officers and governors in the Company‘s 
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employ. Burke thus initiated a broader agenda that targeted at the 
structure anomaly of the Company, or, in his words, the problem of the 
‗mercantile sovereign‘. As he said,  
The India Company became to be what it is, a great Empire carrying on 
subordinately (under the public authority), a great commerce. It became 
that thing which was supposed by the Roman Law so unsuitable, the 
same power was a Trader, the same power was a Lord.489 
 
By shifting his focus to the problematic combination of the public 
governance and private business, Burke added an entirely new dimension 
to his original charges against the Company. According to Burke, this 
could be further broken down in two respects. Firstly, the development of 
the Company ‗reversed‘ the natural order of history. In ordinary affairs, ‗a 
political body that acts as a Commonwealth is first settled, and trade 
follows as a necessary consequence of the protection obtained by political 
power.‘490 But the situation was reversed in the case of the Company, as 
‗the constitution of the Company began in commerce and ended in 
Empire‘. 491  Due to its inherently mercantile character, the Company‘s 
commercial interests outweighed any of its other responsibilities, the 
responsibilities of governance, making peace and waging war, which 
should be treated as the highest.  
 
Secondly, Burke observed that traditionally in history whenever a nation 
extended its sovereign power from one country to another, it did so as a 
nation, not as a company. For example, French treaties of conquest were 
signed on behalf of the French Crown rather than a French company; the 
Dutch took direct charge over their conquests. But the British Company‘s 
practice diverged from its European rivals in this respect. When the 
Company established itself as a sovereign power in India, it tended to 
operate through Indian Viziers and Nawabs, establishing native rulers as 
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‗an empire in an empire‘. 492 It did not exist as an extension of the British 
Nation but rather as ‗a Nation of placemen‘, ‗a seminary for the 
succession of Officers‘.493 In other words, the Company was ‗a Kingdom 
of Magistrates‘, or ‗a Republic, a Commonwealth without a people‘. Since 
the Company did not have to answer to or serve a people, there was also 
no other power to control the Company in the country. It also preserved 
the whole exterior mercantile order with mercantile place and mercantile 
principles. This contrast resulted the fact that the Company became ‗a 
State in disguise of a Merchant‘, ‗a great public office in disguise of a 
Countinghouse‘.494 
 
Esprit de Corps  
As a result, instead of representing the interest of the local people or the 
interest of its mother country, the Company only served its own interests, 
which was called the Esprit de corps (the ‗corporation spirit‘) by Burke. 
Esprit de corps was never was a spirit that ‗corrected itself in any time or 
circumstance in the world‘.495 Such an Esprit de corps transformed the 
already highly hierarchical constitutional structure of the Company into an 
instrument of tyranny and corruption. This also explains Burke‘s reduction 
of the Company‘s issues to the figure of Warren Hastings, which was 
criticized by many modern historians. When substantial political 
responsibilities were given to the Company, the Company not only came 
into conflict with the welfare of the respective local population, but also 
misused these political powers for commercial gain. This meant that the 
East India Company harnessed its new political powers to support its 
trade in alternative ways, for instance, by forcing Indian merchants out of 
business and by compelling artisans and cultivators to accept lower 
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rewards when they worked for the Company.496 Yet, the goods produced 
at the artificial prices enforced by the Company did not sell at a profit in 
Britain. The Indian population thus suffered, and the servants of the 
Company only served their own advantage, making their fortunes by 
oppressing those over whom they ruled. The service of the Company in 
India continued to expand with the growth of the Company's territorial 
power. The quest for further territories and patronage began to absorb 
the Company's directors and proprietors in London, who thus benefited 
greatly from the appointment of 'plunderers' in India.      
 
In talking about the interest Esprit de corps, Burke shared a similar view 
of the political economy in India as his contemporary academic 
commentator, Adam Smith.497  According to Smith, when the Company 
received a share in the power to appoint the ‗plunders‘ of the country, it 
transformed itself from a profit-seeking into a rent-demanding 
organization. Revenue, rather than trade, became to dominate its agenda, 
and there was no limit to their thirst for the forced trade in booty. 
Governance should not be identical with commercial enterprise. In 
marrying politics and trade, the Company corrupted the character of both, 
transforming itself into an avaricious and bureaucratic engine.498 In the 
long run, neither Britain, nor India would benefit. India would become 
impoverished and the East India Company would become bankrupt. 
Indeed, since 1765, the Company had tried to finance its trade from a 
surplus of territorial revenue, thus creating a ‗drain of wealth‘ or an 
‗Annual Plunder‘, which would inevitably ruin the British provinces in India.  
 
Burke argued that the only remedy was to end the use of force and to 
allow a free market in India, as was already supposed to have happened 
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in the past.499 The Indian people should be allowed to gain wealth by 
selling goods at freely negotiated prices. The Company, in turn, was to 
concentrate its attention on those goods that met a genuine demand in 
Britain and thus could be sold at a profit. Both India and Britain would 
benefit greatly, if the Company could again ‗fix its Commerce upon a 
Commercial Basis‘. Belief in the benefit of the free market was as strong 
in Burke‘s Ninth Report as it was in the Thoughts and Details on Scarcity 
twelve years later. The main maxims of the Thoughts and Details were 
that a monopoly of authority would ruin whatever it touches, and 
therefore all trading governments would speedily become bankrupt. 500  
Adam Smith saw free trade as the way to recovery. Smith believed that 
what Burke called the anomaly of the ‗mercantile sovereign‘ should be 
fully abolished. As he wrote, ‗it [the Company] should either cease to be 
a merchant, or at least lost its monopoly, or it should cease to be a 
sovereign, allowing its provinces to be administered by the national 
government.‘ 501  The Company should return to ‗a bottom truly 
Commercial‘ in its own activities and should endeavor to restore 
prosperity to Indian merchants.  
 
The government of writing  
Interestingly, even during the impeachment, Burke did not hide his great 
admiration for the novel system that created by the Company, which he 
called the ‗government of writing‘ or the ‗government of records‘. He 
described it as ‗one mercantile constitution of the Company, so great, so 
excellent, so perfect, that I will venture to say that human wisdom has 
never exceeded it‘.502 This system was so great, according to Burke, that 
the state should adopt it for governing any remote, large, disjointed 
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empire. Even the strictest Court of Justice in its proceedings was not 
more a Court of Record than the India Company in all its proceedings. As 
he said,   
It does so happen that there the Counting-house gave lessons to the 
State. And it will always happen that, if you can apply the regulations 
which private wisdom makes for private interests to the concerns of the 
State, you will then find that active, awakened and enlightened principle 
of self-interest has contrived a better system of things for the guard of 
that interest than ever the droning wisdom of people looking for good 
and of themselves – I mean for the greater part of mankind – ever 
contrived for the public. And therefore I repeated it, that the regulations 
made by mercantile men for their mercantile interest, when they have 
been able, as in this case, to be applied to the discipline and order of the 
State, have produced a discipline and order which no State should be 
ashamed to copy, and without which such a State cannot exist.503   
 
Indeed, the Company‘s development of archival governance was 
unprecedented. Governance was carried out through a practice of 
archiving, a systematic circulation, preservation, and recall of written 
texts that made it possible to rule remotely from London. The system 
obliged their servants to keep a diary of all their transactions and other 
activities. Every proceeding in public Council was to be written down, and 
there were to be no verbal debates. The entirety of any argument was 
recorded on paper—the proposition, the discussion, the dissent. This 
allowed anyone in power in London to track and evaluate the activities of 
their servants, and to form an accurate judgment of everything that 
happened in India. James Mill, in one of his letters in 1819, described his 
job at London‘s India Office in the following way: ‗the Government of 
India is carried on by correspondence…and…I am the only man whose 
business it is, or who has the time to make himself the master of the 
facts scattered in a most voluminous correspondence, on which a just 
decision must rest.‘504 
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This was quite different from the operation of other government bodies at 
the time, such as the Houses of Lords, Commons, the Privy Council, as all 
of these had to abide by secrecy laws. In those bodies, only final 
resolutions of affairs were written down and the course of discussion was 
missing. As a hierarchical bureaucracy, the Company was stratified into 
different levels of competence and authority, ranging from writers, factors, 
junior merchants, senior merchants, counsellors, and presidencies to the 
governorship. The writing system equipped the Company with an 
effective instrument for monitoring and assessment. As Burke concluded, 
'it not only produced to them a more accurate idea of the nature of their 
affairs and the nature of their expenditures, but it gave them no mean 
method of knowing the characters of their servants, their capacities, their 
ways of thinking, the turn and bias of their minds.'505 In addition, it also 
formed a means of detecting and proving the morality of the Company's 
servants. This mechanism, thus, could be of great benefit for the 
government, certainly the imperial government. 
 
Nevertheless, it was one thing for the directors of the Company to lay 
down the well-defined guidelines to ensure that new information would 
be received safely and timely from India (in order to avoid a complete 
breakdown in communication, several copies of a dispatch had to be sent 
via three or four different ships, and, sometimes, an additional copy was 
carried by messengers who travelled over land). It was quite another 
thing to secure compliance with the rules from servants whose self-
interest, incompetence, and neglect of duty would prevent them from 
providing the required information, since everyone wanted to put 
themselves in the best light.506 Occasionally, the information for the East 
India House was deliberately withheld by senior Presidents in India, 
instigating bitter wars between them. More importantly yet, after the 
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Company had acquired its empire, new types of information were 
required by the Directors, which related the day-to-day workings of the 
overseas government, including governance, diplomacy, military affairs, 
revenue collection, and so on. As senior officials were often told to 
mention every detail, not only enormous collections of information were 
sent and much time was devoted to reading them, but more complicated 
balance sheets and sophisticated accounting system were established. 
The Company has developed a great sense of corporate pride in its 
unrivalled record keeping and communication system, maintaining 
bureaucratic order and efficiency. 
 
16. Contextualization  
Often being described as one of the most powerful oratorical 
accomplishments of the time, the theatrical and rhetorical nature of 
Burke‘s speech in the impeachment led to the fact that historians treated 
it more as a public moral drama than a judicial proceeding. Indeed, since 
the form of impeachment had not been used for fifty years, there were 
few established laws or pre-existing legal principles with regard to most 
of Burke‘s charges. Rather than focusing on legal technicalities, Burke 
deliberately wrote the speech to be readily intelligible to the lay public 
and to direct its attention to the moral deficiency of the Company and 
Warren Hastings. Burke exhibited his rhetorical powers in depicting the 
Hastings‘s regime in India as cruel, unscrupulous, and mercenary to the 
extent of a total extinction of all moral principle. In the opening speech of 
the trial, Burke claimed that his engagement with the impeachment was 
for the sake of justice, humanity and the honor of government. The 
extraordinary passion of Burke to this trial was reflected by his frequent 
applications of the strong emotional language, which was so strong that 
observers often reported it to be offensive.  
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Although Burke‘s skillful demonization of the Company was crucial in 
establishing a moral distinction between the public state and private 
company. It would hardly have had the same effect if his arguments had 
not perfectly catered to the imperial sentiment of the metropolitan public 
in the late eighteenth century that aroused by the loss of the American 
colonies. His articulation of the distinction between the public and the 
private strengthened the moral superiority of the British Parliament over 
the private corporation. It endowed the parliament the public honor and 
responsibility to restore the universal justice in India by protecting the 
local people from the selfishness and violence of the Company. The new 
idea of the public/private distinction, thus, constituted a crucial part of 
the general trend in reconstructing an imperial identity that was 
associated with universal justice, civilization, and humanity all over the 
world. This emerging moral differentiation between the public state and 
the private corporation also related to the heated moral discussion of the 
public interest and the private interest in the eighteenth-century public 
sphere. The regulatory concern behind both Fox's India Bill 1783 and 
Pitt's 1784 Act was to alter the facts that the private predations of the 
Company's servants in India had disgraced the British national honor, and 
the Company's deteriorating fiscal condition posted a threat to public 
credit. The absence of public responsibility, or moral personality, of the 
Company, thus became the central critics towards the Company in the 
late eighteenth century.     
 
The literary technique of demonization 
It has been argued that Burke‘s strongly moralizing language and his 
severe scorn resulted from his intentionally modeling the speech after 
Cicero's rhetorical style.507 Cicero enjoyed particular renewed prominence 
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in the eighteenth century due to the great constitutional controversies of 
that time. He has been depicted as a ‗Whig hero of the Roman Republic‘, 
its heroic defender and, in the end, a ‗martyr to liberty‘. 508  Cicero‘s 
historical prosecution of Verres, the corrupt governor of Sicily in Roman 
history around 70 B.C., was read widely at that time. The same kind of 
eloquence skill, originated from Cicero‘s usage of strong moral language 
in his prosecuting Verres, has been highlighted and deliberately imitated 
widely by the eighteenth-century intellectuals. David Hume noted Cicero‘s 
particular fame at his time, in comparison with the decayed popularity of 
Aristotle. He also admirably spoken of Cicero‘s strong language as the 
kind of eloquence which is ‗infinitely more sublime than that which 
modern orators aspire to‘.509 No speaker in modern times, according to 
Hume, could afford to venture on such bold language used by Cicero at 
the climax of his persecution of Verres. What Hume criticized was the fact 
that the so-called modern good sense would disdain the rhetorical tricks 
employed by Cicero, who strove to create a strong passion in the 
audience, in other words, to inflame the audience. Hume further 
explicated 'the orator, by force of his own genius and eloquence, first 
inflamed himself with anger, indignation, pity, sorrow; and then 
communicated those impetuous movements to his audience.‘ 510  James 
White, one of Burke‘s contemporaries, also remarked in the preface to his 
translation of Cicero‘s speeches that particularly the early Cicero was 
most deserving of applause for his fearless and firm integrity, which 
contrasted with his later timidity.511 
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Yet, one of Cicero‘s advantages in the Verres‘ case over Burke in 
Hastings‘s was that Sicily was much closer to Rome, compared to the 
remoteness of the East Indies to England. India was far less 
comprehensible to Members of British Parliament and to the general 
British audience. Burke himself also acknowledged these difficulties, as he 
said, ‗but we are in general… so little acquainted with Indian details, the 
instruments of oppression under which the people suffer are so hard to 
be understood, and even the very names of the sufferers are so uncouth 
and strange to our ears, that it is very difficult for our sympathy to fix 
upon these objects.‘ Nevertheless, modern commentators argue that 
Burke successfully bridged this cultural gulf by deploying familiar gothic 
narratives and themes in his speeches. 512  Such narrative parallels to 
gothic literature would allow the audience to comprehend events that 
would have otherwise seemed removed from their own, daily experiences. 
 
Burke's borrowing from the conventions of gothic fiction in portraying 
Warren Hastings has often been described as striking and effective. 
Gothic fiction emerged during the eighteenth century and reached the 
peak of its popularity in the period of the French Revolution. It 
particularly reflected the anxieties of women, both as readers and writers, 
and the ‗deep-seated fear of radical social upheaval, a fear dramatized in 
a plot that typically confronts the helpless, imprisoned heroine with the 
double threat of impoverishment and violation‘. 514 This fear also reflected 
the social realities of late eighteenth-century England in that women‘s 
social position depended on their sexual purity and their property, and 
the stability of their social position was threatened by the growth of 
capitalism and the imperial expansion. Alluding to or making use of 
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elements of gothic fiction was a popular trend among the journalists in 
that age. As Bruyn writes,  
In an age when unprecedented historical events were rapidly overtaking 
the strangest of gothic fancies, to say nothing of previous historical and 
political orthodoxy, journalists and political commentators such as 
Edmund Burke increasingly recognized in the gothic mode a means of 
apprehending or conceptualizing the bewildering sequence of public 
events unfolding before their eyes.515  
 
Although Burke‘s ‗gothic reading‘ of the French Revolution might be the 
most famous example, 516  his voluminous writings on British affairs in 
India represent a more subtle and complex elaboration of this narrative 
strategy. He explained historical events in India according to the 
conventions of the gothic novel: the Indian peoples were the innocent 
and virtuous heroine, who was suffering from and could barely escape 
the violence of the gothic villain, that were Warren Hastings and his 
Company. Since Hastings was depicted as immune to the humanizing 
influence of moral feeling, it was up to Burke, who visualized himself as 
the ‗paternal protector‘ (or the sublime guardian), to take up the cause of 
the Indians. He dramatized himself as someone who would ‗give up all 
the repose and pleasure of life, to pass sleepless nights and laborious 
days, and, what is ten times more irksome to an ingenious mind, to offer 
oneself to calumny and all its herd of hissing tongues and poisoned fangs, 
in order to free that world from fraudulent prevaricators, from cruel 
oppressors, from robbers and tyrants'. As Bruyn has concluded, Burke's 
allusion to gothic themes not only served the purpose of making the 
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peoples of India seem more like the British, but it also simplified the 
complexity of the reality to a clear-cut vision of good and evil.517   
 
The imperial sentiment      
In the second half of the eighteenth century, England entered into an era 
of ‗conservative‘ liberalism. As the industrial revolution expanded the 
country into a great imperialist power, it was no longer in need of the 
antiquated rationalization of liberalism that might lead to some radical 
and dangerous revolutionary conclusions. The French Revolution had 
given English capitalists a great scare, all sections of the ruling class thus 
united together to extinguish any signs of radicalism. Represented by 
David Hume, liberalism became more conservative (if not more cynical), 
since according to him, no truth was eternal, all depended on the point of 
view. Any abstract idea would be prejudice and not worth arguing about. 
In contrast to Locke, whose notion of property was based on labor, Hume 
founded property on seizure. He further pointed out that government was 
founded solely on usurpation and conquest, instead of the voluntary 
subjection of the people based on social contract.   
 
Meanwhile, it has been argued that, in the years between 1756 and 1783 
the empire was particularly unstable, and the metropolitan British 
vigorously sought to rework the notion of empire and good imperial 
governance. 518  During this period, two high-profile imperial issues 
structured the public debates in the British metropole: one was the loss 
of British colonies in North America, the other was the East India 
Company‘s rule in India. 519  The experience of losing the American 
colonies in the immediate past, apparently dispirited the public who used 
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to have a sense of imperial enthusiasm and grandeur. Rather than 
surrendering to the idea of a diminished empire, the metropolitan public 
determined to maintain the Empire‘s dominance at international level. As 
one British writer wrote at the end of the American Revolution, ‗I will take 
upon me to affirm [that] we are, and shall continue, to be the greatest 
empire, as to riches, commerce, and manufactures, in Europe, mistress of 
its seas, and the balance of its power.‘520 In practice, historians commonly 
agree that, in the decades after the loss of American colonies, Britain 
attempted to centralize its control over India.521 This led to a rethinking 
of the concept and identity of the Empire and to a re-evaluation of the 
appropriate mode of imperial governance. If the loss of America was 
irrevocable, the British still had a chance to improve in India.  
 
As a result, there is much evidence suggesting that, among these public 
debates, there was a sudden emergence of substantial critiques of the 
inhumane British behaviors in the colonies overseas.522 The English public 
of that time was appalled by the injustices committed by the agents of 
the empire, which mainly included the East India Company servants, the 
American slaveholders, the Atlantic slave traders and so on. This 
represented a radical shift from the traditional imperial discourse that 
uncritically celebrated the vibrant power of the British Empire. Specifically, 
the imperial enthusiasm had lasted for several decades previously in the 
metropolitan public sphere, which was companied by a voracious public 
appetite for exotic tales and news of the British overseas world, 
supplemented by the emergence of a wide variety of publications on 
imperial issues. While the general public became more and more 
intimately involved with the colonies, either through producing goods 
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exported to the colonies or through exchanging goods with them, there 
were some basic ideas of what distinguished the British Empire from both 
past empires in history and the contemporary European rivals (such as 
Spain and France) already emerged.523  
 
Apart from the general positive representations of the British Empire, 
including commerce, maritime power, richness, and civility, what was 
exclusive to the attributes of the British Empire was the idea of civilization, 
individual liberty and justice in particular, which was supposed to be 
introduced by the British Empire and enjoyed by all inhabitants of its 
colonies through the exportation of British common law to the British 
Atlantic world.524 Yet, the American experience has demonstrated that it 
was imperative for the Empire to refine this ideology in the face of the 
growing problems. The municipal nature of common law was regarded as 
too narrow to be adequate for the imperial operation. A global 
perspective needed to be developed to represent and implement new 
idea of the British Empire. Thus, a new supranational and deterritorialized 
concept of ‗justice‘ emerged in England which was held above the 
common law as belonging to all human people and became part and 
parcel of a new imperial identity. It was particularly aimed at protecting 
the local population from the oppression and violence that had been 
illegally committed by the trading agents of the Empire. The notion of a 
natural law was the embodiment of this new and universal sense of 
justice for all. To think that the empire brought ‗justice‘ to the other side 
of the world also meant to think that it ‗civilized‘ the world. Therefore, it 
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has been argued that this imperial discourse of justice could also be 
viewed as the prototype of modern international law.525  
 
This new identity of the British Empire was particularly formed with 
respect to its colony in India, not only because it was then the most 
extensive territory of the empire, but also because the situation of India 
was quite different from the other overseas territories. As early as 1783, 
when Burke gave a speech to promote Fox‘s India Bill, he argued that the 
previous settlers‘ ideology could not be applied to the India situation.526 
Burke writes, ‗the earlier invaders of the subcontinent were more violent 
in their conquest, but because they made their homes where they 
conquered, they had an interest in good government. They are very few 
who can bear to grow old among the curses of a whole people.‘ However, 
‗British administrators and traders were not settling in India.‘ Therefore, 
‗young men (boys almost) govern there, without society, and without 
sympathy with the natives. They have no more social habits with the 
people, than if they still resided in England; nor, indeed, any species of 
intercourse but that which is necessary to making a sudden fortune, with 
a view to a remote settlement.‘ This led Burke to suggest a new model of 
self-governance in India. Burke believed that Britain should give up 
envisaging the empire as a ‗spectacle of unity‘, and focus instead upon a 
utilitarian pragmatics – the empire would only work based on the 
practical needs of the diverse people it governed. As he has said, it was 
Britain‘s duty that:  
In all soberness, to conform our government to the character and 
circumstances of the several people who compose this mighty and 
strangely diversified mass. I never was wild enough to conceive, that one 
method would serve for the whole; I could never conceive that the 
natives of Hindostan and those of Virginia could be ordered in the same 
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manner; or that the Cutchery court and the grand jury of Salem could 
be regulated on a similar plan. I was persuaded that government was a 
practical thing, made for the happiness of mankind, and not to furnish 
out a spectacle of unity, to gratify the schemes of visionary politicians.527  
 
Earlier, in 1775, at the close of his speech on conciliation with the 
colonies, Burke has already developed this theme of love and happiness 
of the colonies by arguing that it was not the votes in Parliament that 
brought in the revenues and secured the defense of the colonies. Rather, 
‗it is the love of the people; it is their attachment to their government, 
from the sense of the deep stake they have in such a glorious institution, 
which gives you your army and your navy, and infuses into both that 
liberal obedience, without which your army would be a base rabble, and 
your navy nothing but rotten timer.‘528 Burke believed that ‗the spirit of 
the English constitution, which, infused through the mighty mass, 
pervades, feeds, unites, invigorates, vivifies every part of the empire, 
even down to the minutest member.‘ Burke may well have had the 
famous saying from his role model Cicero at the back of his mind, which 
states that the effects of fear are temporary, but that ‗which is the effect 
of love will be faithful for ever.‘529   
 
Burke‘s argument resonated deeply with the tremendously growing 
attention to and sympathy toward the Indian people in the British 
metropolitan public sphere at the time. In this new climate of imperial 
humanitarian discourse, the Company‘s behavior in India was seriously 
condemned. As the public knowledge of the Company affairs and British 
activities in India increased markedly, every aspect of the Company‘s 
operation was openly debated both in parliament and in the public sphere. 
Burke deliberately wrote the Ninth Report, a report from the Select 
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Committee of Parliament, in a clear and comprehensive way for a public 
which had no specialized knowledge of India. 530  The public became 
familiar with the financing of the national debts, the functioning of the 
patronage system, and many other matters of political significance on 
India. While the British public was particularly concerned with the 
discreditable means by which the Company had gained its power in India, 
at the same time, the metropolitan public also showed a great admiration 
of the local culture in India. Several publications had helped to create this 
climate of opinion531: Abbé Raynal‘s Histoire philosophique et politique 
des Établissemens et du Commerce des Européens dans les Deux 
Indes532 and Alexander Dow‘s History of Hindostan533. Indian history was 
portrayed by them in a sympathetic light, addressing the grievances and 
complaints of the local people resulting from the lurid European 
exploitations and oppressions. One petition in the late eighteenth century 
also reflected this human sympathy:   
It is long since the nations, which have the misfortune to live near the 
East India Company’s settlements, have stretched out their industrious 
and helpless hands to our gracious Sovereign, imploring his protection 
from the oppressions they were sinking under; and it must give great 
pleasure to everyone who knows how much the interest of Great Britain 
are connected with those of humanity…534 
 
 
This new image of the Empire as delivering universal justice all over the 
world largely culminated in the impeachment of Warren Hasting. At this 
point, the House of Lords successfully elevated itself to a premier position 
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as supranational tribunal, rising above the narrow English national 
interests and representing universal judicial neutrality and impartiality. 
There thus emerged a triadic judicial structure: the British parliament as 
an ‗arbiter‘, the people of India as the ‗plaintiff‘, and the East India 
Company as the ‗defendant‘.535  This triadic imperial juridical formation 
replaced the old dyadic colonial political struggles, in which the East India 
Company was perpetually in conflict with the indigenous India. It was 
precisely the differentiation of the public and the private that endowed 
the British parliament such a moral superiority over the Company and a 
capability to restore justice in India that had been previously ruined by 
the Company. It also allowed the parliament to ascribe to itself attributes, 
such as universally objective, impartial, rational, all of which were closely 
connected to its public characters at that time.  
 
Private vices, public virtues 
The meaning of the ‗public‘ in the late eighteenth century was also 
closely related to the emergence of the idea of ‗public virtue‘. As trade 
and commerce became the dominant features of the eighteenth-century 
economy, the question of public immorality escalated to an 
unprecedented degree. Unlike modern discussions of public and private 
interest, which focus on state interventions in market and individual 
property, the debates at that time mainly revolved around the popular 
idea of 'public virtue' (or civic/republican virtue). 536  There were 
substantial political debates about whether a particular form of virtue 
really exists in the public realm, and, if it does, what would be the best 
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means of establishing it. 537  These debates were mainly sparked by 
Bernard Mandeville‘s popular work Fable of the Bees, whose subtitle, 
‗private vices, public benefits‘, was perhaps the best known aphorism of 
eighteenth-century British political thought.538 In its popular version, this 
phrase was altered to ‗private vices, public virtues‘. This transformation 
nevertheless does render the phrase more intelligible, since ‗vices and 
virtues are more naturally contrasted than vices and benefits‘.539 The idea 
of 'public virtue' generated sophisticated and imaginative public 
discussions about the possibility of public participation in political power, 
and about the justified ground on which the political authority and 
decision could be established. This could be viewed as the origin of 
modern constitutionalism and political populism. The later impeachment 
of Warren Hastings, on the other hand, as an extraordinary emblem of 
the condemnation of the erosion of the public interest by the private 
interest, thus carried immense significance for understanding this 
structural reformulation of the public/private distinction. Burke‘s 
differentiation between the public state and the private company might 
also relate to this eighteenth-century public debates on the relationship 
between public and private interest.      
 
As one of the few eighteenth-century authors, who assumed a clear 
distinction between the public realm and private realm, Mandeville 
divided human life into three spheres: the private sphere, a social world 
or 'Society of Men', and a political or governmental realm.540 He, however, 
rejected the popular belief of that time that evil and vice could be 
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eradicated by a ‗reformation of manners‘, and he also rejected the 
general doctrine that the pursuit of an ‗enlightened‘ self-interest would 
eventually reveal the closeness of individual (or private) interest to social 
(or public) good. 541  He entirely repudiated the idea that people are 
naturally and disinterestedly benevolent and generous, and that they love 
each other. As he said, ‗this pretended Love of our Species, and natural 
Affection we are said to have for one another, beyond other Animals, is 
neither instrumental to the Erecting of Societies, nor ever trusted to in 
our prudent Commerce without on another.‘542 While these (traditional, 
biblical) human vices, such as avarice, self-interest, lust, and sloth, 
cannot be altered or even improved upon in Mandeville‘s view, they were 
nevertheless not only essential to the prosperity of the society (by 
keeping the wheels of society in motion), but could also be harnessed to 
accomplish desirable public ends. As he said, 'Private Vices by the 
dexterous Management of a skillful Politician may be turned into Public 
Benefits.‘543 
 
In this sense, the ‗public virtue‘ proposed by Mandeville, was totally 
different from its antecedent in Aristotelian teleology, where civic virtue 
was conceived as the true end of human life and moral good, which was 
worthy of life-long practice and perfection by being an active citizen in 
the polis. Nor was it the same as the notion of public virtue in 
participatory republican doctrines (such as Rousseau‘s notion of general 
will), which saw individual vices, including immorality, evil, and corruption, 
as signs of human depravity that should be improved upon.544 Thus the 
idea of 'public virtue', conceived akin to Mandeville‘s, was the product of 
the eighteenth-century combination of Italian Renaissance humanism and 
Anglo-American republicanism, which is now revived as twentieth-century 
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communitarianism. The political motivation behind the idea of 'public 
virtue' was to establish popular participation in political decision-making. 
This was substantiated in the discursive public sphere in the late 
eighteenth century.  
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VI. THE AFTERMATH  
 
The current liberal interpretation of the public/private distinction was 
formulated during the nineteenth century, when a new ‗scientific‘ 
rationale of laissez-faire was projected onto the established distinction 
between the public and private modes of social organization. By elevating 
the voluntary market to the status of the paramount institution for 
distributing rewards on a supposedly neutral and apolitical basis, laissez-
faire doctrine seems to equate the maximum national wealth with the 
free trade, thus ultimately legitimating the freedom of private 
corporations from state regulation.  
 
In a broader sense, laissez-faire doctrine embodies ‗the nightwatchman 
doctrine of state‘.545 This doctrine of the state proposes for setting a very 
specified narrow boundary for the state activities. As Mill has defined it as 
that the state should limited its internal functions to the simple business 
of ‗the protection of persons and property against force and fraud‘.546 In 
this sense, modern scholar Jacob Viner has defined the function of 
laissez-faire doctrine as: 
[T]he limitation of governmental activity to the enforcement of peace 
and of ‘justice’ (in the restricted sense of ‘commutative justice’), to 
defense against foreign enemies, and to public works regarded as 
essential and as impossible or highly improbable of establishment by 
private enterprise or, for special reasons, unsuitable to be left to private 
operation. (Though in case of emergency or abnormal conditions, such 
as war, famine, or earthquake, these limitations could be slightly relaxed 
or temporarily suspended.) 547 
 
It was commonly agreed that it was Adam Smith‘s Wealth of Nations 
(1776), the so-called Bible of political economy, that first formulated the 
doctrine of laissez faire. But to what extend Adam Smith believed that the 
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principle of laissez-faire would maximize the wealth of a nation is still 
under debate: it has been argued that his proposal for laissez faire was 
also based both on his concern over the unqualified government of that 
time, and on his highly valuation of the individual liberty that inhered in 
laissez faire.548  
 
What the English did in theory, the Americans did in practice. It has long 
been doubted by contemporary scholars whether the laissez-faire period 
ever existed in England, since even in the supposed heyday of laissez 
faire, namely the mid-nineteenth century, the Companies Act of 1844 
presented clear interventionist and regulatory elements. 549  On the 
contrary, it has been commonly agreed that in America, the dictum of 
free trade, free markets, and none governmental interference has been 
given enormous weight in the nineteenth century. The famous juristic 
distinction between the public corporation and the private corporation, 
which was first established in the Dartmouth College Case,550 has long 
been celebrated as a national achievement. Nevertheless, the heated 
legal debate on whether the self-governing colonial government could be 
personified as a corporation, was taking place in Britain and arguably 
strengthening the differentiation between the public and the private 
modes of social organization. 
 
After the formative age of liberalism of the nineteenth century, most of 
the legal and political problems relating to the governmental regulation of 
market, the freedom of the corporation, or the relationship between the 
state and the corporation, at least from the juristic perspective, have a 
tendency to resolve themselves through the discussion of the liberal 
public/private distinction.  
                                        
548 ibid. 
549 Ron Harris, Industrializing English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization, 
1720-1844 (Cambridge University Press 2010). 
550 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819) US 17. 
 
211 
17. The Rationale for the Public/Private 
Distinction as laissez faire  
Although both the laissez-faire doctrine and the free trade doctrine 
represent the idea of economic freedom, their histories should not be 
identified, since some of the exponents of laissez faire, such as American 
businessmen and their legal spokesmen in the nineteenth century, were 
extreme protectionists and interventionists when tariff policy was in 
question (free competition internally and the predominance of monopoly 
abroad). 551  Perhaps, it makes more sense to differentiate a ‗national‘ 
point of view of laissez faire from a ‗universal‘ point of view of laissez 
faire (as the transnational free-trade policy). This would allow the 
separate assessment of the different technical factors between internal 
economic process and transnational economic process.  
 
Economic Freedom 
The idea of economic freedom in England is often regarded as having 
originated in the idea of individual liberty that was protected by the 
common law. Especially since the seventeenth century, the common law 
has been characterized by Sir Edward Coke as an institutional bulwark to 
anyone‘s free will, which included the sovereign and the king. This belief 
in the common law was legitimated by its antiquity: as an ancient custom, 
the common law has stood the test of time through trial and error and a 
process of evolution,.552 This evolutionary conception of the common law 
was later articulated by Edmund Burke in the eighteenth century. Later, in 
a manner analogous to Burke, Hayek formulated his famous idea of 
‗spontaneous order‘.  
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Specifically, in an attempt to revive liberalism against the perceived evils 
of central planning, Hayek emphasizes the previous characterization of 
the common law as a spontaneous arrangement. Common law, just like a 
language, was not a deliberate human design, but the unintentional 
product of intentional individual human actions.553 By demonstrating the 
superiority of the common law over the continental statute law in framing 
a free society, he formulated the theory of ‗spontaneous order‘, arguing 
that social mores or legal rules (or, social cohesion and social institutions) 
can spontaneously emerge and evolve. They are the result of countless 
atomistic initiative of individuals, who act on their local knowledge. There 
is neither original comprehensive blueprints nor systematic guidance from 
the government. Instrumental rationality therefore only has a substitute 
role to play in designing law and social institutions. Besides, the sheer 
magnitude of variables in the economy makes the deliberate and central 
design of egalitarian institutions almost impossible.  
 
Resonating with Adam Smith, Hayek proposes a kind of liberal 
individualism that permits some conservative caution. It is important to 
note that Hayek‘s supporting of the common law was almost entirely 
based on the criteria of individual liberty. In fact, quite contrary to the 
common assumption, it has little to do with either efficiency (wealth-
maximizing), questions of public choice, or whether the decisions of the 
common law courts were Pareto optimal. 554  As he has concluded, ‗a 
consistent argument in favor of economic growth was the outcome of a 
free growth of economic activity which had been…the unforeseen by-
product of political freedom.‘555 Thus, the later defenses of the common 
law based on efficiency, notably by Posner, are not reiterations of Hayek‘s 
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earlier argument.556 Failure to distinguish these two kinds of literature in 
associating the common law with economic freedom might lead to 
serious confusion and misunderstanding.  
 
In tracing the terminology of ‗freedom‘ and ‗liberty‘, Viner argues that the 
idea of economic freedom, or the idea of free trade, was not necessarily 
related with the general idea of ‗freedom‘ as commonly conceived. 
Specifically, Viner noticed that it was not until the late eighteenth century 
that the terms of ‗liberty‘ and ‗freedom‘ began to be used in the singular 
in the economic and political fields. Before this time, debates always 
revolved around concrete issues and specific ‗freedoms‘, or ‗liberties‘, 
which were all used in the plural sense. This meant that the liberties at 
stake in these earlier time were the liberties ‗within the law‘: the 
exponents were requesting liberties from either the exercise of 
unqualified authority, or without ‗due process‘ of law. They were not 
requesting to do (often in the name of God) ‗what is right to desire to do‘, 
which would possibly be advocated as a request for ‗license‘. ‗There is 
little convincing evidence‘, as Viner wrote, ‗that advocacy of specific 
liberties from specific coercive agencies for specific groups or categories 
of persons was historically, markedly elastic or extensible to other 
coercive agencies or to members of other groups of persons‘.557  
 
In this sense, the common association of the common law with the 
political and economic freedom of the individual, as Hayek notably 
expounded, would seem to be mere anachronism to Viner. After all, Viner 
argues that it would be an ‗intellectually uninteresting variety of freedom‘, 
or a pure indulgence in daydreaming, if economic freedom is only studied 
in such vague sense, ignoring whether its subject were lack of power 
over economic resources, or lack of adequate knowledge and skills. He 
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reminds us of St. Thomas Aquinas‘ dictum that ‗when reason argues 
about particular cases, it needs not only universal but also particular 
principles.‘558 The universal principles that are meaningful and serviceable 
to some good purpose can only be formulated in the attempt to deal 
wisely with particular cases.  
 
Adam Smith and the laissez-faire doctrine  
This changing usage of the terminology of ‗freedom‘ (or ‗liberty‘) from the 
plural sense to the singular sense, has also used by Viner as the evidence 
for the fact that the laissez-faire doctrine was first theorized by Adam 
Smith, though Smith did not mention the term laissez faire in the course 
of his book. He argues that it was only after Smith, the singular usages of 
the term freedom became popular. On the opposite, many modern 
scholars through examining the scattered and discrete ideas, have 
claimed that they have found the idea of laissez-faire to be prevalent in 
public discourses in England before Adam Smith. The instant success of 
The Wealth of the Nations when it first published also indicated that the 
public was already quite familiar with and in favor of this idea at the time, 
despite the fact that David Hume first thought that ‗it requires too much 
thought‘ for the audience to really appreciate the Wealth of Nations.559 
Indeed, Adam Smith has drawn from a wide range of earlier sources 
ranging from the Physiocrats, Descartes, Hobbes, to Christian rationality. 
But this only meant that the doctrine of laissez-faire was a product of the 
intersection of legal, political, ethical and economic discourses. Rather 
than an economic theory in a narrow instrumental sense, it was much 
more encompassing and eclectic in essence. 
 
Yet, Adam Smith‘s major claim to originality and fame was his detailed 
application of the idea of a unified and invisible natural order to the 
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wilderness of economic phenomena. In other words, economic 
phenomena were just part of the manifestations of the cordial natural 
order, which was operating according to natural laws and governed by 
the underlying natural forces. There was a providential harmonious and 
self-operating order in the sphere of economy, and for its most beneficent 
operation, it should be left to run its own course. Public regulation and 
private monopolies were often mere corruptions of this perfect natural 
order. According to Smith, the only role of the government was to protect 
the economic order from the uncooperative or even hostile actions from 
ignorant or malicious individuals. Beyond this, the normal operation of 
free competition would suffice to produce a harmony of cooperation and 
an efficient economic system, akin to the system in the physical order of 
nature. Therefore, Adam Smith insists that the freedom of individuals to 
maximize their own interests would lead ‗as if by an invisible hand to 
promote an end which was no part of his intention‘.560 The unintended 
result of each individual‘s work would produce the largest possible social 
product of the economy.  
 
But Smith‘s belief in an invisible hand, as Andrew Schotter has argued, 
was ‗the result more of faith than of logic‘: it was an effort in keeping up 
with the eighteenth-century religious beliefs that the natural order would 
be better preserved if man was not interfered with divine law.561 (This 
faith has later been successfully formalized into a mathematical model of 
a general competitive equilibrium, known as Pareto optimality.) Indeed, 
there was a sincere optimistic deism that has been commonly held 
among the Enlightened Scottish circles, including Smith. And it run 
through the whole reasoning in The Theory of Moral Sentiments by Smith. 
Smith believes that God has endowed mankind the moral sentiments to 
bind with each other and to have concerns for each other. Based on these 
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moral sentiments of mankind, smith was postulating a static society 
psychology that would be unaffected by changing environment.562  But 
there are some complications with this line of thinking. As Viner has 
observed, people who have only read the Wealth of Nations, have not 
regarded it as something difficult to understand, whereas for those who 
sought to interpret it in the light of Moral Sentiments, often find 
themselves immersed in difficulties and failed to find a concordant 
explanation.563 A German scholar even coined a term, Das Adam Smith 
Problem, to denote this failure. Viner argues that the difficulty is due to 
the fact that ‗the system of individual liberty is much in evidence among 
the interpreters of Smith, but that natural harmony which should also 
result is strikingly lacking.‘564 
 
This explanation, perhaps, is true, since most of Smith‘s analysis was very 
much based on an individual perspective. What has been often neglected 
is Smith‘s elaborate conception of human behavior as impelled by 
conflicting forces: a major counterbalance to the desire for and the 
pursuit of wealth is the love of ease and inactivity, or in other words, the 
fact that mankind is prone to indolence.565 The ideal institutional order for 
Smith thus is one that places the individual under just the proper amount 
of psychological tension, since the individual applies himself with 
maximum industry and efficiency when the reward for the effort is 
neither too low (as in the case of slaves, apprentices) nor too great 
(leading to monopolies, and large landownership). This is also the basis 
of Smith‘s critique of mercantilism, laws of entail and primogeniture, 
joint-stock companies, and government businesses. Thus, as Nathan 
Rosenberg has argued, the direct jump from the conception of a man 
who is relentlessly engaged in maximizing material gain to the 
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recommendation of laissez-faire policy short-circuits much of the real 
substance of Smith‘s work and thus oversimplifies his theory.566  
 
Although Smith took a rather individual approach in his analysis, in both 
Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations, he only treated the increase 
in national aggregated wealth as a highly worthy objective for a country, 
and attached little importance to an increase of per capita wealth. If 
Smith cared so little about individual benefit, why his cared so much 
about individual liberty? How did he balance national wealth with 
individual liberty in his doctrine of laissez faire? These questions would 
require further serious discussions, and it is helpful here to quote some 
words from Viner as a reluctant ending: 
It is not clear that Adam Smith believed that laissez faire would 
maximize the wealth of a nation in terms of a theoretically conceivable 
maximum. What is clear is that subject to a vaguely-defined list of 
qualifications, economic society left to its autonomous operation would 
produce a higher level of economic welfare than would accrue if 
government, inefficient, ignorant, and profligate, as in practice it was, 
should try to direct or regulate it. Beyond, moreover, its material 
benefits, left to the individual unimpaired the ‘liberty’ to which he had a 
natural right. It is quite probable, therefore, that Adam Smith would 
have rejected an extensive program of state regulation of economic 
enterprise even if he had believed that the wealth of nations could 
thereby be augmented.567   
  
 
18. Public Corporation vs. Private 
Corporation  
The distinction of the public corporation and the private corporation is 
fundamental in current legal discourse, since the legal principles with 
regard to them are assumed to be quite different. According to modern 
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ideas, private corporations are created voluntarily for the pursuit of 
private interest. Their establishments would not promote, either directly 
or consequentially, the public interest. Once incorporated, the legislative 
grant is irrevocable, and generally any subsequent legislation cannot 
arbitrarily destroy it, unless the right to do so has been reserved at the 
time of incorporation. Public corporations, on the other hand, are 
established by the state for public purposes exclusively. Although in the 
case of the municipal corporation the charter may need the consent of 
the local people to be affected, it is in no sense the contract between the 
state and the local people, or the corporation. Public corporations are 
within in the boundary of the public law in the sense that they are often 
regarded as part of the administrative government. Unlike the private 
corporation, whose rights cannot be changed without its consent, the 
power of legislature over the public corporation is supreme and 
transcendent.568 
 
However, this distinction has not been established until the nineteenth 
century. In the mercantilist tradition of the eighteenth century, most 
corporations were created by the state to increase available public goods 
and provide public services. These were in the areas of hospitals, 
insurance, banks, and canals. It was both practical and ideologically right 
for a state to claim large supervisory authority over these corporations. 
However, it made less sense for the government to do so once 
corporations entered the manufacturing area in the eighteenth century. 
On the one hand, the government did not have the adequate knowledge 
and resources to carry out such supervisions. On the other, individuals 
would not have invested money in corporate enterprises if they felt their 
investment would be influenced by political policies and state regulation. 
It seemed quite pertinent at that time to develop a proper doctrine to 
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separate the corporations into the two classes, namely the public 
corporation and the private corporation. 
  
Before the public/private distinction has been applied in the 
categorization of the corporation, the corporation was classified based on 
the differences of their nature. For example, there were the distinction 
between the corporation sole and the corporation aggregate, and the 
distinction between the ecclesiastical corporation and the lay corporation. 
The lay corporation was further divided into the eleemosynary 
corporation and the civil corporation. Municipal and business corporations 
are both classed together as civil corporation, and the same rules were 
applicable them likewise. Yet, the law of corporations that has been 
applied on them without much distinction.569 
 
 
A celebrated distinction in American legal history  
When concerning American legal history, one of the earliest classification 
of the corporation could be found in Lord Chief Justice Holt‘s 1694 
opinion in Philips v. Bury.572 Holt distinguished between ‗ecclesiastical and 
eleemosynary foundations‘ and ‗corporations merely lay constituted for 
civil purposes‘. He ruled that private charitable corporations were subject 
to the governance of those who create them.573 After the emergence of 
the modern business corporation in the late eighteenth century, this 
functional classification of the corporation became implicitly manifest in a 
few cases. 574  Yet, the courts never further explicitly defined this 
distinction. This was probably because of the fact that even the most 
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private corporation have a public dimension. Thus the attempt to precise 
the definition would plunge the court into a morass of the ambiguous 
nature of the corporation. Nevertheless, Supreme Court Justice Joseph 
Story later abandoned this difficult functional perspective and drew the 
line exclusively on the nature of the foundational capital of the 
corporation. He explicitly announced his doctrine of the public and private 
corporation for the first time in his separate concurring opinion in 
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819).575  
 
Dartmouth College was established by a charter granted by the King of 
England in 1769. In 1816, the state legislature of New Hampshire passed 
a law revising the charter, changing the college into a state university 
under state control. The existing trustees filed suit, claiming that the 
state legislature violated the contract clause of the Constitution (article I, 
section 10 of the Constitution). The focal point of the case, however, was 
not on the issue of the contract clause of the Constitution, since the 
proposition that a charter was a contract was so obvious that ‗it can 
require no argument‘. It was the nature of the Dartmouth College that 
was at issue. If Dartmouth College was a ‗civil institution‘, then the state 
had the power to control it, which included the right to revise its charter. 
If, on the other hand, it was a ‗private eleemosynary institution‘, then the 
state had no general right of regulation, and Dartmouth was controlled 
entirely by the terms of its charter. Avoiding any sweeping doctrine, Chief 
Justice Marshall ruled that Dartmouth was a private eleemosynary 
institution, because the nature of corporations ‗does not grow out of their 
incorporation, but out of the manner in which they are formed, and the 
objects for which they are created‘. 576  Whereas Chief Justice Marshall 
intended to limit the decision of Dartmouth College to private educational 
institutions, Story in his concurring opinion made one step further and 
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broadened the potential application of the decision to all business 
corporations. He differentiated the corporation only through the source of 
their initial capital. Thus even when the function of the corporation was 
public, as long as it was established on the initial capital that came from 
individuals, it was regarded as a private corporation. Public corporations 
were subject to state regulation, whereas private corporations were 
protected by the contract clause of the Constitution against the state 
intervention.  
 
The distinction between the public corporation and the private 
corporation resolved the long-lasting conflict over the need for regulating 
the corporation and the desire to provide the individual with possibilities 
to invest free from state control. It resolved this conflict by prioritizing the 
individual‘s right to free investment, and this choice satisfied economic 
expediency for a nation in its infanthood like America. It laid the 
foundation of the relationship between corporations and state authority, 
and provided the basis for the later American company law. Therefore, 
the significance of the Dartmouth College case was not only that privately 
endowed educational corporations were now protected by the United 
States Constitution against state interference, but this protection was 
generalized to the normal business corporation. The doctrine of the public 
and the private corporation helped to free the newly emerging business 
corporations from state regulation. Assured of this protection, capital 
flowed into corporations, which intrigued the following pre-eminent 
growth of business incorporation in America. Therefore, the doctrine of 
the public and the private corporation was largely responsible for the 
transformation of the corporation into a modern business organization. 
Nonetheless, it has recently been argued that the truly radical aspect of 
the Dartmouth College case is that public contracts has been reduced to 
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the level of private contracts, thus putting them within the interpretive 
purview of the judiciary and the common law.577  
 
The absence in English legal history  
Such a doctrine of the public and the private corporation, which became 
so central in America in crystallizing liberal political and constitutional 
ideology, did not have an equivalent in English law. The eighteenth-
century English common law had no explicit conception of the corporation 
either as a private organization or as a public organ. In fact, the 
corporate doctrine was not even a part of English legal discourse at that 
time. English jurists seemed still satisfied with the obsolete franchise 
theory, which simply told that the corporation was the entity created by 
the Crown by way of the concession in a feudal context, and was subject 
to his regulation or interference. The prerogative to form corporations, 
originally held by the Crown, was gradually transferred to Parliament 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the post-1689 
constitutional settlement, Parliament was free to enact and repeal 
incorporation acts, according to changing circumstances or majorities. It 
was not until the Companies Act of 1844 that this purely public character 
of the corporation was abandoned. This delay might attribute to the 
general indifference of the jurists towards the business world of that time. 
Unlike the high continental law of early modern Europe, high English law 
of that period was not developed by scholars in university, but by a 
handful of overworked common-law judges and Lord Chancellors. Also, 
they only focused on the aspects of corporate life that were subject to 
dispute and litigation, and were not interested in more general and 
abstract theories.578 
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Yet, it could be argued that in England the same process was still 
observable, though it might not have been defined as openly and legally 
as in America. It should be noted that although there was a lack of legal 
distinction between the public and the private corporation in English law, 
there was, however, a long-existing distinction between the public joint-
stock corporation, which was allowed to seek public subscriptions within 
or outside the stock exchange, and the private unincorporated 
partnership, which was restricted by the Bubble Act of 1720 in issuing 
transferable shares. It was the very contrast between the monopolistic 
joint-stock corporation and the private partnership of the merchants that 
later evolved into the prevalent public antagonism towards the East India 
Company. The public antagonism was theoretically justified by the 
eighteenth-century political economists, most famously by Adam Smith in 
his attack on the massive corporation and his promotion of free private 
partnership.   
 
If the liberal public/private distinction, after all, mainly concerned with 
freeing the corporations from state regulation, then the essential question 
would be whether laissez faire ever existed in England?579  Again, this 
cannot be traced by examining the general company legislations, as the 
earliest Act of 1844 had already clearly indicated an interventionist 
turning point. What exactly happened during this ‗legislature-empty‘ 
period of the late eighteenth century and the early nineteenth centuries? 
Dicey‘s narrative of the laissez-faire in Law and Public Opinion has often 
been regarded as the orthodox narrative of the extent of laissez faire in 
the nineteen-century Britain.580 According to Dicey, Britain of 1825-1870, 
the era of utilitarian reform, realized the apotheosis of laissez faire, the 
fundamental formulators/prophets of which were Jeremy Bentham and 
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John Stuart Mill. Yet, some argued that his articulation was rather a 
political pamphlet than the real history.581 Others proclaimed that British 
laissez-faire was a political and economic myth (the myth here was used 
in the sense formulated by George Sorel), as it would have been 
incommensurable with the immense Parliamentary and Governmental 
intervention (for collectivist ends) of that time.582 One scholar has argued 
that the idea of laissez-faire is ‗one of the grander misunderstandings of 
intellectual history‘.583  
 
We may well recall here that, when talking about the English history of 
modern liberal constitutionalism, Martin Loughlin described how British 
legal scholars of the nineteenth century ―are engaged in the exercise of 
assembling imaginary foundations or, like alchemists, devising 
‗fundamental‘ precepts from a jumble of customary arrangements of 
whose practical significance they have only a dim appreciation‖.584 Indeed, 
as Atiyah has described, what happened in England is that ‗England 
stumbled into the modern administrative State without design, and even 
contrary to the inclinations of most Englishmen. They dealt with social 
problems, one by one, as these were brought to their attention‘. 585 In 
addition, the lawyers at that time might fail to rationalize what was really 
happening in their time, since the vast new body of law was not enforced 
by them but by the new bureaucracy with the new administrative staff 
and their expert advisers.586  
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19. Personifying the Colonial 
Government as Corporation  
The first phase of British imperialism, whose theatre of operation was 
mostly in the Atlantic Ocean in the early seventeenth century, is said to 
have been brought to an end by the loss of the thirteen American 
colonies in 1776. Meanwhile, the East India Company‘s conquest of India 
in 1757 launched the second phase of British imperialism, which was 
centered on the Indian Ocean in the nineteenth century.587 Since the late 
eighteenth century, industrialization in Britain and the corresponding 
expanding economy gave rise to the unprecedented need to invest 
overseas, which was later categorized as the period of late capitalism and 
thus was called ‗new imperialism‘. 588  The British Empire continued its 
overseas expansion in two colonialist patterns in accordance with its two 
economic modes: one was the pattern of ‗informal empire‘ accompanying 
the free trade economy, and the other was the pattern of formal 
dominion accompanying the traditional mercantilist economy. The 
‗informal empire‘ was identified as the main source of imperial income,589 
and its most distinctive feature was a limited influence over the colonies 
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with less direct colonial rule. Rather than a tight political possession or a 
full occupation, it was argued that the British Empire of this period would 
refrain from further involvement in the local affairs as long as a 
satisfactory trading environment could be secured.590 Flexible forms of 
colonialism, including the ‗consular jurisdiction‘ and ‗protectorates‘, thus 
emerged. Nevertheless, as Craven has argued, when it comes to matters 
of ultimate motivation, both the new colonial rule and the old colonial 
rule aimed to ‗cultivate the non-European world into a space equipped for 
commerce.‘591 In this sense, a continuity of imperial colonial policy can be 
detected between the ‗old colonial system‘ and new colonial form of 
‗internationalized regime‘.592 
 
Over the course of the second phase of imperialism, two long-existed 
legal tenets of the common law began to shatter. They were ‗the colony 
was not a corporation‘ and ‗the Crown was indivisible‘. During this period, 
the promotion of self-governance in traditional colonial dominions gave 
rise to the maturity of the local colonial government. The requirement for 
a clear legal personality for these colonial governments before the 
common law stemmed from the increasing business contracts that they 
have involved themselves in with various trading companies. The 
proposal for viewing the colonial government as a ‗corporation‘ in the 
common law thus was constantly brought up in formal lawsuits in order 
to held the colonial governments responsible for their business 
engagements. For the political considerations, the common law judges 
repeatedly denied such proposals. Yet, in order to solve the practical 
problem, they chose to resort to an alternative solution by viewing the 
colony as a separated Crown. In other words, although the Crown 
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227 
remained ‗one and indivisible‘ in general,593 it was divisible in the sense 
that separated new Crowns was created for both the self-governing 
colonies and for the constituent units of colonial federations.594  
 
The reason behind the courts‘ choice might be attributed to two 
considerations. The fierce international competition among the European 
colonial powers required the British Empire to maintain the de facto 
political control as much as the de jure legitimacy over these colonies. 
Recognizing the colonial government as a corporation would be harmful 
to these both wishes. In terms of de facto political control, having a 
personality as corporation would naturally require the further stabilization 
and normalization of the degree of political autonomy in these colonies. 
This would be contrary to the Empire‘s political expectations in terms of 
the flexibility of colonialism, especially considering its bitter experience in 
dealing with the ‗corporate colonies‘ in North America. With regard to the 
de jure legitimacy of an unitary Empire, the common law of the late 
nineteen century still mainly relied on the old-fashioned property 
relationship to construct the political relationship between the ‗Crown as 
corporation sole‘ and its colonies. Conceiving of the colonies as 
corporation would challenge this structure fundamental. A coherent 
discourse on the sovereignty of the Empire was still absent in the late 
nineteenth century. Therefore, personifying the colonial governments as 
corporation would cause widespread constitutional uncertainty and 
conceptual chaos. 
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The colonial government as corporation 
The debate as to whether the colonial government could be granted a 
legal personality of corporation by the common law gathered momentum 
in Britain in the course of the nineteenth century. Most of the legal cases 
in question arose in the so-called self-governing Dominions. The term 
‗Dominions‘, or self-governing Dominion or Her Majesty‘s dominion, had 
already been widely used595 even before it was officially defined by the 
Statute of Westminster (1931) as ‗appl[ying] to all the original Members 
of the British Commonwealth of Nations, except the United Kingdom‘.596 
It also referred to the dependent territories such as Protectorates and 
Mandated Territories. The colonial policy of self-governance began in the 
mid-Victorian period. In the late nineteenth century, this policy became 
prevalent, as it was the attempt of the Empire to avoid the administrative 
cost of the colonial rule. 597  The promotion of self-governance in the 
colonies also related closely to the rise of nationalism among European 
countries. Since nationalism indicates the ‗government by consent‘, in the 
case of colonialism it naturally implies the ‗native consent‘ purported by 
Kasson.598 More importantly, the prevalent self-governance in the colonies 
correlated with the rising commitment to the belief in free trade: it was 
widely assumed at that time that nation‘s prosperity would depended on 
the free flow of goods around the world without the government 
interference. This resulted in heated domestic debates on the relationship 
between ‗formal empire‘ and colonization, for both ‗formal empire‘ and 
colonization represented a kind of government interference in trade.599  
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As a result, most self-governing colonies had grown into political entities 
that had public debts of their own, and became the subjects of contracts 
with many colonial trading companies. But they were not yet recognized 
by the common law as a legal person, but were generally conceived as 
the representative of the Crown. 600  Traditionally, writs could not be 
brought against the Crown in its own courts, though subjects would be 
allowed to bring petitions of right. ―The procedure used was that a 
petition was made to the crown which endorsed it with the words, ‗Let 
right be done‘‖. 601  Through these petitions, claims against the Crown 
would be discussed in courts, although the ambit of the remedy often 
remained very unclear. In the end, ‗the petition was sent to the Lord 
Chancellor, who would issue a commission to report on the facts 
alleged‘.602 
 
The first case that initiated the legal controversy was Sloman v. 
Government of New Zealand (1876).603 The case Sloman concerned the 
legal liability of the colonial government under a contract of public works 
that was concluded with a German shipping agent. The plaintiff Sloman 
attempted to sue the New Zealand government in the English courts for 
the failure of the New Zealand government to fulfil the obligations under 
an emigration contract that had been concluded in Europe. The New 
Zealand Government had decided to stop paying passage money to 
subsidize migrants to New Zealand. The Court decided that New 
Zealand‘s government could not be sued in English courts because it was 
not a legal person. Although the plaintiff tried to argue that both the 
governor and the government of New Zealand had become a ‗corporation 
sole‘ in New Zealand law according to the Crown Redress Act 1871, Judge 
James LJ still concluded that ‗there is no body politic residing in 
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England,…called the Governor or Government of New Zealand.‘604 In this 
respect, it could be only concluded that the legal liability of the colonial 
government was invisible in common law because it lacked an 
appropriate legal personality. Later, in 1880, in the case Kinlock v 
Secretary of State for India in Council, Justice James L. once again 
denied that the colonial government was a ‗corporation‘, stating that 
‗there really is in point of law, no such person or body politic whatever as 
the Secretary of State for India in Council‘.605  
 
The case Sloman was quite special at that time, because it was one of 
the few cases that considered the liability of the colonial governments in 
relation to public contracts concluded in their name, 606  whereas most 
other cases concerned the colonial governments‘ liability in tort.607 This 
kind of public contracts that concluded between the colonial governments 
and the individuals or overseas companies, were generally made in the 
name of the Crown on behalf of a colonial government. Since the Crown 
could not be sued according to the Crown liability law in the late 
nineteenth century and the colonial government was not a legal person, 
the legal liability of the colonial government was invisible in the common 
law. This invisibility of the colonial government became a serious legal 
concern in the late nineteenth century, but surprisingly the concern was 
not only for the companies, but also for the colonial governments 
themselves. This was because the rapid economic development in the 
colonies required a high degree of foreign involvement and large amounts 
of foreign capital, which mainly took the form of legal contracts between 
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the colonial government and the overseas companies. In the case of 
Sloman, the New Zealand Government was not satisfied with the court‘s 
decision as well. They feared that this inadequacy of its legal personality 
might prevent the government from suing its contractors in another 
instance, where a case was brought before court over the explosion of 
the ship Cospatrick in 1874.608  
 
The divisibility of the Crown  
Traditionally, the legal doctrine of the ‗indivisibility of the Crown‘ was 
utilized in treating the legal relationship between the imperial government 
and the colonial governments. According to this doctrine, neither the 
colonial federal government nor the colonial provincial government had a 
legal personality in the common law, since they were merely the 
representative apparatus that were attributed ‗executive authority‘ by Her 
Majesty, the Crown. The Crown, who was the head of all governments, 
the owner of all the public property, and the embodiment of the only 
reigning sovereignty, ‗acts through different hierarchies of representatives, 
agents and servants but they are all acting in Her Majesty‘s business‘.609 
 
However, the practical necessity behind the controversy over the legal 
personality of the colonies, finally forced the English judges to resort to 
an alternative solution, which considered the divisibility of the Crown. It 
has been claimed that the indivisibility of the Crown at common law 
would not merely lead to ‗inconvenient or absurd consequences‘ in 
business, but also to ‗mischievous political result[s]‘ in the case of the 
self-governing colonies.610 Hence, the long-established legal doctrine of 
the ‗indivisibility of the Crown‘ has been changed: there was the tactical 
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admission that although the Crown still remained ‗one and indivisible‘ in 
its imperial sense, the colonies and the self-governing Dominions could 
be recognized as legal persons in their own right – as a separate Crown.  
 
The modern principle of ‗the divisibility of the Crown‘, meaning that a 
separate Crown is recognized if there is a separate government for a 
particular territory, was only formally established in the Ex parte Indian 
Association of Alberta (1982) case. 611  ‗The divisibility of the Crown‘ 
requires the monarch to act on the advice of the responsible Ministers of 
self-governing Dominions with respect to matters concerning those 
Dominions.612 Yet, the common assumption was that this new tenet had 
already manifested itself during the nineteenth century and the early 
twentieth century in a series of colonial legal cases concerning the 
divisions and transactions of the public lands between the colonial 
governments, where the self-governing colonies and the constituent units 
of colonial federations were recognized as a separate Crown.613 Among 
these cases, the most famous one is A.—G. of Brit. Columbia v. A.—G. of 
Canada. 614  The case A.—G. of Brit. Columbia v. A.—G. of Canada 
considered one innovative legal provision in the British North America Act, 
1867 (B.N.A Act) relating to the division and transaction of the public land 
between the colonial governments.615 In the article 109, it stated that ‗all 
lands, mines, minerals, and royalties belonging to the several 
Provinces…‘. This was of great significance since it established the legal 
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personalities of the colonial governments as the legitimate owners of 
public lands for the first time.  
 
Nevertheless, the later case of St. Catherine‘s Milling (1889) soon denied 
the colonial government‘s right to own the lands and used an agency 
theory to explain this legal provision. According this principle, the 
ownerships of public lands held by the colonial governments were ‗vested‘ 
in the Crown. The colonial governments just worked as different 
representatives of Her Majesty to carry out the administration of the 
lands. Accordingly, the transactions of lands between the colonial 
governments were interpreted as the transfers of responsibility and duty 
to administer the lands. Therefore, the Crown still remained ‗one and 
indivisible‘. It further clarified the general property division in Act 1867: 
―in constructing these enactments, it must always be kept in view that, 
wherever public land with its incidents is described as ‗the property of‘ or 
‗belonging to‘ the Dominion or a Province, these expressions merely 
important that the right to its beneficial use, or to its proceeds, has been 
appropriated to the Dominion or the Province, as the case may be, and is 
subject to the control of its legislature, and the land itself being vested in 
the Crown.‖616  
 
The emergence of the ‗divisibility of the Crown‘ is generally regarded as 
the primary legal technique of conferring independence to the self-
governing colonies.617 As to the question of why the old tenet ‗the Crown 
is indivisible‘ still partially remained, one explanation is that as long as a 
‗much more minor change‘ could solve the practical problem, a ‗wholesale 
revision‘ of the ‗Crown is indivisible‘ was simply not necessary and 
maintaining it also avoided the danger of ‗widespread uncertainties‘.618 On 
the contrary, a seminal study on the history of the royal prerogative 
                                        
616 St. Catherine‘s Milling and Lumber Co. v The Queen (1889) 14 A.C. 46, 56. 
617 Noel Cox, ‗The Control of Advice of the Crown and the Development of Executive 
Independence in New Zealand‘ (2001) 13 Bond Law Review 166–89. 
618 Mundell (n 609). 
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revealed that this remaining unity of the Crown was the very legal means 
through which Dominions achieved their separateness. 619  Nonetheless, 
the co-existence of these two conflicting legal doctrines still brought 
irreconcilable anomalies to the imperial constitutional structure. 620  The 
recent Quark Fishing case provokes the controversy again as to the 
different understandings of the term ‗the Crown‘ with regard to the 
‗divisibility of the Crown‘. 621  Challenging the decision of the Quark Fishing 
case, Anne Twomey argues that the House of Lords conflated the two 
different meanings of the term ‗the Crown‘, namely ‗the concept of the 
Crown as a separate government‘ and ‗the concept of the Crown that 
governs the constitutional relationship between the monarch and her 
realms and territories‘. 622 This conflation, warned by Twomey, might 
undermine both the fundamental principle of responsible government and 
the constitutional integrity of the United Kingdom. 
 
 
Contextualization  
Perhaps it is only possible to understand the true nature of this 
nineteenth-century legal controversy on the legal personality of the 
colonial governments by situating it in the imperial and global context of 
the Second British Empire. It has been argued that one of the most 
important features of the Second British Empire was the imperial legal 
reordering project, as it reflected clearly the British aspirations to control 
the world through law and legal administration. Since the late eighteenth 
century, there were myriad imperial legal projects taking place that 
                                        
619 See Herbert Evatt and Leslie Zines, The Royal Prerogative, Commentary by Leslie 
Zines (N.S.W. Law Book Co. 1987). 
620  See DP O‘Connell, ‗The Crown in the British Commonwealth‘ (1957) 6 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 103. 
621 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Quark Fishing 
Limited [2005] UKHL 57. R (on the application of Quark Fishing Ltd) v Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2006] 1 A.C. 529. 
622 Anne Twomey, ‗Responsible Government and the Divisibility of the Crown‘ (2008) 
Public Law 742-767.  
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attempted to use law as a technique to affect the colonial processes and 
institutions.623 Colonial Commissions of Inquiry were accordingly launched 
to collect the information about the law of the empire. Bundled 
information, including ‗letters about colonial scandals, trial reports, drafts 
of law charters and treaties, and proposals for a diverse set of legal 
reforms‘ bombarded the jurists and officials in London.624  
 
The imperial legal reordering project was not simply a project of imperial 
administration, it was also part of the British ambition to order the world. 
Having emerged from a half-century of war as the hegemonic global 
power since 1815, Britain had much interest in setting the terms for 
commerce and policing outside the boundaries of the empire. The 
reordering project was the very opportunity for it to project its legal 
episteme and political aspirations into the international legal system. 
Indeed, it has been argued that the reordering project developed in 
multiple international registers, ‗installing [the] empire as the ghost in the 
machine of global governance‘.625 Wilhelm Grewe further has observed 
that the British devised a distinctive global strategy of ‗indirect rule‘, 
resulting in a ‗worldwide unorganized interconnected State system that… 
depended entirely on the interests and requirements of the British global 
empire‘. 626  Nevertheless, since there were few international lawyers 
engaged in summarizing these processes, the global impact and legacy of 
this multifaceted project still remains largely opaque.  
 
Both the imperial legal reordering project and the international aspiration 
behind it could explain to some extent why the English courts were 
reluctant to attribute to the colonial government a clear legal personality 
as corporation. It should be well remembered that the legal reordering 
                                        
623 See generally Lauren A Benton and Lisa Ford, Rage for Order: The British Empire and 
the Origins of International Law, 1800-1850 (Harvard University Press 2016).  
624 ibid. 
625 ibid.  
626 Wilhelm Georg Grewe and Michael Byers, The Epochs of International Law (Walter de 
Gruyter 2000).  
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project, in fact, first emerged in the late eighteenth century as a response 
to the anxiety aroused by the immediate experiences of both losing the 
colonies of North America and governing a new territory in India. Those 
anxieties prompted sharp public challenges to the constitutional structure 
of the empire, and provoked heated debates over a large variety of issues 
with unprecedented liberal and humanitarian concern. These not only 
included general issues, such as the abolition of the slave trade, the 
degree of autonomy in colonial governance, the rationale behind British 
conquests, or British foreign policy, but also included specific colonial 
constitutional controversies, such as colonial legislative powers, the 
Crown's prerogative, and finally the legal personality of the colonial 
government. The public discourse of this period mostly ended up with a 
prevalent liberal account of citizenship, rights, free trade, sovereignty, and, 
ultimately, the independence and the self-determination of these self-
governing dominions.   
 
The political discourse over the independence of the self-governing 
dominions resonated deeply with the legal controversy over the legal 
status/personality of the colonial government. The issue was stirred up by 
both the British Empire and the Dominions themselves. The ambiguity 
and flexibility of the legal status and the constitutional theory of 
dominionhood echoed the elusive political stance of these self-governing 
colonies. For the self-governing dominion, there was the newly emergent 
constitutional self-consciousness of the dominions that visualized 
themselves as ‗distinctive blend of national status and Imperial 
identity‘.627 They required the British Empire to recognize their equality 
and independence in exchange of their loyalty. From the perspective of 
the Empire, there was the enduring tension between, on the one hand, 
the desire to construct a constitutional solidary Empire by normalizing the 
                                        
627 John Darwin, ‗A Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics,‘ in 
Judith Brown and Wm Roger Louis (eds), The Oxford History of the British Empire, 
Volumn IV: The Twentieth Century, 64. 
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legal status of the self-governing colonies; and, on the other hand, the 
desire to have an unspoken tight grip of the substantial power in these 
colonies, which contributed to the reluctance for a genuine recognition of 
the dominions. Holland has illustrated this imperial self-conflicting 
psychology most vividly when remarking on the presence of the dominion 
premiers at the imperial conference. As he said, that this dominions‘ 
presence ‗smacked of a metropolitan preference to allow imperial 
compatriots a tantalizing glimpse into the inner sanctum of power, 
without actually allowing them inside‘.628 
 
This contrasting imperial attitude towards the self-governing dominions 
was not hard to understand in the context of the late nineteenth-century 
world scene. The most important difference between the colonialism of 
the late nineteenth century and that of the previous ages, was the 
international political environment. Although it was still a dominant power 
at international level, Britain was no longer enjoying the exclusive 
privileges of colonialism and political pre-eminence. Several ‗industrially 
invigorated and fiercely nationalistic‘ European colonial powers gave rise 
to the ‗unsettling climate‘ concerning overseas politics.629 Among them, 
Germany was the primary threat. As Holland has identified, ―a 
preoccupation with the potentialities of building a British imperial 
‗superstate‘, capable of competing with the new types of continental 
politics of which the Wilhelmine Reich was the archetype, ran deep in 
Edwardian psychology.‖630 In this sense, it might be right to argue that 
Britain‘s desire for colonial acquisition in this phase was largely driven by 
the fear that other rival colonial powers might impose ‗monopolistic or 
protectionist policies‘ to prevent its trade.631 This fear also gave rise to 
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the concern about the legitimacy of the Empire‘s constitutional unity. As it 
has been argued, from the late nineteenth century to the beginning of 
First World War, what ‗really mattered in imperial terms was the 
preservation of the British Empire‘s integrity as a single body within the 
international system, and thus its undifferentiated and efficient 
belligerency in war.‘632  Thus, it is not hard to predicate that the legal 
personality of the self-governing dominions, in the context of the 
prevalence of the liberal account of self-determination, left the English 
jurists and officials in an awkward position.  
  
                                        
632 Holland (n 628).   
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VII.   CONCLUSION 
 
As we have seen, drawing the line between the public and the private has 
long been one of central preoccupations of Western thought since the 
time of classical antiquity (though the dichotomy should also be treated 
as an universal and trans-cultural category). 
 
The genealogy of the public/private distinction  
In general, the Western idea of the public/private distinction could be 
concluded as having gone through four major phases to date, and 
chronologically, they are: 
 
(a) The Pre-Modern Phase: the earliest articulation of the public/private 
distinction could be traced down to Aristotle‘s Politics, where he has 
described a distinction between the democratic polis and the despotic 
household in Greek republican city-states. As democracy was 
gradually abandoned by the Roman Empire and religion became the 
primary occupation of people‘s life, it    been argued that the private 
household ‗devoured‘ the public sphere entirely during the Middle 
Ages and the private/private distinction was accordingly dissolved. 
The feudal social unit, condensed in the medieval concept of 
dominium, was as a hybrid of the public and private authority.  
 
(b) The Early Modern Phase: in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
the public/private distinction re-emerged as the distinction between 
the public state and the private property ownership in the course of 
the nobility‘s struggle against the absolutist king. In order to restrain 
the unlimited divine rights that proclaimed by the king and also to 
avoid the possible alternation of popular sovereignty, the nobilities 
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promoted the idea of an abstract and impersonal state, separated 
from both the ruler and the ruled. They proposed that the operation 
of the state, instead of continuing to be secret and subject to the 
king‘s arbitrary will, should be both transparent to the public and 
restricted by a set of rationalized principles of governance. John 
Locke‘s idea of the unlimited property right and civil society also 
proved convenient for them to require the government to both 
respect their right over the property while providing essential 
protection for it.   
 
(c) The Republican Phase: the Hellenic polis has been restored in the 
eighteenth century as the bourgeois discursive ‗public sphere‘, which 
worked as the communicative mediator between the will of the 
private property owner and the will of the public sector. Political 
discourse became public, and derived from rival appeals to public 
opinion on many important topics that connected more or less 
intimately with colonies and colonial trading companies, such as 
those on the East India Company and the American Revolution. The 
focus of the public/private distinction thus has been transformed to 
the substantial political debates on civic (or republican) virtue in the 
public realm. Bernard Mandeville‘s near-utilitarian ‗private vices, 
public virtues‘ became the best-known aphorism of eighteenth-
century British political thought. The near experience of the East 
India Company also stimulated the public opinion holding that the 
public interest should be organizationally separated from the private 
interest. This arguably inaugurated the distinction of the 
public/private modes of social organizations.   
 
(d) The Liberal Phase: Adam Smith‘s laissez-faire doctrine provides a 
finale rationale of the relationship between the public interest and 
the private interest, which proposes that the maximum public interest 
would be expected if the private interest would be allowed to work 
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freely on its own will. It legitimated the freedom of the private 
enterprise from the state regulation. While a clear distinction 
between the public corporation and the private corporation has been 
juristically defined in America, in English legal history there was 
apparently no such corresponding development. Nevertheless, in a 
similar sense, there was a heated legal debate taking place in 
England, which concerned whether the colonial government could be 
personified as corporation.  
 
Some concluding observations 
Having juxtaposed the intellectual history of the public/private distinction, 
with those of the state and the corporation, several important 
observations should be highlighted: 
 
First, by trancing the genealogy of the public/private distinction, it has 
been revealed that one of the most genuine contributions of liberalism in 
reinventing the idea of the public/private distinction in the late eighteenth 
century was to establish the distinction as the key analytical marker for 
different modes of social organization, namely the public state and the 
private corporation. Part of the reason for this establishment was 
concerns stemming from the transformation of the East India Company 
into a local sovereign power in India. It has been widely believed that the 
public interest of both the mother country and the local Indian people 
was seriously jeopardized by the private interest of the Company and its 
servants. The majority of the public opinion at that time, most 
exemplified in Edmund Burke‘s speech in impeaching Warren Hastings, 
began to hold that public and private interests should be institutionally 
separated to avoid the possible erosion of the public interest by private 
interests. And the British government therefore should rule directly in 
India. It is requisite to add, however, that what was criticized in the case 
of the East India Company was that a mercantile organization should not 
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be endowed with the responsibility of governance. This should be 
carefully differentiated from a situation in which a government begins to 
participate in private service, manufacture and commerce.   
 
On this premise, it might be sufficient to argue that when Adam Smith 
later rationalized the relations between the government and the market 
by the laissez-faire doctrine, he was working on an already existing 
organizational separation of the public   and private interest. What he 
was concerned with was how to reconcile the public interest of the state 
with the private interest of the corporation (and other non-state actors). 
In fact, as early as the early eighteenth century, there was already a 
substantive moral discussion in this respect, which was provoked by 
Bernard Mandeville‘s famous articulation of how the private vices were 
essential in keeping the wheels of a prosperous society in motion. Adam 
Smith further argues that the most ideal institutional order for keeping 
theses wheels in fastest speed is to place the individual under just the 
right amount of incentives, allowing the individual to apply himself with 
maximum industry and efficiency when the reward for effort is neither 
too low (slaves, apprentices) nor too great (monopolists, large 
landowners). Nevertheless, liberalism ultimately simplified all these 
doctrines into an equation of the maximum national wealth with the 
maximum freedom of the corporation and the minimum regulation of the 
market.  
 
Secondly, a chronicle historical narrative of the public/private distinction 
makes clear that one of the most important aspects of the public/private 
distinction that has been hitherto neglected (or ill-remembered) in 
current liberal discourse is the concept of the discursive public sphere 
that underlies it. Emerging in the eighteenth century, the discursive public 
sphere has played a significant role in both practice and theory, 
inaugurating the democratic idea of public participation as an essential 
element in defining public interest and justifying government action. It 
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resulted in the elevation of public opinion from being mere common 
sense to a semi-legislative power that  fundamentally rationalized and 
publicized the practice of politics. Reviving the concept of the public 
sphere is crucial in promoting real democracy as a way of enabling 
citizens to affect the national polices. This is especially important in the 
current situation, when globalization now seems to dictate national 
polices and international institutions are proving inadequate to harness its 
power.633  
 
Last but not least, the most important insight of this thesis perhaps is 
that the current liberal interpretation of the public/private distinction 
prevents us from seeing the homogeneity and the interdependence 
between the state and the corporation by arbitrarily separating them into 
the public realm and the private realm as embodied the public interest 
and the private interest respectively. Especially given the fact that the 
justification for the separation of public governance from private business 
was established in the process of the British government‘s taking control 
over the East India Company, this thesis implies the ‗artificiality‘ in using 
the public/private distinction as a rubric for defining the different 
characteristics of the state and the corporation. In addition, by reading 
the history of the corporation against the development of the 
public/private distinction, it suggests that the significance of the public 
dimension of the corporation has long been underacknowledged by 
modern minds. Not only did the form of the corporation first emerged in 
medieval time as an important form of self-governing political entity, but 
during the imperial period, it assumed the distinctive form of colony as 
well, even when its primary aim was gaining business profit. The earliest 
joint-stock corporation was also in fact a public organ of government 
from the outset (though it cooperated several private interest within it). 
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This last argument was particular important in light of current problems 
that have been identified in the first chapter of Introduction, which 
concern the failure of the traditional public/private binary in 
corresponding to the new roles that the state and the corporation have 
played in promoting and protecting the public interest. Whatever the 
ontological truth about the natures of the corporation and the state, their 
increasing assimilation and the close cooperation in serving the public 
welfare is undeniable. In light of this, it might suggest that the real focus 
of contemporary enquiry should not be upon the putative corruption of 
democracy by way of privatization, but rather the ‗corruption‘ of the 
corporation that came about by stripping it of any democratic 
responsibilities. In the following, I will try to explain why recognizing this 
interlinkage between the corporation and the state both in history and at 
present would significantly shed some light on current predicament. I will 
argue that what is at stake now is to redefine the relationship between 
the state and the corporation based on a nuanced understanding of their 
complex interactions in society, rather than a simplified public/private 
dichotomy.   
 
Rethinking individualism 
The centrality of the opposition between the public state and the private 
corporation has often been located in the contrasting and incompatible 
moral principles they inherited. In fact, all the social organizations could 
be divided according to these principles: conservative v liberal, public 
good v self-interest, solidarity v progress, moral v money, and democracy 
v economic efficiency, though the question of whether these values are 
really antagonistic never stops generating heated political argument. In 
general, the institution of the private corporation is often regarded as 
representing an opposed social value to that of the public state. The state 
is supposed to cater for the human needs of security and stability both 
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physically and psychologically, helping the individual to sustain his/her life 
in a basic way. It is united by common beliefs, whether these beliefs stem 
from religious or moral principles. Individuals thus are treated as passive 
subjects to political power. Anything original, progressive and competitive 
would not be encouraged (in some senses), as they present challenges to 
the existing harmony and cohesion of the social system.  
 
On the other hand, the most characteristic quality of corporations is 
active self-government, which is grounded in the idea of the importance 
of the individual as free and equal. The corporation generally welcomes 
creativity, progress and evolution, as long as that is admitted by the 
political environment it inhabits. This allows the people to be united but 
still maintain their individual diversity. A new kind of ethics consisting of 
liberty, equality and fraternity is enshrined in the corporation. The very 
human need for collaboration and active self-improvement has led to 
constant innovative applications in the form of corporation, which proved 
to be critical to almost all the major evolutions of human society: 
churches created ecclesiastic corporations to acquire land and appoint 
officials; guilds were founded to regulate local craft and trade; traders 
created merchant companies to pursuit new markets overseas; and 
municipalities were established to govern free urban communities outside 
the traditional feudal system. In this sense, it has been argued that 
modern individualism might be seen to have been inaugurated in 
corporate life long ago, rather than in the nineteenth-century industrial 
revolution as traditionally presumed.634 
 
The word ‗individualism‘ often represents the Enlightenment stress on 
political liberalism, freedom of conscience, individual rights and the 
pursuit of economic self-interest. According to classical liberal 
individualism, a society is the aggregate of individual interests and there 
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is no social or universal interest beyond this. Only individuals have ends 
and those ends prevent the state from imposing collective ends on 
individuals. Therefore, society should be judged by how well it preserves 
the maximum space for permitting individuals to pursue their interests 
without leading to social chaos. It is on this ground that liberalism 
accused socialism as guilty of destroying individuality by promoting a 
paternalistic expansion of the public sector subordinating individual 
initiative to the notion of the equality of groups. Since the question of 
individual freedom is essential to the question of a free society, Noonan 
warns that any socialist strategy that hopes to have any resonance must 
take this criticism of the public/private distinction with the utmost 
seriousness.635  
 
Yet, it is well known that methodological individualism has been 
subjected to sustained criticism. It has been argued that the abstract 
individual, often taken as the basic building block for the purposes of 
social analysis, is a deficient and overly-simplistic conception. The 
conception of the individual provided by classical liberalism is criticized by 
socialism as lacking concrete socio-material difference. Avoiding any 
responsibilities to society, the capitalists conveniently resort to 
individualism to argue that each citizen has to stand on his own feet and 
take care of himself, when the capitalist alone of all individuals is the 
most able to take care of himself. Individualism reduces society to simply 
an aggregate of individuals and idealizes the brutal irresponsible 
criminality of the capitalist. It also wrongly treats collectivities as simply 
aggregates of individuals by ignoring the troubled identities of individuals 
and the constitutive role of society in constructing them. 636 
Communitarian writings, on the other hand, treat individuals as mere 
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artifacts and privilege the significance of collective entities, though they 
have also been criticized as lapsing into collectivist reductionism. 637 
Nevertheless, what is at stake is the question of whether the current 
simplified version of individualism obscures the way in which the 
individual is embedded in the various associations of society.  
 
In order to answer this question, it is important to distinguish 
individualism as a value from individualism as a social mechanism. 638 
Individualism as value was not an invention of the nineteenth century. It 
has its roots in the open and sharp conflict between the Church and the 
Roman lawyers in the medieval period. The ‗individualist-spirit‘-charged 
Roman law had been taught throughout Europe from the thirteenth 
century, replacing the moral influence of the Church with civil power and 
secular law. Writing on the topic of the highly developed property rights 
of women, legal historian FW Maitland argued that England ‗long ago‘ 
had chosen her ‗individualist path‘. 639  Following Maitland, Mcfarlane 
identifies that a key feature of the English socioeconomic structure has 
long been a stress on the rights and privileges of the individual as against 
the wider group or the state, which later has spread all over the world. 
This peculiar individualism is not only reflected in the idea of the 
individual‘s direct communication with God or in the concept of individual 
private property,640 but is also reflected in the economic freedom that is 
inherent in the English common law.641  
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Specifically, in the phase of feudalism, approximately from the eighth 
century to the thirteenth century, England was in a position very similar 
to the rest of Europe, where a large diverse agrarian civilization broke 
into small competing quasi-states, unified under Christianity while 
preserving their differences. It was a period of balanced tension between 
the Church and the State, accompanied by rapid technological, artistic 
and intellectual growth. Commerce was encouraged, as were 
intermediary bodies such as trade guilds and town governments. However, 
in the next 500 years, while everything in continental Europe seemed to 
gravitate upwards (with the exception of Holland), moving towards the 
trapping and mechanisms of absolutism, England somehow escaped this 
centripetal force and managed to maintain a unique devolution of 
power.642 The three great tendencies that swept across most of Europe 
did not occur in England, namely political absolutism and centralization 
with an incontestable ruler above the law, the ecclesiastical infusion into 
the lay authorities, and the stratification in the terms of caste-like birth 
privileges for the ‗nobility‘. At times, there were attempts at monarchical 
aggrandizement, but they either failed or provoked serious reactions, 
such as the Magna Carta and Elizabethan Parliament. There was no large 
central bureaucracy, no standing army and few hired mercenaries. The 
deep conflict between the State and the Church remained, and neither of 
them was strong enough to subdue the other until the Reformation 
placed the individual at the heart of his religion, which finally became a 
private matter excluded from political and economic life. As the country 
grew steadily wealthier, an unusual ‗proto-class system‘ emerged which 
was based on wealth and achieved status rather than the ‗proto-caste or 
estate system‘ of Europe that was based on blood. Instead of the normal 
pattern of a few enormously privileged individuals and a great mass of 
illiterate agrarian producers, in England there was a huge bourgeoisie 
placed at the middle level which enjoyed great fluidity. As Macfarlane 
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concluded, ‗all these are both signs and associated features of the 
absence of the normal tendency for power to corrupt‘.643  
 
Yet it was during the nineteenth century that individualism reached its 
climax in England by emerging as a social mechanism. Individualism in 
this sense is taken to describe a historical reality – that society was 
rapidly becoming highly atomistic in its social organization as a 
consequence of the Industrial Revolution. This new social mechanism 
might be best embodied in the personal experience of the urban 
industrial worker. They used to work at home with the family (kinship 
relations), but now had to engage in impersonal, financial and contractual 
relationships with the factory owners. Industrial workers also found 
themselves involved in various contractual relationships with urban 
landlords and shop owners. This change was famously described by 
Henry Maine as the movement ‗from status to contract‘. 644  However, 
Maine‘s theories of movement of all societies from community to 
association and from status to contract might seriously oversimplify what 
really happened in England. As Atiyah observes, ‗it is commonly the case 
that even the most percipient of men only observe a movement when it 
has virtually run its course.‘645 According to Atiyah, even in Maine‘s time 
the extreme individualism of England had been greatly modified. Atiyah 
also suggests that the creation of new institutions, especially those that 
were formed by the industrialized workers themselves, such as 
combinations or unions, had been intentionally restricted during this age 
in order to suppress worker bargaining power and ward off revolution.646 
Nonetheless, ever since John Stuart Mill‘s attack on Jeremy Bentham‘s 
utilitarianism, which by then was the embodiment of political 
individualism, the weakness of liberal individualism has been identified 
with Bentham‘s narrowly selfish, narrowly rationalist, version of it.  
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Doubts about individualism were prevalent even in the heyday of 
individualism in the nineteenth century. Reflecting upon the failure of the 
French Revolution of 1789, many theorists in this period became very 
critical of the corrosive individualism of the time. Some even argued for a 
restoration of religious and political authorities. The general condolence 
of the disappearance of community, as the mediator between the state 
and the individual, among intellectuals could be observed in the 
nineteenth century. In fact, individualism was already a term of 
opprobrium that had been widely used by the early anti-revolutionary 
conservatives. As the militant Catholic conservative Louis Veuillot wrote:  
The evil which plagues France is not unknown; everyone agrees in 
giving it the same name: individualism … since society is the union of 
minds and interests, and individualism is division carried to the infinite 
degree. All for each, each for all, that is society; each for himself, and 
thus each against all, that is individualism.647  
 
In the nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville predicted the dark future 
of individualism when he wrote:  
After having thus taken each individual one by one into his powerful 
hands, and having molded him as it pleases, the sovereign power extends 
its arms over the entire society; it covers the surface of society with a 
network of small, complicated, minute, and uniform rules, which the 
most original minds and the most vigorous souls cannot break through 
to go beyond the crowd; it does not break wills, but it softens them, 
bends them and directs them; it rarely force action, but it constantly 
opposes your acting; it does not destroy, it prevents birth; it does not 
tyrannize, it hinders, it represses, it enervates, it extinguishes, it 
stupefies, and finally it reduces each nation to being nothing more than a 
flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the 
shepherd.648  
 
The current liberal public/private distinction, however, is precisely built on 
its deep commitment to the ideology of individualism. The abstraction of 
                                        
647  Quoted in George H Smith and Marilyn Moore, Individualism: A Reader (Cato 
Institute 2015) 16.  
648  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (first printed at New York 1838, 
University of Chicago Press 2002) ch 6, ‗What Sort of Despotism Democratic Nations 
Have to Fear‘.  
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the self-interested natural person, premised by individualism, constitutes 
the ontological unit of the liberal discourse, which relies on the 
public/private distinction to restrain the state in order to ensure a free 
society for individual to pursue maximum personal interest. The 
corporation is defined by law as a subject that is analogous to that of a 
natural person, standing against the state. Individualism thus offers the 
ultimate criteria for assessing the functioning of the public/private 
distinction as far as the role of the state in society is concerned. Since the 
liberal public/private distinction is identical to the adoption of 
individualism, and accordingly to the devaluation of community, the 
increasing problem of the public/private distinction thus echoes the 
prevalence of collectivism recently. The increasing disaggregation of the 
state from a unique, unified entity into a loose coalition of independent 
collectivities is undeniable. The problematic character of the 
public/private distinction once again reflects the difficulty in fitting 
corporations into the traditional private legal subject of the individual by 
ignoring the apparent social power they have acquired and the crucial 
role they have played in uniting the society.   
 
Indeed, as Michael Walzer has pointed out, what the dysfunction of the 
public/private distinction has exposed is precisely the failure of the liberal 
theorists in recognizing the real constitutive effect of the public/private 
distinction, or in a more preferred term, ‗the liberal art of separation‘, in 
constructing social reality. 649  Liberal theorists are obsessed with 
individualist version of the public/private distinction, which focuses on 
how to protect freedom and equality of private subjects, namely 
individuals and corporations, from the public force of the state. What they 
failed to realize is that, on the one hand, political tyranny is not the only 
form of tyranny since freedom and equality can also be threatened by 
                                        
649 See Michael Walzer, ‗Liberalism and the Art of Separation‘ (1984) 12 Political Theory 
315. 
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private power via vast wealth and ownership.650 The result is that society 
is currently suffering from the abuse of market power and capitalists.651 
Walzer suggests that the real power of the public/private distinction is 
that it separates society into relatively isolated and autonomous social 
settings, each of which are operating with their own internal logic, 
practices and integrity. In this way, freedom and equality are ensured 
because success in one institutional setting cannot be converted into 
success in another. As he states, ‗this is the socialist form of the old 
liberal hope that individuals secure in their own circles won‘t invade the 
circles of others‘.652  
 
At this point, we might well recall how Tocqueville prescribed the 
decentralized social power as the perfect means to regulate the 
government administration, rather than relying purely on the legal control 
of public law. Struck by the invisibility of administrative power in the 
United States, Tocqueville argued that in a thoroughly decentralized 
democracy (based upon his idealized view of American democracy), the 
administration was difficult to distinguish from other associations and the 
distinction between public and private ultimately disappeared. 653  More 
importantly, in such society, a precious free ‗moeurs‘ would arise, which is 
a precious personal capacity that promoted both self-reliance and the 
habit of free association of all kinds, not only political association but also 
other forms of association, ranging from the industrial and commercial to 
the religious and moral.  
                                        
650  As Walzer has argued, ‗limited government is the great success of the art of 
separation, but that very success opens the way for what political scientists call ―private 
government‖, and it is with the critique of private government that the leftist complaint 
against liberalism properly begins.‘ ibid.    
651 Walzer has identified three ways in which the private power overrides the limits of 
free market: first, radical inequality of wealth results in coerciveness, rendering 
exchanges only ‗formally free‘; second, market power, such as corporate structures, 
generates quasi-government patterns of command and obedience; and thirdly, capital 
(vast wealth and ownership) converts readily into the coercive power of the state. ibid; 
Also see Charles E Lindblom, Politics and Markets (Basic Books 1977), especially ch V.    
652 ibid. 
653 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (first published 1853, Saunders and 
Otley 1840) ch 5.  
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Rather than recovering a socialist conception of individuality, or 
emphasizing the moral worth of the individual by situating it in 
community, what is needed, therefore, is a reconfiguration of the analogy 
between the corporation and the individual. The corporation, perhaps, is 
more similar to the state than to the individual, especially when taking 
those increasing social responsibilities of the corporation into account. 
The traditional laissez-faire has assumed that as long as the market offers 
sufficient alternatives, and all the information about the products and the 
services is open and transparent, the consumer knows how to make the 
best choice. This assumption is increasingly untenable, as the 
improvability of the ‗buying skill‘ of the consumers is in fact rather limited 
due to the complexity and the invisible closeness of many matured 
industries, and in some extreme cases even the safety of the consumer is 
in danger. In addition, the general ‗social conscience‘ of the corporations 
for improving employment, environmental protection and social equality 
have also been the subject of increasing attention. The case for the 
multinational corporations are complicated, as they often bears the extra 
responsibility for reforming developing countries, ranging from economic 
models, democratic institutions and other humanitarian issues.   
 
The essence of corporateness  
If the state and the corporation are of the same genus, as opposite to the 
individual, then what is assumed to be the defining character that shared 
by both of them, and that separates them from the other groups that are 
also consisted by individuals? One might argue that both the state and 
the corporation represent a common ownership of the property, which is 
different from either individual property or organizations without 
collective property. In order words, it is a ‗socialist‘ form of property. But 
this kind of view can be confusing, since once being created both the 
state and the corporation ‗own‘ their properties in their own name, having 
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their rights and duties independent from the founders. And they have the 
separate personalities permanently until their ultimate deaths (if there is 
one). Therefore, simplifying them as a special form of property ownership 
would be a detrimental and pernicious reading of them that not only 
annihilates their existence discursively but also demoralizes their 
personalities. Fortunately, the clue to find the genuine tributes that 
characterize both the state and the corporation could be detected in 
Maitland‘s monumental lectures of Township and Borough.  
 
Township and Borough has become one of those enduring classics that 
many talk but few read. A current resurgent interest in it indicates that 
more than anachronistic value, it bears a grand initiation of some 
pioneering political thoughts in understanding modern state and 
government by visualizing it as a similar form of corporation. The most 
enduring theme of Township and Borough, perhaps could be detected in 
the following passage: 
But, to return to our pastures. Are not ‘the green commons’ of the 
village too common to be owned by a community? Perhaps I put the 
question ill: but in one form or another it should be put, for popular 
expositions of the village community will sometimes leave this question 
in the happy gaze of ‘collective ownership.’ Now I am very ready to 
believe that haze is its native atmosphere, and that, when we have 
plucked it out and inspected it in the modern daylight, we must once 
more tenderly put it back into the medieval muddle. That seems to me a 
work which Dr Gierke has been admirably performing in his fascinating 
book. Only let us know that haze is haze. May be there is an element of 
co-ownership in the case and an element of corporate ownership. May 
be our ancestors did not distinguish the all which is plurality from the all 
which is unity. But we must. If we do not, we ought to applaud the 
common-councillor who says that the property of a municipal 
corporation is bona fide ‘their’ property.654  
 
In an attempt to illustrate the process of urbanization, Maitland has set 
himself to explain the evolution among the townsmen and their 
unprecedented form of unity that inhered in the corporate personality of 
                                        
654 FW Maitland, Township and Borough: The Ford Lectures 1897 (Cambridge University 
Press 2011) 31–32.  
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the township. This new kind of unity, according to Maitland, could be 
observed by tracing the emergence of a series of conceptual dichotomies, 
which included the contrasts between the ‗plurality‘ and the ‗unity‘, 
between the ‗public‘ and the ‗common‘, between dominium and proprietas, 
and finally between the ‗corporate ownership‘ and the ‗collective 
ownership‘ that has been identified in above passage. All of these 
conceptual dichotomies exemplified the inaugurating divergence between 
the two forms of unity, inhered respectively in village and in township: 
they were the form of corporateness and the form of commonness.  
 
In fact these two forms of unity, namely the unity in the form of 
commonness and the unity in the form of corporateness, have already 
co-existed in the medieval communitas, though it proved to be 
exceedingly hard to disengage them clearly. In the village, the element of 
unity was appeared as ‗a mere power of government and regulation‘, 
which embodied in the so-called ‗local authority,‘ an organ of subordinate 
government.655 It is well-know that in England, the term ‗borough‘ has 
been traditionally applied to refer to both incorporated cities and the 
incorporated villages. Yet, it was hard for the village to transform from its 
original kind of unity to the kind of unity that characterized by a 
proprietary corporation. Because, on the one hand, the line between 
public and private has not yet been drawn, nor been felt. On the other 
hand, the village was centered on the lord: Maitland has assumed that if 
the village had become lordless they might perhaps in course of time 
have exhibited some decisive symptoms of corporate unity. But he didn‘t 
think the village would finally evolve into any corporation, as ‗the 
community was too automatic to be autonomous, too homogeneous to 
be highly organized, too deeply immersed in commonness to be clearly 
corporate, too plural to be legal unit, too few to be one.‘656 After all, the 
                                        
655 ibid 33-34.   
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real corporation was no doubt only started in urban life. As Maitland 
wrote, ‗corporateness came of urban life.‘657  
 
Maitland‘s vivid depiction of the corporate elements of the township 
reveals how the ‗business side‘ of the communal life proved to be crucial 
in formulating the ‗corporate‘ kind of unity that differentiated the town 
from the village, such as the debts, the property, the profit and so on. 
Later in another article, he regards this as the focal point in bridging the 
state and the corporation together. As he has argued, the same genus of 
the state and the corporation would reveal itself whenever there is an 
inquiry contemplating at the ‗business side‘ of the state, that is the 
national debts, national property and so on.658 Indeed, it might be well 
recalled how the stocks of the East India Company has been widely 
acquired by the public, and how the Company in turn lent those money 
from the stocks to the government. The liquidation of capital was just 
one of the myriad ways in which the ‗business side‘ of the state might 
interact with the ‗business side‘ of the corporation, and the ‗business side‘ 
of the individual. 
 
Maitland‘s insightful observation continues to be relevance in current 
political life. Reading into Maitland, David Runciman argues that 
recognizing the corporate identity of the state is crucial in explaining the 
nature of the modern welfare state, as it helps to answer the basic 
question of how the state could own anything and how individual has a 
share in it. 659 Indeed, the political theory of state proposed by Maitland is 
                                        
657 ibid. 
658 Frederic W Maitland, ‗Crown as Corporation‘ (1901) 17 LQ Rev. 131.  
659 David Runciman, ‗Is the State a Corporation?‘ (2000) 35 Government and Opposition 
90. However, Runciman argues that recognizing the corporate identity of state has little 
to do with the questions about the role of corporations in political life (political questions 
such as corporatism, or the powers of multinationals). According to him, it is a question 
of whether the state has its own separate identity over and above the identities of its 
separate members. In this sense, although Runciman has claimed to apply Maitland‘s 
understanding of the state in illustrating the nature of the welfare state. He in fact 
identifies Maitland‘s theory as similar to those traditional images of the state that 
depicted by Hobbes and Spinoza, which conceived the state as a ‗body politic‘ in 
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quite visionary. By signifying the importance of financial relationship 
between the state and the people in bonding them together, he proposed 
an unprecedented understanding of the state that is more modern, 
secular, and technical, or borrowing Max Weber‘s term, it is a 
‗disenchanted‘ interpretation of the modern state. For Maitland, this 
financial aspect of the State, or ‗the business side of the State‘, not only 
resembles closely to the operation of the corporation, but also needs the 
decisive and mediate help from the latter in the solidarity and liquidation 
of the financial relationship between the state and the people. What 
Maitland has envisioned and underscored is the inevitable assimilation in 
terms of rationality and the close financial connection between the state 
and the corporation in modern society. And he believes that this would 
require some revolutionary understanding of the modern state by 
recognizing its similarity with the corporations especially by examining 
and comparing their financial sheets. The current problematic of the 
public/private distinction might just be a prelude to the apocalyptic 
overturn of the obsolete individualism that underpins the current 
mainstream understanding of the state‘s role in society. The orthodox 
liberal depiction of the state has long been hidden behind a screen that 
has been supplied by the public/private distinction and individualism. The 
screen, on the one hand, allows it to be immune from a clear 
rationalization and normalization of its financial duties and responsibilities. 
On the other hand, it glorifies the state with various political theories of 
nationalism, mysticism and romanticism of all sorts. At this point, the 
screen is doomed to collapse, as all of these apparently lost their old 
charms and good justifications. 
  
                                                                                                           
possession of a single personality distinct from the separate persons of its sovereign and 
its subject. Also see Thomas Hobbs, Leviathan (first published 1651, Richard Tuck ed, 
Cambridge University Press 1991); Benedic de Spinoza, Political Treatise (trans R. H. M. 
Elwes, Dover Publications 1951). 
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